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THE ANTICANON 
Jamal Greene∗ 
Argument from the “anticanon,” the set of cases whose central propositions all legitimate 
decisions must refute, has become a persistent but curious feature of American 
constitutional law.  These cases, Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. 
New York, and Korematsu v. United States, are consistently cited in Supreme Court 
opinions, in constitutional law casebooks, and at confirmation hearings as prime 
examples of weak constitutional analysis.  Upon reflection, however, anticanonical cases 
do not involve unusually bad reasoning, nor are they uniquely morally repugnant.  
Rather, these cases are held out as examples for reasons external to conventional 
constitutional argument.  This Article substantiates that claim and explores those 
reasons.  I argue that anticanonical cases achieve their status through historical 
happenstance, and that subsequent interpretive communities’ use of the anticanon as a 
rhetorical resource reaffirms that status.  That use is enabled by at least three features of 
anticanonical cases: their incomplete theorization, their amenability to traditional forms 
of legal argumentation, and their resonance with constitutive ethical propositions that 
have achieved consensus.  I argue that it is vital for law professors in particular to be 
conscious of the various ways in which the anticanon is used — for example, to dispel 
dissensus about or sanitize the Constitution — that we may better decide if and when 
those uses are justified. 
INTRODUCTION 
t is a curious feature of American constitutional law that the project 
of identifying the Supreme Court’s worst decisions is not solely a 
normative one.  There is a stock answer to the question, not adduced 
by anyone’s reflective legal opinion but rather preselected by the 
broader legal and political culture.  We know these cases by their peti-
tioners: Dred Scott,2 Plessy,3 Lochner,4 and Korematsu.5  They are the 
American anticanon.  Each case embodies a set of propositions that all 
legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.  Togeth-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  This Article was enabled by the indis-
pensable research assistance of Melissa Lerner, Caitlin Smith, Joanna Wright, Vishal Agraharkar, 
and Tejas Narechania.  For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Akhil Amar, Nicholas 
Bagley, David Bernstein, Justin Driver, Ariela Dubler, Robert Ferguson, Katherine Franke, Su-
zanne Goldberg, Kent Greenawalt, Don Herzog, Bert Huang, Olati Johnson, Gerard Magliocca, 
Henry Monaghan, Elora Mukherjee, Anthony O’Rourke, Richard Primus, Judith Resnik, Barak 
Richman, Dan Rodriguez, Brad Snyder, Stephen Vladeck, Matthew Waxman, the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review, and participants at workshops at American University Washington College 
of Law, Columbia Law School, the University of Michigan Law School, and the University of 
Minnesota Law School.  This Article benefited from the generous support of the Madsen Family 
Faculty Research Fund. 
 2 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 3 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 4 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 5 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
I
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er, they map out the land mines of the American constitutional order, 
and thereby help to constitute that order: we are what we are not. 
The anticanon poses a distinct problem for teachers and students of 
constitutional law.  Professional competence in law is established by 
one’s ability to distinguish strong from weak legal arguments and to 
predict how judges or other relevant legal actors might decide cases or 
resolve controversies.  Most constitutional law courses identify a set of 
materials that students may draw from to perform these tasks with re-
spect to constitutional cases: constitutional text, structure, and history; 
judicial and political precedent; and prudential or policy considera-
tions.6  It is tempting to say that the anticanon constitutes those deci-
sions in which the Court did an especially poor job of navigating and 
synthesizing these traditional materials, and anticanon Courts are fre-
quently accused of just this error.7  As I will show, however, the status 
of a decision as anticanonical does not depend on the magnitude, or 
even the presence, of contemporaneous analytic errors by the deciding 
Court.  Rather, it depends on the attitude the constitutional interpre-
tive community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision 
has come to represent, and the susceptibility of the decision to use as 
an antiprecedent.  These factors might not relate to the decision’s in-
ternal logic.  A professor could explain anticanonical decisions through 
the lens of historicism, but she would not then be indoctrinating her 
students in the norms of professional legal practice; she would not be 
“doing” constitutional law. 
A parallel problem exists with respect to the constitutional canon, 
the set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional ar-
gument must always assume.  Brown v. Board of Education8 is the 
classic example of such a case: all legitimate constitutional decisions 
must be consistent with Brown’s rightness, and all credible theories of 
constitutional interpretation must accommodate the decision.9  And yet 
Brown was inconsistent with longstanding precedent,10 was in tension 
with the original expected application of the Fourteenth Amendment,11 
was not compelled by the text of the Equal Protection Clause,12 and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–119 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–
90, 1194–1209 (1987). 
 7 See sources cited infra note 146. 
 8 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 9 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 675 (1992). 
 10 See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 11 Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Profes-
sor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–1914 (1995). 
 12 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (referring to “findings below that the Negro and white schools 
involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifi-
cations and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors”). 
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has required a Herculean effort — one well beyond the Court’s compe-
tence — to implement comprehensively.13  Justifying Brown in the face 
of all that bad news requires reaching somewhat beyond the tradition-
al tools of constitutional argument.  Still, constitutional law professors 
persevere, and few these days find Brown a hard sell. 
I will argue, though, that the presence of anticanonical decisions in 
textbooks, in syllabi, and as decisional precedents poses a more acute 
problem for constitutional lawyers.  All but the stingiest formalist ac-
cept that constitutional law is not simply constructed from a series of 
doctrinal algorithms, that some decisions reflect the triumph of a par-
ticular community’s ethical values, or nomos; or a judge’s perception 
of moral imperative; or whimsy; or mistake.  And we accept that many 
such decisions, though not produced by the conventional tools of con-
stitutional analysis, may yet become part of the legal fabric and wor-
thy of our respect as precedent, whether because of significant reliance 
interests,14 out of a Burkean prudence that counsels deference to past 
decisions of long standing,15 or indeed because the legal culture’s ac-
ceptance of a case works a kind of informal constitutional amendment 
that acquires democratic purchase.16  It is therefore important to teach 
these cases, commensurate with their doctrinal and political  
significance, and to seek to accommodate them within accepted modes 
of constitutional reasoning — they are, after all, the law. 
But anticanonical cases are not the law; they are its opposite.  
Their holdings cannot reasonably be relied upon, and it is not obvious 
how the law would be any different were they never cited, taught, or 
thought about again.  Yet we cite them, we teach them, and we think 
about them, and it would border on professional malpractice for us not 
to.  This practice is in need of explanation.  Several important articles 
about the constitutional canon also refer to the anticanon as a species 
of canon.17  This Article takes a different approach.  I argue that the 
presence of the anticanon within our constitutional discourse, and its 
particular use in briefs, in cases, and in classrooms, is a distinct phe-
nomenon requiring distinct theoretical treatment. 
For one, as Part I explains, the anticanon differs from the canon in 
that it is both narrower and less contested.  The content of the consti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803–22 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing integration efforts of Seattle and Louisville). 
 14 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 367–69 (2006). 
 16 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47–50 (1991). 
 17 See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Histo-
ricism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2005); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Con-
stitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018–19 (1998); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon 
as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009); Richard A. Primus, 
Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245 (1998). 
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tutional canon depends heavily on the purpose for which it is being 
used — Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have identified a cultural 
literacy canon, a pedagogical canon, and an academic theory canon, 
each with distinct content and each contested in itself.18  By contrast, 
the anticanon likely comprises no more than the four cases I have 
identified, and may comprise just three — Dred Scott, Plessy, and 
Lochner.  Part I substantiates that descriptive claim by canvassing the 
existing secondary literature on anticanonical decisions, examining Su-
preme Court confirmation hearings, studying constitutional law case-
books, and recording the pattern of Supreme Court citation for the 
four cases and for others that might be thought to fall into this catego-
ry.  As the citation study shows, unlike many other negative prece-
dents, the four cases I have identified as anticanonical are frequently 
cited in modern opinions, and three of the four — all but  
Korematsu — are generally cited only as negative authority.  (Kore-
matsu presents a special case that I discuss at the end of Part I.)  These 
four cases are also the only ones that consistently register in each of 
the other measures of anticanonicity. 
Part II explicates the dilemma that I have so far only suggested.  
Namely, anticanonical cases are not distinguished by unusually poor 
reasoning, by special moral failings, or because these problems exist in 
tandem.  This claim will surprise some readers, and so Part II devotes 
some attention to explaining why the traditional tools of constitutional 
analysis — text, structure, history, precedent, and prudential or policy 
considerations — are not sufficient to identify any of the four cases as 
of uniquely low quality.  To assist in making out that “negative” case 
for anticanonicity, I also discuss four other cases — Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania,19 Giles v. Harris,20 Gong Lum v. Rice,21 and Bowers v. Hard-
wick22 — that are particularly poorly reasoned or morally challenged 
but are not, as a descriptive matter, anticanonical. 
Part III reconstructs the anticanon.  Since conventional legal logic 
alone is not dispositive, section III.A uses history to develop a more sa-
tisfying account of how and why the anticanon was formed.  It turns 
out that each of these cases surged in prominence during the Warren 
Court era.  For Dred Scott and Plessy, the evolving consensus around 
the evils of official racial discrimination dramatically elevated their 
rhetorical purchase.  Lochner’s salience as a substantive due process 
precedent owes a debt to Felix Frankfurter, whose admiration for Jus-
tice Holmes led him to emphasize the case out of proportion to its doc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 970–76. 
 19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 20 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 21 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
 22 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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trinal significance.  Korematsu did not, and could not, emerge as anti-
canonical until Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Doug-
las — each of whom played a significant role in the decision — had 
left the Court. 
Section III.B marshals this history in support of a theory of the an-
ticanon.  I conclude that anticanonical cases share three important fea-
tures.  First, these cases are what I call, borrowing from Cass Sunstein, 
incompletely theorized.23  There is consensus within the legal commu-
nity that the cases are wrongly decided but (in part because their ana-
lytic flaws are obscure) there is disagreement, even irreconcilable disa-
greement, as to why.  This feature of anticanon cases is indispensable, 
as it enables multiple sides of contemporary constitutional arguments 
to use the anticanon as a rhetorical trump.  Second, and relatedly, the 
traditional modes of legal analysis arguably support the results in anti-
canon cases.  That is, these cases are, in some formalistic sense, cor-
rect.  To many who have internalized the norms of American constitu-
tional argument, this claim will sound jarring, almost scandalous.  But 
these cases remain alive within constitutional discourse precisely be-
cause their errors are susceptible to repetition by otherwise reasonable 
people.  Third, each case has come to symbolize a set of generalized 
ethical propositions that we have collectively renounced.  The persis-
tent use of anticanonical cases as positive authority for the proposi-
tions that they reject supports the independent significance of ethos-
based argument as a mode of constitutional reasoning.24 
In their classic treatment of the constitutional canon, Balkin and 
Levinson write that professors of law have less control over the con-
tent of the constitutional canon than professors in other disciplines 
have over their own, because legal canons are “largely shaped and con-
trolled by forces beyond their direct control — the courts and the polit-
ical branches.”25  Whether or not this is true of the canon, it seems less 
likely to be true, or true to a lesser degree, of the anticanon.  The 
courts and the political branches necessarily shape the contours of con-
stitutional law by dynamically resolving constitutional cases and con-
troversies.  The precedents those resolutions birth must be accommo-
dated within academic theory because those precedents structure the 
life of the nation.  In contrast, cases that are not good law do not of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735–
36 (1995). 
 24 See Balkin, supra note 17, at 706–11.  See generally BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 93–119 (in-
troducing the concept of ethical argument as a mode of constitutional analysis). 
 25 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 1001.  Balkin and Levinson make this observation 
about the academic theory canon, the set of materials legal academics must know and account for 
in their theories.  Id. at 976, 1001. 
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themselves exercise any coercive authority.  They lie dormant unless 
and until someone resolves to use them for some end. 
Part IV devotes particular attention to the role legal academics play 
in devising and promoting the anticanon.  I argue that law professors 
have more control over the content of the anticanon than over the con-
tent of the canon, and must remain self-conscious about how the anti-
canon is used in constitutional argument.  Depending on how it is con-
textualized, the anticanon may serve to cleanse the Constitution of its 
inequities, smooth the rough edges of historical social conflict, bolster 
the argument for originalist modes of interpretation, or shed light on 
constitutional dissensus.  But the anticanon is not a conceptual certain-
ty, unlike, perhaps, the canon.  Its existence reflects a contingent pro-
fessional practice that must be understood and, ultimately, justified. 
I.  DEFINING THE ANTICANON 
A canon is the set of texts so central to an academic discipline that 
competence in the discipline requires fluency in the texts.  Harold 
Bloom describes a canonical literary text as “a literary work that the 
world would not willingly let die”;26 a canonical work’s indispensabili-
ty is ostensibly a measure of quality, not an opportunity to torture stu-
dents, though it is easy to conflate the two.  After all, most teachers be-
lieve it is important for most students to know what most teachers 
know — this approaches tautology — and the remainder will be 
scolded by parents.  Teacher friends tell me that nothing would spark 
more outrage than to remove To Kill a Mockingbird27 from the  
curriculum. 
I suspect a like reaction would greet me — in this case from my 
adult students — were I to refuse to teach Brown.  Brown, along with 
Marbury v. Madison28 and McCulloch v. Maryland,29 stands for a set 
of essential truths of American constitutional law30: “[T]he doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place”;31 “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”;32 and “we 
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”33  
These are the fixed stars in our constitutional constellation.  Of course, 
Justice Jackson’s famous phrase, from his majority opinion in West 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES 
19 (1994). 
 27 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
 28 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 29 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 30 See Primus, supra note 17, at 252. 
 31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 32 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 33 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
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Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,34 does not describe any 
of those truths, but rather the truth that “no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion.”35  To this we should add that judges should 
specially train on “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” in 
the political process.36  And who can forget that an individual subject 
to custodial interrogation must be informed of his “right to remain  
silent?”37 
I could go on.  A well-turned phrase stating a principle that stands 
the test of time may easily nominate a decision for the constitutional 
canon.  Likewise, broader developments within the society — in Mi-
randa’s case, the migration of its language into popular culture — may 
contribute to a case’s canonization.  The problem in identifying a con-
sensus constitutional canon is that canonical cases generally remain 
good law.  Not all cases that count as good law are included — we 
must remember, it is a canon we are expounding — but, as in litera-
ture, what is included is inevitably subject to contest.  Who is to say, 
after all, which among a set of true judicial statements of the Ameri-
can ethos is the most true, the most central? 
Balkin and Levinson recognize this uncertainty.  They argue that 
there are at least three different legal canons based on “the audience 
for whom and the purposes for which the canon is constructed.”38  
Thus, the pedagogical canon is the set of materials that are “important 
for educating law students”; the academic theory canon constitutes 
those texts that “serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories 
about the law”; and the cultural literacy canon “ensure[s] a necessary 
cultural literacy for citizens in a democracy.”39  Brown comfortably fits 
within all three canons, but a case like McCulloch — always taught 
but rarely written about or discussed in policy circles — may be better 
suited for the pedagogical than for the academic theory or cultural  
literacy canon.40 
The anticanon is different.  In parallel to the canon, it is the set of 
legal materials so wrongly decided that their errors, to paraphrase 
Bloom, we would not willingly let die.  It remains important for us to 
teach, to cite, and to discuss these decisions, ostensibly as examples of 
how not to adjudicate constitutional cases.  Balkin and Levinson have 
described anticanonical cases as those that “any theory worth its salt 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 35 Id. at 642. 
 36 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 37 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966). 
 38 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 970. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. at 974–75. 
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must show are wrongly decided”41 and as “wrongly decided cases that 
help frame what the proper principles of constitutional interpretation 
should be.”42  Others describe the anticanon, or what Mary Anne Case 
has called “anti-precedents,” in similar terms.43  Gerard Magliocca 
calls such cases “examples of a judicial system gone wrong” and “the 
haunted houses of constitutional law — abandoned yet frightening.”44  
Akhil Amar writes that Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner “occupy the 
lowest circle of constitutional Hell.”45 
There is plenty of disagreement over the normative question of 
which cases are the most incorrectly decided, but unlike with the ca-
non, there is remarkable consensus around the descriptive question of 
which decisions the legal community regards as the worst of the worst.  
The pedagogical, academic theory, and cultural literacy canons tend to 
converge on the four decisions I have identified: Dred Scott, Plessy, 
Lochner, and Korematsu.  No other case so consistently acknowledged 
as important to legal education, professional theory and practice, and 
elite cultural literacy is so uniformly acknowledged to have been 
wrongly decided.  This agreement suggests either consensus as to how 
poorly reasoned these cases actually are or consensus as to the status of 
these cases as especially poorly reasoned.  The former is implausible, 
as Part II shows.  The latter is obvious to many who have been ex-
posed to modern legal education, and suggests that much more is afoot 
than traditional legal argumentation. 
As of August 2011, the LexisNexis database contained fifty-four 
U.S. law review articles that referred to an anticanon or to anticanoni-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Id. at 1018. 
 42 J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on “The 
Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1553 (1999); ac-
cord Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 586 (2009).  Balkin also has suggested as an important feature of an anticanonical case that 
legal scholars are willing to say the case was “wrong the day it was decided.”  Balkin, supra note 
17, at 684–90. 
 43 See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Dis-
crimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1469 n.112 (2000); 
Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 
803, 803 n.3 (2004); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA 
L. REV. 587, 590 n.27 (2009). 
 44 Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and 
Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 487 (2002). 
 45 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: BETWEEN THE LINES 
AND BEYOND THE TEXT (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 464) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  Richard Primus offers another definition of the anticanon, as the set of texts 
representing arguments that were rejected by canonical judicial opinions.  Primus, supra note 17, 
at 254.  This definition is idiosyncratic, and reflects little more than a difference in nomenclature.  
Primus acknowledges that the term “anti-canon” may also describe “the set of the most important 
constitutional texts that we, the retrospective constructors of constitutional history, regard as 
normatively repulsive,” which approximates my usage.  Id. at 254 n.41. 
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cal legal texts,46 and an additional seventeen that referred to “antipre-
cedent” or to antiprecedential decisions.  Table A lists, by frequency of 
citation, the fifteen decisions described by the authors of any of these 
seventy-one articles as anticanon or antiprecedent cases: Dred Scott,47 
Plessy,48 Lochner,49 Korematsu,50 Bradwell v. Illinois,51 Dennis v. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 This number excludes articles referring to an anticanon strictly in literature as opposed to 
law, or referring to an anticanon as the opposite of a canon of statutory interpretation. 
 47 See Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an Old Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 141, 174–75 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law 
and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1449 (2001) [hereinafter Balkin, Bush]; Balkin, supra note 42, at 
586; Jack M. Balkin, The Use that the Future Makes of the Past: John Marshall’s Greatness and 
Its Lessons for Today’s Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1326–27 (2002) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Marshall]; Balkin, supra note 17, at 681–82; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 
42, at 1553; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 976, 1018–19; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levin-
son, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 76 (2007) [hereinafter 
Balkin & Levinson, Dred Scott]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial  
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1473 (2005); Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran, The 
Story of Law and American Racial Consciousness: Building a Canon One Case at a Time, 76 
UMKC L. REV. 851, 856 (2008); Case, supra note 43, at 1469 n.112; Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizen-
ship and Family: Revisiting Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 59 n.87 (2008); Daniel A. 
Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust, 1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 496, 496 (2005); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 693–94 (2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Mul-
ti-Valenced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons: An Essay in Honor of 
Mark Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599, 632 n.111 (2008); Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: 
Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 N.Y.U J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 405 (2005); Sanford 
Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitu-
tional? Do We / Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1157; Maglioc-
ca, supra note 44, at 487; Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875, 928 (2003); Primus, supra note 17, at 281–82; Sharon E. Rush, 
The Anticanonical Lesson of Huckleberry Finn, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577, 580 (2002) 
[hereinafter Rush, Anticanonical]; Sharon E. Rush, Identity Matters, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 909, 
928 (2002) [hereinafter Rush, Identity]. 
 48 See Allen, supra note 47, at 174–75; Balkin, Bush, supra note 47, at 1449; Balkin, Marshall, 
supra note 47, at 1326–27; Balkin, supra note 17, at 682; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 
1018; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 41, at 1553; Randy E. Barnett, Clauses not Cases, 115 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 65, 67 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/barnett.html; Bernstein, 
supra note 47, at 1473; Carbado & Moran, supra note 47, at 864; Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitu-
tionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1028 (2011); Crane, supra note 47, at 496; Jus-
tin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 788–90 (2011); Fletcher, supra note 
47, at 693–94; Scott Grinsell, “The Prejudice of Caste”: The Misreading of Justice Harlan and the 
Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 336 (2010); Jackson, supra note 47, 
at 632 n.111; Levinson, supra note 47, at 1157; Magliocca, supra note 47, at 927; Primus, supra 
note 17, at 245–46; Rush, Anticanonical, supra note 47, at 580; Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segre-
gation: Huckleberry Finn in the Modern Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 308 n.11 
(2003); Rush, Identity, supra note 47, at 928;; David J. Seipp, Introduction to Symposium: Loch-
ner Centennial Conference, 85 B.U. L. REV. 671, 673 (2005); Adrienne Stone, Defamation of Pub-
lic Figures: North American Contrasts, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 31 n.109 (2005); Robert L. Tsai, 
Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095, 1146 (2005); Vladeck, supra note 43, at 590 n.27. 
 49 See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics / Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 514 
(1989); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Ackerman, Living Constitution]; Allen, supra note 47, at 174–75; Balkin, supra note 17, at 
682–84; Balkin, Bush, supra note 47, at 1449; Balkin, supra note 42, at 587; Balkin & Levinson, 
supra note 17, at 1018; Bartrum, supra note 17, at 346–47; David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revi-
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United States,52 Johnson v. M’Intosh,53 Buck v. Bell,54 Chisholm v. 
Georgia,55 Goesaert v. Cleary,56 Hoyt v. Florida,57 Minor v. Happer-
sett,58 Muller v. Oregon,59 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,60 and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
sionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 58 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Revisionism, Revised]; Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1473; 
David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 63 (2003) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Legacy]; Case, supra note 43, at 1469 n.112; Crane, supra note 47, at 496; Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1293 n.150 (2007); Fletcher, supra 
note 47, at 693–94; Kens, supra note 47, at 405; Michael Anthony Lawrence, Government as Liber-
ty’s Servant: The “Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner” Standard of Review for All Government 
Restrictions on Liberty Interests, 68 LA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007); Levinson, supra note 47, at 1157; 
Thomas B. McAffee, Overcoming Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and 
Popular Sovereignty Seriously as We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote the Public 
Good, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 597, 599 n.8 (2008); Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and  
Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 643 (2011); Primus, supra note 17, at 245; Jedediah Purdy, 
People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Prop-
erty, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1069 n.64 (2007); Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and 
Lochner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2009); Seipp, supra note 
48, at 673; Stone, supra note 48, at 31 n.109; David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003); Vladeck, supra note 43, at 590 n.27; Howard M. Wasserman, Bart-
nicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 421 
(2006). 
 50 See Allen, supra note 47, at 174–75; Balkin, Bush, supra note 47, at 1449; Balkin & Levin-
son, supra note 17, at 1018; Crane, supra note 47, at 496; Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tolerance: 
Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 22 (2003); Driver, supra 
note 48, at 788–89; John Ip, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5023, 
5038 (2010); John Ip, The Supreme Court and the House of Lords in the War on Terror: Inter Ar-
ma Silent Leges?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 (2010); Jackson, supra note 47, at 632 n.111; Jer-
ry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s Shadow, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 2005, at 255, 275; Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: 
FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1141, 1215 n.314 (2007); Strauss, supra note 49, at 373; Vladeck, supra note 43, at 590 n.27. 
 51 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that barring women from obtaining law licenses does 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause); see Case, supra note 
43, at 1469 n.112; Brian Johnson, Admitting that Women’s Only Public Education Is Unconstitu-
tional and Advancing the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 61 (2002). 
 52 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding, against a First Amendment challenge, a federal conviction 
for advocating the overthrow of the government); see Primus, supra note 17, at 251 n.33; Stone, 
supra note 48, at 31 n.109. 
 53 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (refusing to recognize title to land conveyed by an Indian tribe 
to a private citizen); see Fletcher, supra note 47, at 693–94; Rachel Godsil, Book Review, 27 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 462, 464 (2009). 
 54 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Virginia’s practice of 
sterilizing the mentally retarded); see Allen, supra note 47, at 174–75. 
 55 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction permits a 
citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court); see Primus, supra note 17, at 282. 
 56 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a general prohibition on women’s serving as bartenders); see 
Johnson, supra note 51, at 61. 
 57 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding Florida’s presumptive exclusion of women from jury lists); see 
Johnson, supra note 51, at 61. 
 58 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant wom-
en the right to vote); see Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 
IND. L.J. 1289, 1344 (2011). 
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Prigg v. Pennsylvania.61  Of these fifteen decisions, only seven are 
called anticanon or antiprecedent by more than one author: Dred 
Scott, Plessy, Lochner, Korematsu, Bradwell, Dennis, and M’Intosh.  
Only the first four are called anticanon or antiprecedent by more than 
two authors, and each of those four is so labeled by at least twelve dis-
tinct authors.  Balkin and Levinson, who have done the most work in 
elaborating the anticanon, appear to limit it to these four cases.62  In 
ten articles in which either Balkin or Levinson or both have referenced 
the anticanon or its equivalent, and in multiple editions of the consti-
tutional law casebook they coedit, they have never placed any other 
case in that category.63  It is fair to say that the four cases I have iden-
tified are a class apart. 
 Those seeking to be confirmed as federal judges (and presumably 
their professional handlers) also appear to regard these four cases as 
unusually non gratus.  Responses given at confirmation hearings are 
among the most reliable measures of anticanonicity.  They reflect not 
only the considered view of an accomplished lawyer sufficiently recep-
tive to the norms of American legal practice to have been selected as a 
federal court nominee, but also the collective judgment of an advisory 
legal team comprising both political appointees and career lawyers in 
the White House and the Department of Justice.  Any decision a  
nominee is willing to repudiate is likely to be one that a large number 
of well-informed and politically attuned lawyers believe it safe to repu- 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a maximum hours law for women on the ground that women 
require special legislative protection); see Johnson, supra note 51, at 61. 
 60 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating an unapportioned direct tax on income); see Primus, supra 
note 17, at 282. 
 61 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding, among other things, that the Fugitive Slave Clause is 
self-executing and preempts conflicting state procedural laws); see Barnett, supra note 48, at 67. 
 62 Balkin and Levinson do not, however, believe that the anticanon is limited to cases.  See 
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 1003. 
 63 See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA 
B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 253 (5th ed. 2006); Balkin, 
supra note 17, at 681–85, 688–89, 700–11; Balkin, Bush, supra note 47, at 1449; Balkin, supra note 
42, at 586; Balkin, Marshall, supra note 47, at 1326–27; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 42, at 1553; 
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 976, 1018; Balkin & Levinson, Dred Scott, supra note 47, at 
76; Levinson, supra note 47, at 1157.  In one of those ten articles, Levinson characterizes the Insu-
lar Cases, including, most prominently, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), as “exemplifying 
the anti-canon.”  Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular 
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 244 (2000).  Levin-
son’s usage is whimsical, and differs conceptually from the subject of the present discussion (as 
well as his own usage elsewhere), and so I omit it from my tally.  In another article, Balkin, while 
not using the term “anticanon,” argues that constitutional scholars use Prigg, along with Dred 
Scott, as “litmus tests for the worth of their theories and as means of attacking competing theo-
ries.”  J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1703, 1710 (1997). 
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TABLE A: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 
IDENTIFYING CASES AS ANTICANONICAL 
 
Case Articles 
Distinct     
Authors 
Lochner v. New York 28 22 
Plessy v. Ferguson 25 19 
Dred Scott v. Sandford 22 15 
Korematsu v. United States 13 12 
Bradwell v. Illinois 2 2 
Dennis v. United States 2 2 
Johnson v. M’Intosh 2 2 
Buck v. Bell 1 1 
Chisholm v. Georgia 1 1 
Goesaert v. Cleary 1 1 
Hoyt v. Florida 1 1 
Minor v. Hapersett 1 1 
Muller v. Oregon 1 1 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. 1 1 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania 1 1 
  
diate.64  The confirmation process, moreover, is an opportunity for 
translation between legal and political forms of argumentation.  It is 
enabled by its trade in symbols, with a nominee’s willingness to affirm 
or deny particular propositions standing in for a wider range of  
substantive views.  Canonical and anticanonical cases, with their out-
sized symbolism, are vital to this process.  As Michael Dorf writes, 
“We hear nominees uniformly praising or accepting as settled those de-
cisions widely regarded as canonical, while invoking anti-canonical 
cases as illustrations of the proposition that sometimes the Court must 
overrule its own precedents.”65  The hearing is a bellwether, and no-
minees’ responses to committee questioning reliably reflects, as David 
Strauss puts it, “the mainstream of American constitutional law  
today.”66 
For that reason, a research assistant and I examined the written 
transcript of each of the thirty-two Supreme Court confirmation hear-
ings in which the nominee testified openly and without restriction.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 Cf., e.g., Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 220 (1987)  
[hereinafter Kennedy Hearing] (statement of then–Judge Anthony M. Kennedy) (“I have been ra-
ther cautious about going through a list of cases that I agree with and disagree with.”). 
 65 Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox Is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 521–22 (2007). 
 66 Strauss, supra note 49, at 373.  
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This list includes every hearing since that of John Marshall Harlan II 
in 1955, plus the 1939 hearing of Felix Frankfurter and the 1941 hear-
ing of Robert Jackson.  We recorded every instance in which the  
nominee arguably asserted or affirmed that a previously decided Su-
preme Court case was decided wrongly.  As table B indicates, through 
thirty-two hearings over seven decades, and despite numerous invita-
tions,67 there are only six cases that any successful Supreme Court  
nominee has asserted were wrongly decided: Dred Scott, Plessy, Loch-
ner, Korematsu, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,68 and Bradwell.  Only 
the first four of these six have been repudiated in open testimony by 
multiple nominees, and each of those four has been disavowed by at 
least four nominees.69 
In addition to explicit recognition as anticanonical in legal academ-
ic literature and implicit recognition at confirmation hearings, a deci-
sion’s treatment in casebooks might reflect dominant pedagogy, and 
therefore provide an additional measure of anticanonicity.  In 1992, 
and again in 2005, political scientist Jerry Goldman set out to deter-
mine whether there is a constitutional canon by studying the treatment 
of cases in eleven textbooks used widely in undergraduate courses in  
constitutional law.70  Goldman constructed an index comprising “prin- 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 For example, senators asked then-Judge John Roberts whether he agreed with the Court’s 
decisions in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Ply-
ler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 
(1992).  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 154, 241, 167, 
188–89, 207, 223–24, 261, 301–02, 391, 414 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing].  Roberts testified 
at the hearing that he would not “agree or disagree with particular decisions,” id. at 143, but as 
Table B shows, he in fact said he disagreed with Plessy, Dred Scott, Lochner, and Korematsu.   
 68 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage law for women and children in the Dis-
trict of Columbia). 
 69 At his 1987 confirmation hearing, Judge Robert Bork criticized the reasoning of Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971).  See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 113–14, 155, 156–57, 
253, 286–87, 347–49, 711–12, 749–51 (1987).  These cases are not only non-anticanonical but are 
arguably part of the constitutional canon.  Judge Bork’s failure points up the risk in saying that 
any case is poorly reasoned at a confirmation hearing, even those cases whose intellectual under-
pinnings have long been criticized by both liberals and conservatives within the legal academy.  
Bork tried to separate questions of faulty analysis from questions of faulty results, and his fate 
suggests that the discourse around canonical and anticanonical cases tends to conflate the two 
inquiries. 
 70 Goldman initially reviewed twelve casebooks, but he chose to bracket one of them because 
it focused exclusively on individual rights rather than structure.  See Jerry Goldman, Is There a 
Canon of Constitutional Law?, 2 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 134, 134–35 (1992). 
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TABLE B: DISAVOWALS IN CONFIRMATION  
HEARING TESTIMONY 
 
Case Hearing(s)
Plessy Alito (2006); Roberts (2005); Thomas (1991); Souter 
(1990); Kennedy (1987); Rehnquist (1986)71 
Dred Scott Roberts (2005); Ginsburg (1993); Thomas (1991);  
Kennedy (1987)72 
Lochner Roberts (2005); Ginsburg (1993); Thomas (1991);  
Rehnquist (1971)73 
Korematsu Sotomayor (2009); Alito (2006); Roberts (2005);  
Ginsburg (1993)74 
Adkins Rehnquist (1971)75
Bradwell Thomas (1991)76
 
cipal” cases, defined as any whose excerpt was not paraphrased and 
that was typographically identified in the same way as other key cases 
in the book.  “Operationally,” Goldman writes, “I searched for text en-
tries that began: ‘Justice X delivered the Opinion of the Court’ or lan-
guage to that effect.”77  As Richard Primus has noted, of the ten cases 
included in every one of the eleven casebooks Goldman reviewed in 
1992, only one — Lochner — is never cited for its positive legal au-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 71 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 379, 440, 462, 530, 601 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing]; Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, 
at 204; Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 469 (1991) [hereinafter 
Thomas Hearing]; Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 303 (1990); Kenne-
dy Hearing, supra note 64, at 149; Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 136–38 
(1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist Hearing]. 
 72 Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, at 180; Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 103d Cong. 126, 270 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearing]; Thomas Hearing, supra note 
71, at 464; Kennedy Hearing, supra note 64, at 175. 
 73 Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, at 162, 408; Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 72, at 271; Tho-
mas Hearing, supra note 71, at 115, 241; Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 159 (1971) [hereinafter Rehn-
quist and Powell Hearings]. 
 74 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 117 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Hearing]; Alito Hearing, supra note 71, at 418; Ro-
berts Hearing, supra note 67, at 241; Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 72, at 210, 247. 
 75 Rehnquist and Powell Hearings, supra note 73, at 159.  
 76 Thomas Hearing, supra note 71, at 202. 
 77 Id. 
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thority.78  In a follow-up study that relaxed some of the standards for 
inclusion, Goldman added twelve cases to this list.79  Only two of these 
additional cases, Dred Scott and Plessy, are even arguably  
anticanonical. 
With the help of a research assistant, I conducted a comparable ex-
periment using casebooks commonly assigned in law school constitu-
tional law courses.  Like Goldman, I was interested only in those cases 
that received substantive treatment in each casebook, not with every 
case that appeared in whatever context.80  Of the twenty-two principal 
cases that appeared in all ten casebooks, the only two the modern legal 
culture generally treats as error are Lochner and Plessy.81  Of the sixty 
principal cases that appeared in nine of the ten casebooks, only two 
additional cases are treated as error: Korematsu and Hammer v. Da-
genhart.82  Dred Scott appears as a principal case in six of the ten  
casebooks. 
 Table C indicates the ten books selected and indicates whether each 
book treats each of eight potential anticanonical cases — Dred Scott, 
Plessy, Lochner, Korematsu, Bradwell, Dennis, Adkins, and Buck — as 
a principal case.  As the table shows, Bradwell is a principal case in 
only four casebooks, and Buck is a principal case in only three.  In 
contrast, Dennis and Adkins each receives significant coverage, with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 Primus, supra note 17, at 243–44. 
 79 Jerry Goldman, The Canon of Constitutional Law Revisited, 15 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 
648, 650 (2005). 
 80 My definition of a principal case was somewhat broader than Goldman’s.  Although I did 
require that some part of the opinion be verbatim rather than paraphrased or that the case be ty-
pographically similar to other principal cases in the book, I did not require that the casebook’s 
treatment of a case begin with language so indicating. 
 81 The other twenty cases are United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Of these cases, 
the decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases comes in for the most criticism: many constitutional 
scholars believe that the Court improperly failed to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as applying the Bill of Rights to state and local action.  See  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029–30 (2010).  This is not a universal view with-
in the academy, however.  See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 61 (2011) (arguing that the purpose of the clause was to extend Comity Clause rights to free 
blacks).  And as the Court recently affirmed in McDonald, the decision in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases remains good law.  131 S. Ct. at 3030–31. 
 82 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not authorize a federal ban on 
interstate commerce in the products of child labor). 
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the former case listed in eight of the ten books and the latter listed in 
seven.  Section II.B discusses a “shadow” anticanon of four cases — 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Giles v. Harris, Gong Lum v. Rice, and Bowers 
v. Hardwick — that are poorly reasoned and morally disturbing but 
are not part of the anticanon.  The first two of these cases — Prigg 
and Giles — each appears as a principal case in two of the ten case-
books.  Gong Lum is a principal case in none of the ten books, and 
Bowers is a principal case in eight of the ten.  Given that Bowers was 
decided just twenty-five years ago, this makes some sense, but as I dis-
cuss in section III.B, it is a surer indication that Bowers is not yet fully 
disavowed than that it is part of the anticanon.  
 
TABLE C: PRINCIPAL CASES IN SELECTED TEXTBOOKS 
 
 Scott Plessy Lochner Korematsu 
SSSTK83     
C84     
SG85     
BLBAS86     
VCA87     
CFKS88     
M89     
B90     
FEF91     
R92     
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2009). 
 84 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009). 
 85 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (17th ed. 
2010). 
 86 BREST ET AL, supra note 62. 
 87 JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 2009). 
 88 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 
(9th ed. 2001). 
 89 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 90 RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT (2008). 
 91 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th 
ed. 2009). 
 92 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 2009). 
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TABLE C (CONTINUED) 
 
 Bradwell Dennis Adkins Buck 
SSSTK     
C     
SG     
BLBAS     
VCA     
CFKS     
M     
B     
FEF     
R     
 
 We can now say that Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu 
each presents a compelling case for placement within the anticanon.  
Each decision has been rejected by our legal culture, but all are suffi-
ciently significant that legal academics confer special status upon them 
within the literature on antiprecedents; Supreme Court nominees be-
lieve they will curry favor with senators and the public by declaring 
them to be reliably bad law; and casebook authors assume that law 
professors should assign them to students.  A handful of additional 
cases are candidates for similar status, though none are “successful” on 
all of our criteria.  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital was specifically dis-
avowed by one Supreme Court nominee93 and appears frequently as a 
principal case in constitutional law textbooks but seems never to have 
been recognized as an antiprecedent in other academic writings.  Den-
nis v. United States is mentioned more than once in discussions of an-
tiprecedent within the law reviews94 and is considered significant by 
casebook authors, but it has escaped negative discussion at confirma-
tion hearings.  Bradwell v. Illinois also has received attention from law 
review authors, but it does not appear to be part of the “pedagogical” 
anticanon.95 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 See supra p. 393. 
 94 See supra pp. 388–89. 
 95 Bradwell presents an example of a decision that is anticanonical within certain  
subcommunities but is not universally deprecated within the larger constitutional culture.  See 
infra p. 470.  Women’s rights advocates who speak in the language of legal precedent are inti-
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Having narrowed the possibilities, we can attempt an additional, 
and quite significant, test of anticanonicity: citation in Supreme Court 
cases.  We should not expect anticanonical cases to be cited in Su-
preme Court opinions except negatively, that is, in order to point out 
flaws in an argument the opinion seeks to reject.  We should also ex-
pect that those cases that are in fact frequently cited negatively are 
strong candidates for the anticanon.96  This feature of the anticanon 
knows no parallel in the canon.  Cases that the Court frequently cites 
positively are necessarily important to its work, but the fact of exten-
sive positive citation may tell us no more than that the case contains 
the first, last, or most cogent statement of some legal proposition either 
foundational to or decisive within a large number of cases.  Craig v. 
Boren,97 the first case to apply intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimina-
tion, was cited in an average of 2.4 decisions per Term between the 
1976 and 2010 Terms of the Supreme Court, but to say it is therefore 
part of the canon would make the canon unworthy of any special in-
terest or attention.  By contrast, Court citation, because so often gra-
tuitous, is the feature of anticanonical cases that makes them most  
interesting.98 
Figures A and B graphically demonstrate the pattern of citation in 
the Supreme Court, by decade, for ten majority opinions.99  Figure A 
contains citation statistics for the four cases that I argue are in the an-
ticanon.  Figure B contains statistics for Adkins, Dennis, Bradwell, 
and three of the four cases in the “shadow” anticanon discussed in sec-
tion II.B — Prigg, Giles, and Bowers.100  The figures separate “nega-
tive” from “positive” citations.  A negative citation indicates that the 
opinion is cited to support a proposition that the citing judge believes 
is inconsistent with the cited decision.  A positive citation indicates 
that the opinion is cited to support a proposition that is consistent with  
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
mately familiar with Bradwell, just as legally attuned gay rights advocates have long considered 
the wrongness of Bowers v. Hardwick to be self-evident. 
 96 Certainty as to the completeness of my list of anticanonical cases might therefore require an 
analysis of the general pattern of citation of every case the Court has ever cited.  I leave this re-
search to (very) interested readers.  As discussed, I believe the identity of the anticanon to be near-
ly axiomatic, and so incomplete proof is no discomfort. 
 97 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 98 It is for this reason that judicial citation does not make out a fourth “canon” to accompany 
the pedagogical, academic, and cultural literacy canons.  Citation is not an interesting feature of 
the canon, but without citation, a case cannot be part of the anticanon.  (Alternatively, if citation 
is not a feature of the anticanon, then the anticanon is no longer interesting.)  See infra pp. 403-04. 
 99 The citation count excludes citations to dissenting or concurring opinions but includes dis-
sents and concurrences as citing sources. 
 100 I omit a figure for Gong Lum, which is cited only neutrally in subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions. 
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FIGURE A: POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE  
SUPREME COURT CITATIONS — STRONG CANDIDATES 
 
the cited decision.  The figure excludes “neutral” citations, defined as 
those discussions of a case that are meant neither to criticize nor to 
support any particular claim.  Typically, “neutral” citations occur in 
the course of historical discussion that is tangential to the normative 
arguments at issue in the citing case. 
 Figure A shows that three of the four principal candidates for the 
anticanon — Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner — have been cited nega-
tively far more frequently than positively over the last half century.  
For reasons I explore in Part III, a strong pattern of negative citation 
does not begin for any of the three cases until the 1960s.  The clear 
outlier among the four is Korematsu, which has been cited positively 
far more than negatively.  Over the last several decades, the over-
whelming majority of these positive citations have been in support of 
the proposition that governmental racial classifications receive strict 
scrutiny from reviewing courts. 
 Of the other candidate anticanon cases, only Adkins, Dennis, and 
Bowers have been cited with any frequency in recent decades.  Even 
so, negative citation of Adkins is appreciably lower than for Dred 
Scott, Plessy, and Lochner.  Dennis and Bowers, like Korematsu, have 
received more positive than negative citation. 
The citation pattern for Korematsu is surprising.  By the criteria al-
ready discussed, it presents a strong case for sharing the status of Dred 
Scott, Plessy, and Lochner.  Notably, each of the last four nomi- 
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FIGURE B: POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE  
SUPREME COURT CITATIONS — WEAK CANDIDATES 
 
nees to receive a Supreme Court confirmation hearing, and five of the 
last six, stated either in live testimony or in their written question-
naires that Korematsu was either wrongly decided or, according to 
Elena Kagan, “poorly reasoned.”101  The decision has not been over-
ruled by the Supreme Court, but a district court vacated Fred Kore-
matsu’s conviction on a writ of coram nobis in litigation brought in 
1983.102  In that litigation, the government did not formally confess er-
ror, but it refused to oppose Korematsu’s petition, on the ground that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 472 (2010); see Soto-
mayor Hearing, supra note 72, at 117; Alito Hearing, supra note 71, at 418; Roberts Hearing, su-
pra note 67, at 241; Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 72, at 210, 247. 
 102 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
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the statute of conviction “has been soundly repudiated.”103  The gov-
ernment noted that Executive Order 9066, under which Korematsu 
was ordered evacuated and detained, could not be issued today with-
out prior congressional authorization due to the Non-Detention Act of 
1971.104  For his part, Korematsu relied on the findings of the 1982 
Report of the Commission of Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians, which concluded that “a grave injustice”105 was done to 
those interned and that “today the decision in Korematsu lies overruled 
in the court of history.”106  The government agreed with that assess-
ment in its filings,107 and Congress officially apologized for the intern-
ment108 and allocated more than $1.6 billion in reparations in 1988.109     
These events might well have influenced citing courts.  As indi-
cated in Figure B, citation to Korematsu has been fairly balanced  
between positive and negative since the 1970s.  More dramatically, 
discussion of Korematsu has been conspicuously absent from recent  
detention-related litigation before federal appellate courts.  Formally, 
Korematsu should be a valuable precedent for the government in  
its prosecution of the war on terror, given its outsized deference to  
executive power.  Yet it appears that at no time since September 11 
has any U.S. government lawyer publicly used the Korematsu deci- 
sion as precedent in defending executive detention decisions.110  That 
claim relies on a survey of every publicly available Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) opinion since September 11 and the merits brief- 
ings and published opinions in ten detention-related cases to reach  
the Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeals during  
that period: Rasul v. Bush;111 Rumsfeld v. Padilla;112 Hamdi v.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 103 Id. at 1413. 
 104 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006); see Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1413. 
 105 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417.  
 106 Id. at 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 953, 993 (2002). 
 107 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
 108 Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1989 (2006).  More recently, then-Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal referred to former Solici-
tor General Charles Fahy’s defense of the relocation and internment program as a “mistake[].”  
Tracy Russo, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American 
Internment Cases, THE JUSTICE BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/1346. 
 109 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-3 (2006). 
 110 Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 193 (2010) (“[I]t is hard to 
conceive of any future Court referring to [Korematsu] favorably or relying on it.”). 
 111 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the statutory grant of authority for federal district courts 
to hear habeas cases extends to applications from foreign nationals held at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba). 
 112 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (dismissing, on jurisdictional grounds, a case filed by a U.S. citizen chal-
lenging his military detention as an enemy combatant). 
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Rumsfeld;113 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld;114 Bismullah v. Gates;115 Boume-
diene v. Bush;116 Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli;117 Munaf v. Geren;118 Al Ma-
qaleh v. Gates;119 and Al-Bihani v. Obama.120 
The majority opinion in Korematsu is cited just once in the merits 
briefs of any of these cases, when the petitioner’s reply brief in Al 
Odah v. United States121 (the companion case of Rasul) unselfcons-
ciously cites the opinion as an example of the Court’s rejection of 
claims of unreviewable executive authority.122  Jose Padilla’s merits 
brief before the Supreme Court avoids reference to the binding 
precedent in Korematsu but refers to the district court decision on 
Fred Korematsu’s writ of coram nobis as an example of a case in 
which “the Government has misled the courts.”123  No publicly availa-
ble OLC opinion since September 11 has made any mention of Kore-
matsu.  Those opinions include the memo signed by Jay Bybee assert-
ing that any reading of the statutory prohibition on torture that 
interfered with the President’s conduct of a military campaign would 
be unconstitutional.124  Even though that memorandum argues that “it 
is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding executive authority to detain indefinitely a U.S. citizen who 
was accused of being an enemy combatant and held in the United States after capture on foreign 
soil, but requiring that he be afforded due process). 
 114 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating the Bush Administration’s system of military tribunals as 
in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions). 
 115 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (entering a protective order governing court and detainee law-
yer access to evidence in reviewing enemy combatant determinations of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal). 
 116 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that under the Constitution the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus extends to foreign nationals held at Guantánamo Bay and that the administrative  
tribunals in place did not serve as an adequate substitute). 
 117 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding executive authority to detain 
as an enemy combatant a lawful resident alien arrested at his home in the United States but find-
ing that petitioner had not been provided with a sufficient opportunity to contest his designation). 
 118 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (holding that the habeas statute extends to U.S. citizens held abroad by 
the U.S. military operating under a U.S. chain of command but that the statute does not authorize 
an injunction against release to foreign authorities for prosecution under foreign law). 
 119 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not 
extend to foreign nationals held by U.S. forces at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan). 
 120 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding the extension of authority to detain Al Qaeda- or 
Taliban-affiliated individuals not accused of direct hostilities against U.S. forces and holding that 
international law does not constrain that authority). 
 121 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 122 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11 n.27, Al Odah, 542 U.S. 466 (No. 03-343), 2004 WL 
768555, at *12.  
 123 Brief for Respondent at 44 n.33, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 
2004 WL 812830, at *44.  
 124 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 2 (Aug. 1, 2002).  
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against the enemy,”125 it does not cite Korematsu, which is perhaps the 
most direct precedent for that proposition. 
Of all the appellate opinions issued in any of these cases, the only 
published opinions to refer to Korematsu single it out as a case to be 
avoided.  Thus, in dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in 
Hamdi, Judge Motz warned of “the lesson of Korematsu,” a case whose 
holding “history has long since rejected.”126  In reply, Judge Wilkinson 
asserted that “[t]here is not the slightest resemblance of a foreign bat-
tlefield detention to the roundly and properly discredited mass arrest 
and detention of Japanese-Americans in California in Korematsu.”127  
It is fair to say that Korematsu is almost uniformly recognized by se-
rious lawyers and judges to be bad precedent, indeed so bad that its 
use by one’s opponent is likely to prompt a vociferous and public 
denial. 
Before we start to understand why and how Dred Scott, Plessy, 
Lochner, and Korematsu have come to constitute the anticanon, it is 
worth noting that the anticanon need not be limited to court cases.  
Historical statutes that have been disavowed might, for example, qual-
ify.  In New York Times v. Sullivan,128 in which the Court erected con-
stitutional barriers to libel liability, one of the most significant “prece-
dents” discussed was the Sedition Act of 1798,129 which Justice 
Brennan used to affiliate the majority’s position with James Madison’s 
arguments in the Virginia Resolutions.  “Although the Sedition Act 
was never tested in this Court,” Brennan wrote, “the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court of history.”130  We can also 
imagine political documents other than statutes becoming notorious in 
the style of an anticanonical judicial decision.  The Southern Manifes-
to, a resolution signed by nearly the entire Southern congressional del-
egation and pledging resistance to the Court’s decision in Brown,131 
could in theory play a role not unlike the role played by Plessy: as a 
foil to the principles assumed to be universally accepted in Brown I,132 
Brown II,133 or Cooper v. Aaron.134  Courts have not used the South-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 Id. at 38. 
 126 337 F.3d 335, 375 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 127 Id. at 344 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). 
 128 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 129 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
 130 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276; see also id. at 274–76. 
 131 102 CONG. REC. 4459–60 (1956). 
 132 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 133 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 134 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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ern Manifesto in this way, however, as only two published federal 
court decisions have referred to it.135 
A perhaps more common use of something like an antiprecedent is 
what Kim Lane Scheppele calls “aversive” reference to the practices of 
foreign courts or institutions in the course of constitutional drafting 
and interpretation.136  Reference to the ideas or values of Nazi Ger-
many or apartheid South Africa are ready ways to signal disgust with 
an opponent’s position and to put her on the defensive.  Recall, for ex-
ample, Justice Stevens’s identification, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,137 of 
government racial assignment with “precedents such as the First Regu-
lation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935.”138  David 
Fontana has catalogued numerous instances in which the Supreme 
Court has deployed what he calls “negative comparativism,” often used 
to associate challenged domestic practices with apartheid, or to invoke 
totalitarian regimes in cases dealing with rights of free speech or free 
expression.139 
Reference to disavowed statutes or to offensive foreign practices 
has much in common with use of anticanonical cases, but is less inter-
esting than citation of the anticanon.  Argument by negative example 
is a common feature of our political and social discourse, and we 
should not expect judges to disclaim the rhetorical resources used to 
valuable effect by others.  But citation to the anticanon can be prob-
lematic in a legal system wed to stare decisis.  Judges in the United 
States, including judges in constitutional cases, are embedded within a 
common law tradition of incremental policymaking through the slow 
accretion of a body of principles, standards, and rules that we collec-
tively call “the law.”140  That process demands more of resort to 
precedent than do other discourses.  Common law decisionmaking de-
rives its sustenance from the artful and appropriate use of analogy, and 
we assume that judges in such systems cite cases for reasons internal 
to the analysis contained therein.  If precedent is used in some other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 135 See Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 967 (D.S.C. 1995); Henderson v. Bd. of Supervisors 
of Richmond Cnty., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16729, at *31 (E.D. Va. July 27, 1988). 
 136 Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 300–01 
(2003). 
 137 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 138 Id. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 139 David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 551 
n.59 (2001). 
 140 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996) (arguing that a common law approach provides the best explanation and justifi-
cation for American constitutional practice). 
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way, we should want desperately to have a sense of its prevalence, its 
potential, and its limitations.141 
II.  DEFENDING THE ANTICANON 
The claims a legal culture makes about past cases tend to be his-
toricist in nature.  The meaning we ascribe to legal precedents is de-
termined not at the time of decision, but over time by subsequent 
normative communities.142  This is as true of the anticanon as it is of 
the canon and indeed of cases outside the canon.  And yet it is com-
mon practice to describe anticanonical cases not in terms of cultural 
evolution but in terms of analytic errors that should have been obvious 
at the time.  As Balkin notes, we like to believe that such cases were 
wrong the day they were decided.143  In criticizing Elena Kagan’s de-
fense of precedent at her confirmation hearing, Senator Tom Coburn 
said that if precedent could trump original intent, “then we would 
have never had [Brown], and [Plessy] would still be the law.”144  John 
Roberts suggested something similar at his confirmation hearing in 
2005, arguing that Brown “is more consistent with the 14th Amend-
ment and the original understanding of the 14th Amendment than 
[Plessy].”145 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 This discussion raises the question of whether other constitutional systems have their own 
“anticanons.”  That question exceeds this Article’s scope, but two possible examples come to 
mind.  The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian commentators sometimes frame debates 
over constitutional interpretation through a dichotomy between the “living tree” approach  
symbolized by the “Persons” Case, Edwards v. Att’y Gen. of Can., [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal 
taken from Can.), and the “frozen concepts” approach associated with, for example, the Labour 
Conventions Case, Att’y Gen. of Can. v. Att’y Gen. of Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from Can.).  See, e.g., In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 698 para. 20–26 (Can.).  The Labour Conventions Case is not, however, used as a negative 
example in Canadian discourse to nearly the same degree as a case like Lochner or Dred Scott is 
used in the United States.  In fact, as Sujit Choudhry has documented, the Lochner decision itself 
performs similar work within Canada — and within several other foreign constitutional dis-
courses — as it does in the United States.  See Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative 
Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 3–4 (2004).  A second example is India.  Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta has said of Jabalpur v. Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (India), in which the Supreme Court 
of India upheld Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency against a constitutional chal-
lenge, that it is “now unanimously regarded as one of the worst [decisions] in Indian judicial his-
tory.”  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 70, 73 (2007). 
 142 See Balkin, supra note 17, at 679. 
 143 See supra note 42. 
 144 Julie Percha, Sen. Coburn: Kagan ‘Ignorant’ of Constitutional Principles;  
‘I Wouldn’t Rule Out a Filibuster,’ THE NOTE, ABC NEWS (June 30, 2010, 2:12 PM), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2010/06/sen-coburn-kagan-ignorant-of-constitutional-principles-
i-wouldnt-rule-out-a-filibuster.html. 
 145 Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, at 204; cf. The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor 
of Arizona to Serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 66, 84 (1981) (stating that the Brown Court had 
determined that Plessy violated the original intent of the Equal Protection Clause). 
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They are not alone.  Commentators frequently accuse the Courts 
that decided Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu of defective 
reasoning, often in harsh terms.146  This practice is more common 
among politicians and judges than among academics, who often tend 
toward dissent, but as this Part will show, legal scholars are hardly 
immune from associating anticanonicity with their preferred analytic 
defect.  The burden for these commentators is not simply to show that 
the deciding Courts committed analytic errors, but also to show that 
those errors were so monumental, indeed historic, that the cases must 
be burned in effigy for all to bear witness.  This Part shows that they 
cannot meet this burden.  Section A argues that none of the four anti-
canon cases is unusually wrong, either by contemporaneous legal stan-
dards or by the conventional forms of legal argument that remain 
popular today.  Moreover, although all of the anticanonical cases can 
be accused of moral failings of varying magnitudes, section B shows 
that those failings are inadequate to justify their modern-day  
treatment. 
A.  The Anticanon’s Errors 
There are errors and there are damned errors.  We can imagine, in 
principle, how to construct each category as it relates to judicial re-
view.  Ordinary errors are good faith mistakes of judgment, with  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See, e.g., Thomas Hearing, supra note 71, at 464 (“I think [Chief Justice Taney in Dred 
Scott] should have . . . read the Constitution and attempted to discern what the Founders meant 
in drafting the Constitution.”); ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CON-
STITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 101 (1960) (calling Plessy “a compound of 
bad logic, bad history, bad sociology, and bad constitutional law”); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE 
PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 4 (1987) (noting one scholar’s charac-
terization of Plessy as “one of the most irrational opinions ever announced” (quoting Ralph T. 
Jans, Negro Civil Rights and the Supreme Court, 1865–1949, at 199 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University of Chicago)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 869–70 (2010) (calling the Dred Scott Court’s citizenship holding “incredible” and “mon-
strous,” calling its Fifth Amendment holding a “wild claim” and “utterly implausibl[e] as a matter 
of the actual meaning of the text of the Constitution,” and calling the case generally an “atrocious 
misinterpretation of the Constitution”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term —  
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 62 (2000) (calling Chief Justice 
Taney’s view that free blacks could not be citizens “an outlandish reading of the [Constitution]”); 
Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19, 21 (2003) (call-
ing Lochner “an abomination” that was not “based on a reasonable interpretation of the Constitu-
tion”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor 
Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1997) (“I think the general con-
sensus of our tradition has been that in cases like Dred Scott and Plessy the Supreme Court gave 
too much weight to the background social practices of the time and not enough weight to text, to 
founding commitments, and to things that have been constitutionalized.”); see also Paul Finkel-
man, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2007) (discussing the ways in which diverse constituencies have used Dred 
Scott as “a symbol of mistakes made by the Court”). 
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manageable consequences, the commission of which forms a central 
attribute of the human condition.  A judge who respects the conven-
tional tools of legal analysis and remains in role but simply arrives at 
the legally incorrect result deserves, on sober reflection, our sympathy 
more than our anger.  He is not, after all, the judge who recklessly or 
intentionally disregards an important input into the process of judicial 
decisionmaking, or harbors delusions of political grandeur, or is unfor-
givably narrow-minded or incompetent.  Conceptually, it seems as if 
the errors committed by this second type, often identifiable at the time 
of decision, should be the ones for which we reserve our deepest and 
most consistent condemnation.  This section seeks to demonstrate that, 
with respect to Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu, this is not 
so.  The degree to which we collectively renounce these decisions is not 
nearly in proportion to the outrageousness of their errors.  Part of the 
reason for that is fundamental: the conceptual dichotomy described 
above, between judicial errors and damned judicial errors, is contin-
gent and unstable in practice.  What is surprising is that it is no less so 
with respect to the few cases that we all agree are wrong. 
1.  Dred Scott v. Sandford. — The Dred Scott case involved a 
slave, Dred Scott, who sued his nominal master, John Sanford, for his 
freedom.147  Scott claimed that because a former master had taken him 
first to the free state of Illinois and then to Fort Snelling in the Wis-
consin Territory, where slavery was prohibited by federal statute, he 
could not legally be re-enslaved in the slave state of Missouri, where he 
resided.148  It was vital to the case and to its controversial outcome 
that Sanford was a resident of New York, for the sole jurisdictional 
hook claimed by Scott was based on the diversity of citizenship be-
tween the litigants.149  In a convoluted opinion, Chief Justice Taney 
ruled that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because 
neither Scott nor any black American could be a citizen of the United 
States within the meaning of Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdic-
tion.150  The Court also ruled, in a holding sometimes described as dic-
ta and at other times called in-the-alternative, that Scott’s argument 
failed on the merits: Congress could not constitutionally forbid slavery 
in U.S. territories, as doing so would deprive traveling slaveholders of 
their property without due process of law.151 
The decision is, to say the least, troubling.  Taney reached his con-
clusion that blacks could not be United States citizens through flawed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 400 (1857).  Sanford’s name is misspelled in 
the official court caption.  See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE ix (1978). 
 148 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 431. 
 149 Id. at 400. 
 150 Id. at 406. 
 151 Id. at 452. 
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analysis.  His major premise was that blacks could be citizens now on-
ly if they could have been citizens at the time of the Constitution’s 
drafting.152  His minor premise was that they could not have been citi-
zens at the Founding for any number of reasons, chief among them 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV153 would entail 
their equal treatment with whites, which was a nonstarter.154  Both of 
these premises are routinely challenged in the literature, and with good 
reason.  Taney’s self-conscious embrace of originalism even when it 
leads to moral depravity is often cited as Exhibit A in the case against 
originalism as a viable method of constitutional interpretation.155  His 
originalism, moreover, was bad originalism.156  The notion that even 
free blacks could not be citizens at the Founding is embarrassed by the 
fact that many free blacks were in fact citizens at that time.157  And 
Taney’s privileges-and-immunities argument was a non sequitur: the 
fact that, under Article IV, citizens in one state are entitled to the  
privileges and immunities available to citizens in another state does 
not mean that they may not be subjected to racial discrimination.158  
These errors raise a suspicion that Taney’s aggressive positivism was 
but a façade for his abject racism.159 
That is not all.  Taney’s further holding that Congress could not 
ban slavery in the territories adds injury to insult.  For one thing, it 
was premised on the notion that slaves are not people but property, 
and as such have no Fifth Amendment rights to liberty competitive 
with their masters’ Fifth Amendment rights to own them.  For anoth-
er, those who reject the idea of “substantive” due process will wonder 
what process was found wanting in the decision of Congress to ban 
slavery in the territories.160  Most importantly, perhaps, the Dred Scott 
decision rendered unconstitutional the political positions both of the 
nascent Republican Party and of Stephen Douglas and other northern 
Democrats on the question of slavery in the territories.  The Republi-
cans maintained that the territories should remain free, and southern 
Democrats insisted that they should not.  Douglas and other northern 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 Id. at 404. 
 153 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 154 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405–06. 
 155 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism’s Forgotten Past, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 165–69 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004); Paul Finkelman, 
Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261, 270 (2000). 
 156 See Balkin & Levinson, Dred Scott, supra note 47, at 70–71. 
 157 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 252 (2005).  
 158 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 265 (1985). 
 159 See BEN W. PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY: STATESMEN OF THE LAW 218–20 (1939) 
(noting and ultimately rejecting the view that Taney’s opinions reflected his underlying racism). 
 160 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 31 (1990). 
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Democrats adopted the compromise position that residents of the terri-
tories should be able to determine for themselves whether to permit 
slavery.161  Taney’s decision made only the pro-slavery position consti-
tutionally viable, causing a deep rift in the Democratic Party and pre-
venting a compromise that could have averted the bloodiest war in 
American history.  And as if that were not enough, he did so in dicta! 
Can such errata be defended?  Mark Graber has tried, somewhat, 
to do so (post-tenure, I hasten to add).  Graber argues that because the 
original Constitution rested on a set of political accommodations for 
slavery — and therefore abided “constitutional evil” — the Dred Scott 
majority was armed with a set of interpretive resources that made its 
claims just as plausible as the dissent’s.162  He notes that the argument 
typically criticized by modern commentators as the most odious — 
that black Americans could not be U.S. citizens — “reflected beliefs 
held by the overwhelming majority of antebellum jurists in both the 
North and the South”163 and was consistent with the views of large 
segments of the American public.164  Taney’s historical case against 
black citizenship was flawed but, on Graber’s view, the case would 
have come out no differently if it were flawless.165  Graber may or may 
not be persuasive on these points, some of which I explore further be-
low, but remember the burden we are concerned with — not whether 
Dred Scott was wrong but whether it deserves to serve as a prime ex-
ample of how to be wrong. 
I’m not so sure.  In Taney’s defense — not words one reads every 
day — some of Dred Scott’s critics miss the big picture.  Let us brack-
et for the moment Taney’s actual opinion and reconsider the case with 
fresh eyes.  First, it is easy to defend the result in the case — a loss for 
Scott — under then-existing precedents and legal norms.166  In Strader 
v. Graham,167 decided six years before Dred Scott, Taney had written 
(in dicta) that the laws of the domiciliary state — not those of a state 
or territory of prior residence or inhabitation — conclusively deter-
mined whether someone was slave or free.168  While Missouri prece-
dents were arguably on Scott’s side,169 the Missouri Supreme Court 
held otherwise in Scott’s state court suit for emancipation.170  If the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 165–66. 
 162 MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 4 
(2006). 
 163 Id. at 28–29. 
 164 Id. at 28–33. 
 165 See id. at 46. 
 166 See Magliocca, supra note 44, at 576. 
 167 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851). 
 168 Id. at 93–94. 
 169 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 262. 
 170 Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). 
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startlingly pro-slavery majority opinion in Strader was right, then 
Scott could not win on the merits at the Supreme Court and, more-
over, was not a citizen of the state of Missouri for jurisdictional pur-
poses.171  All Taney had to do was affirm Strader’s dicta as a holding 
and the case could have been dismissed without any discussion of 
black inferiority or the constitutionality vel non of prohibiting slavery 
in the territories.172 
More broadly, the basic question in Dred Scott was whether free 
blacks were entitled to the constitutionally conferred benefits of state 
citizenship.  The Court had never before been so directly called upon 
to define the central features of citizenship, and it is difficult to dispute 
the conception Taney settled on: citizens have rights.  In 1857, as in 
1787, it offended no constitutional prohibition for states to protect the 
right to keep blacks as chattel slaves, and, a fortiori, for a state to de-
ny, even to free blacks, the right to marry, to sue, to enter into con-
tracts, or to own property, much less to deny them political rights such 
as voting and jury service.  Blacks were subjected to all manner of 
discriminatory treatment that no government would dare visit upon its 
white population.  As Taney infamously wrote, blacks were “regarded 
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, 
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”173 
Let us also keep in mind a doctrinal point to which I return later in 
this Part.  Under the Court’s holding in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, which 
remained good law at the time of Dred Scott, a free state was constitu-
tionally forbidden from providing a free black with due process of law 
if that person were kidnapped by a slave catcher.174  To hold in the 
face of such precedent that the same Constitution recognizes the citi-
zenship of free blacks feels like the rankest sophistry.175  No nation 
worth its salt could abide the treatment of its citizens in this way.  Ei-
ther the treatment of blacks or their designation as citizens had to go.  
Only the designation was before the Court, and the war came. 
Dred Scott’s other “holding” — that prohibiting slavery in federal 
territories offended the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment — 
is also flawed, but not for the reasons often given.  First, it was not at 
all clear at the time of Dred Scott that the Constitution applied to the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 171 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 278–80. 
 172 Justice Nelson’s initial draft decided the case on approximately those grounds, but, for rea-
sons that are a matter of historical dispute, the majority scrapped that draft and decided to reach 
broader issues.  Id. at 307–09. 
 173 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407; see Eisgruber, supra note 155, at 168. 
 174 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613–14, 625–26 (1842).  
 175 One might object that Prigg is also profoundly wrong, but if this is the objection, then it 
would argue for placing Prigg firmly in the anticanon.  As we have seen, it is not. 
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actions of Congress in federal territories.176  Second, we do not ordi-
narily perceive substantive due process difficulties when regulations in 
one state reduce the value of chattels transported across state lines.177  
If one state permits the carrying of marijuana and another prohibits it, 
it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for 
the regulating state to confiscate a visitor’s hash, much less simply to 
define it as contraband.  Perhaps most significantly, the argument that 
Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories not only rendered 
the Missouri Compromise not a compromise at all, but also would 
have invalidated the Northwest Ordinance, which was passed by the 
same Continental Congress that authorized the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, and which was unanimously reaffirmed by the First Congress.  
The First Congress not only comprised many delegates to the federal 
and state constitutional conventions, but it was also the same Congress 
that referred the Bill of Rights, whose Fifth Amendment Taney 
claimed made the Northwest Ordinance unconstitutional.  This was a 
curious originalism indeed, one that prompted Abraham Lincoln in 
1858 to call Taney’s misdirection “an astonisher in legal history” and “a 
new wonder of the world.”178 
These points do not, however, form the usual case against Dred 
Scott’s substantive due process holding.  It is not uncommon, particu-
larly in popular discourse, to see assertions that Dred Scott’s chief fail-
ing is its assumption that the Constitution countenanced the treatment 
of blacks as personal property.179  That assumption, though, was unas-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 176 See Magliocca, supra note 44, at 582. 
 177 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 625–26 (Curtis, J., dissenting).  
 178 Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Chicago, July 10, 1858, in THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-
DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 26, 37 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958).  Taney argued in Dred Scott 
that the Northwest Ordinance followed from Congress’s Article IV, § 3 power “to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States,” and that this language did not apply to the later-acquired territory at issue in the 
case.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432.  Even if we accept this contention, it is barely rele-
vant — if at all — to the argument that the Territories Clause would not have insulated Congress 
from a challenge to the Northwest Ordinance based on independent limitations imposed by the 
Due Process Clause.  Cf. Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 
YALE L.J. 1820, 1871 (2011) (“Despite Taney’s insistence that the free-soil principles violated due 
process of law, the Ordinance is a testament to the consistency of the prohibition of slavery with 
due process of law in America’s organic law.”). 
 179 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Path to Court: Speak Capably but Say Little,  
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at A1; Glenn Beck (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 30, 2010)  
(interview with David Barton) (rush, unofficial transcript), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,591966,00.html; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE 
THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES 
OUR HISTORY 98 (1985) (writing that Dred Scott “sanctified the status of blacks as property and 
made the Civil War all but inevitable”). 
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sailable.180  A slightly more nuanced criticism faults Taney for resort-
ing to substantive due process at all.  Robert Bork writes: “[O]nce it is 
conceded that a judge may give the due process clause substantive 
content, Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe are equally valid examples of 
constitutional law.”181  Here is not the place to rehearse the arguments 
for and against substantive due process, but suffice to say that any 
federal constitutional claim to freedom that Scott had also would have 
been grounded in substantive due process.  Had Taney adopted the 
Republican argument that the Fifth Amendment actually forbids  
slavery in federal territories — likely a correct claim today182 — surely 
Dred Scott would not be regarded as anticanonical, or even wrong.183 
There is a broader point that extends beyond doctrinal minutiae.  
Dred Scott does not gnaw at us because it misused syllogism or in-
vented constitutional rights; we hate it because it abided constitutional 
evil.184  The conclusions Taney reached were morally insufferable, and 
so should have counted as dispositive evidence that his position was 
incorrect.  But if this is what makes Dred Scott anticanonical, then 
there is incongruity in the conservative critique of the Warren Court, 
many of whose members envisioned their role precisely as we wish 
Taney had envisioned his.185 
In his time, Taney could not easily have held other than he did.  
His commentary on the status of slavery in the territories, though un-
necessary to his holding, was at the invitation of prominent members 
of Congress, President Buchanan, and even Abraham Lincoln.186  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 180 Which is not to say that it was not assailed.  The 1856 and 1860 Republican Party plat-
forms, for example, both argued that allowing slavery in the federal territories violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 141. 
 181 BORK, supra note 160, at 32; accord Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
998 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 182 The structure of the claim would be that neither federal courts nor federal agents could be 
used to enforce a master-slave relationship.  Doing so would violate both the Fifth Amendment 
and, after 1865, the Thirteenth.  Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting state court 
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant). 
 183 The claim would have been in tension with the original understanding of the Fifth Amend-
ment.  See generally Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408 (2010).  But see Hegreness, supra note 178, at 1871. 
 184 See GRABER, supra note 162, at 1–10; Balkin, supra note 63, at 1704–20; Levinson, supra 
note 47, at 1151–52. 
 185 Cf. CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 505 (1935) (“It is inconsistent to denounce 
Taney for deciding questions broadly in the hope of benefiting the country, while praising others, 
Marshall for instance, for doing the same thing.”). 
 186 For extended discussion of the pleadings of members of Congress, see Wallace Mendelson, 
Dred Scott’s Case — Reconsidered, 38 MINN. L. REV. 16, 18–24 (1954).  Buchanan said in his 
1857 inaugural address that the issue of slavery in the territories “is a judicial question, which le-
gitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States before whom it is now pending, and 
will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.”  Id. at 24.  On Lincoln, see Abraham Lin-
coln, Speech at Galena, Ill. (July 26, 1856), reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 355 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“The Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal 
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more obvious route to war would have been a holding that Scott was 
made free based on his residence at Fort Snelling or, better still, in Illi-
nois.  Had Taney instead remained silent on the Missouri Compromise, 
the standard account of Dred Scott tells us that he might have enabled 
Stephen Douglas to win the Presidency in 1860 and might therefore 
have put off the War.187  If this is the fate Taney denied us, then we 
should celebrate the decision.  If Dred Scott’s legacy is existential mili-
tary conflict, then it is also emancipation for millions of enslaved 
Americans, the new birth of freedom that the Fourteenth Amendment 
promised, and confrontation with the moral inadequacy of our original 
commitments.188  Dred Scott told us we had to take or leave a Consti-
tution that enshrined white supremacy.  We left it, and we are better 
for it.189 
2.  Plessy v. Ferguson. — In 1883, the Supreme Court upheld an 
Alabama statute that punished adultery more severely when commit-
ted between a white person and a black person than when committed 
between two people of the same race.190  Without dissent, the Court 
held that the statute did not offend the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it did not discriminate between races: “The punishment of each 
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.”191  That deci-
sion, Pace v. Alabama, was good law in 1896, and it was not an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the text of the Equal Protection Clause to as-
sume its indifference to a law that, on its face, treated members of all 
races analogously.  That, too, was the structure of the 1890 Louisiana 
Separate Car Act192 challenged in Plessy.193  It required railway 
coaches operating in the state to provide “separate” accommodations 
for white and “colored” passengers, but it also required that those ac-
commodations be “equal.”194 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
to decide [the extension of slavery to the territories], and [Republicans] will submit to its  
decisions.”). 
 187 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 455 (calling the standard account “one of the most 
familiar stories in American political history”); PALMER, supra note 159, at 223; Louise Weinberg, 
Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 733, 735–40 (2007).  But see 
Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional 
Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 285–93 (1997) (arguing that the decision more likely streng-
thened than weakened the Democratic Party). 
 188 See Eisgruber, supra note 155, at 181. 
 189 See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 64 (“Perhaps Americans really did have to fight a Civil 
War before blacks could become citizens of the United States?”). 
 190 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
 191 Id. at 585. 
 192 1890 La. Acts 152. 
 193 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). 
 194 1890 La. Acts 153.  By the time of Plessy’s challenge to the law, it had been interpreted as 
applying only to intrastate railway cars.  State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 11 So. 74 (La. 1892). 
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So why is Plessy wrong?  And why have most lawyers never heard 
of Pace?195  There are several views on the first question, and they 
stand in some tension.  As noted in Part I, Chief Justice Roberts has 
offered that Plessy was inconsistent with the original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.196  This is an unorthodox, though not un-
heard of,197 view of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Congress that 
debated the Fourteenth Amendment did so in front of segregated gal-
leries that remained so into the 1960s.198  The debate over whether 
that same Congress understood the Equal Protection Clause to 
mandate public school integration continues, though most scholars be-
lieve it did not.199  The Reconstruction Republicans were concerned 
above all with eliminating discrimination in “civil” rights such as the 
rights to contract, to sue, and to own and dispose of property, not with 
what many would have then called “social” rights such as the right to 
associate freely, even in public or quasi-public institutions.200 
A second, more common critique of Plessy echoes the language of 
Justice Harlan’s canonical dissent: “Our Constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”201  On this 
view, the overriding command of the Equal Protection Clause is that 
government is not to recognize racial distinctions and distribute social 
benefits and burdens on that basis.  As Justice Scalia has written, “In 
the eyes of government, we are just one race here.  It is American.”202  
A noble goal, perhaps, but colorblindness is an even less obvious im-
perative of the Fourteenth Amendment than is racial integration.  Cer-
tainly it would be difficult for the federal government to ensure equali-
ty for the freed slaves and for their descendants if it could not make 
itself aware of their race.203  And given that colorblindness is foreign 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 195 For scholars recognizing the doctrinal significance of Pace, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–1986, at 40 (1990); 
Balkin, supra note 17, at 707. 
 196 See supra p. 404. 
 197 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Segregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 980–82, 1120–31 (1995). 
 198 See Email from Laura O’Hara, Historical Publ’ns Specialist, Office of History and Pres., 
U.S. House of Representatives, to Melissa Lerner (Oct. 13, 2010, 17:36 EDT) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library); Email from Katherine Scott, Assistant Historian, U.S. Senate His-
torical Office, to Melissa Lerner  (Oct. 12, 2010, 09:38 EDT) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). 
 199 Compare Klarman, supra note 11, at 1882–84, 1903–14, with McConnell, supra note 197, at 
1131–40. 
 200 RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 154–55 (1999). 
 201 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 202 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 203 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 430–32 (1997).  An originalist 
could, in principle, object that the Fourteenth Amendment does not bind the federal government, 
but I am personally unaware of any originalist (including Justice Scalia in Adarand) who claims 
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to both the text and the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not to mention its application in cases like Pace, it is 
hard to divine the source of this reading, apart from Justice Harlan’s 
dissent itself. 
Read in context — or even in paragraph — that dissent’s invoca-
tion of colorblindness suggests a rather different principle.  Justice 
Harlan’s famous phrase has an infamous preamble: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And 
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.  
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its 
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.204 
That the paean to white supremacy in Plessy comes in the dissent 
feels ironic, and it is frequently taught as such.  But Justice Harlan’s 
words can be read more charitably as supplying the necessary social 
meaning that is absent from the majority opinion.  A law providing for 
separate public accommodations may be race neutral in a formal sense 
but emerges from a barely disguised effort to formalize and thereby 
perpetuate white dominance through Jim Crow legal institutions.  Jus-
tice Harlan continues: “[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the 
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citi-
zens.”205  The third common critique of Plessy, then, follows Justice 
Harlan’s lead: the majority’s error was willfully remaining blind to the 
social meaning of segregation, that blacks are and should remain a 
permanent underclass. 
The criticism is fair.  We want judges to take notice of obvious so-
cial facts, and the meaning of segregation could hardly have been more 
obvious.  As Charles Black so memorably wrote of segregation in Aus-
tin, where he was raised, “I am sure it never occurred to anyone, white 
or colored, to question its meaning.”206  It was problematic enough for 
the Plessy Court to maintain that it lacked the competence to ascribe a 
white supremacist social meaning to segregation.207  But the Court’s 
absurd suggestion that blacks were inventing such a meaning208 com-
pounded the error manyfold.  I am comfortable in my agreement with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
that the command of colorblindness applies, but only to state and local governments.  Cf. Stephen 
A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist In-
quiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 482 (1998) (making without endorsing the argument that “from an 
originalist perspective there are strong arguments that the national government may enact racially 
discriminatory laws and there are compelling arguments that it may enact affirmative action  
legislation”). 
 204 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 
(1960). 
 207 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
 208 Id. 
379 - 475 GREENE - BOOKPROOFS.DOC 10/29/11 – 11:45 PM 
2011] THE ANTICANON 415 
Black that, on this point, “[t]he curves of callousness and stupidity in-
tersect at their respective maxima.”209 
I am less comfortable that Plessy can fairly be called a model of 
bad legal reasoning.  We have already seen that judicial precedent was 
firmly on the side of the majority.  We have also noted the strong ar-
gument, accepted by many experts, that the decision is consistent with 
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.210  There is 
plenty of evidence that the provision’s drafters sought to end the 
common practice of barring blacks altogether from public accommoda-
tions, but little evidence that anyone of influence thought that its pas-
sage would require integration.211  Segregation of rail cars in particular 
was a common feature of civil society in nineteenth-century Ameri-
ca.212  “[I]n the states of the former Confederacy, from the end of the 
war into the late 1880s and early 1890s,” Charles Lofgren writes,  
“segregation or discrimination [in public conveyances] existed almost 
everywhere to an identifiable degree; and in perhaps half the states 
these practices flourished to the extent that their absence was the ex-
ception.”213  We should think it relevant, moreover, that segregated 
public accommodations were considered by many, including seven of 
the eight Plessy Justices, to be a feature of the social order.  If we as-
sume that we can distinguish between social rights and civil rights, 
then where should the Court have placed the right to sit next to who-
mever one pleases? 
Of course, the division of rights in this way has fallen out of favor.  
It was never applied with rigorous exactitude and too often was used 
to justify the refusal to disturb discriminatory practices.214  We might 
instead look to the touchstone of modern equal protection analysis: 
discriminatory legislative intent.  A reasonable judge could infer 
odious intent in Plessy, but the Separate Car Act required equality on 
its face and conferred no discretion on train conductors.215  A judge 
would not have been unreasonable in ascribing to the Louisiana legis-
lature a concern for “the promotion of [passenger] comfort, and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 209 Black, supra note 206, at 422 n.8. 
 210 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1247 (1993).  But see 
Klarman, supra note 11, at 1882–83, 1882 n.7 (suggesting that neither Brown nor Plessy may have 
been consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 211 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2339–40 
(1995) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–
1910 (1993)). 
 212 See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of Racial 
Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 155, at 181, 194–96. 
 213 LOFGREN, supra note 146, at 17. 
 214 See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 144–54 (2011). 
 215 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896). 
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preservation of the public peace and good order.”216  Maintenance of 
white supremacy might have simply been a happy accident. 
It may be time, you are thinking, to invoke the sovereign preroga-
tive of laughter.217  We must remember, though, that to strike down a 
law based on hidden illicit motives would squarely confront a power-
ful tradition of refusing to look beyond the face of statutory text.  In 
Ex parte McCardle,218 in which the Court upheld a jurisdiction strip 
that was clearly designed to remove a specific case from the Supreme 
Court’s docket, Chief Justice Chase wrote for a unanimous Court that 
“[w]e are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.”219  
A century later, Justice Black, in upholding the city of Jackson’s deci-
sion to close rather than integrate all public swimming pools, wrote 
that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate 
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who 
voted for it.”220  There has always been some play in the joints here.  
We must carefully distinguish, as Justice Black sought to do,221 be-
tween subjective indicia of legislative motivation, which have long 
been deemed nondiscoverable, and objective indicia of motive that 
may appear on the face of a statute.222  But that distinction is little 
help in an attack on Plessy, as the Separate Car Act required “equal” 
accommodations across race. 
We might reasonably imagine an imperative for judges to look 
beyond the formalism of the Separate Car Act and to consider equality 
as a substantive guarantee, but that imperative, if it once existed, has 
been disavowed by the modern Court.  One cannot establish an equal 
protection violation solely by demonstrating that a statute has the ef-
fect of entrenching racial inequality,223 and a statute that formally  
recognizes race but does so in the spirit of dismantling a racial caste 
system is presumptively unconstitutional.224  Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1225 is perhaps the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 216 Id. at 550. 
 217 Cf. Black, supra note 206, at 424. 
 218 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 219 Id. at 514; accord Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885) (“[T]he rule is general 
with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the 
motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, 
or inferrible from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and 
existing legislation.”). 
 220 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). 
 221 Id. at 225. 
 222 Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1787–88 
(2008). 
 223 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 
 224 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (holding that strict 
scrutiny attends all governmental racial classifications). 
 225 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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best example of the modern Court’s racial formalism at work.  There, 
the Court invalidated a voluntary public school desegregation plan on 
the grounds that it violated the command of Brown not to assign stu-
dents to schools on the basis of race.226  The notion that Plessy is anti-
canonical because it is too formalistic rings hollow these days.227 
Plessy was consistent with Court precedent, with the most defensi-
ble original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, and with 
the text of the Equal Protection Clause.  What about consequences?  
The Separate Car Act was part of a wave of Jim Crow statutes passed 
in Southern legislatures newly purged of significant black representa-
tion in the wake of the Compromise of 1877, in which the Republican 
Party agreed to relinquish military control of Southern states in ex-
change for Democratic support for Rutherford B. Hayes in the dis-
puted presidential election.  A contrary result in Plessy would have 
undermined that compromise.  Would violence have followed?  Ac-
cording to Eric Foner, before the compromise, thousands of Democrat 
Samuel Tilden’s supporters proclaimed themselves ready to take up 
arms and march on Washington to ensure that he was seated in the 
White House.228  We cannot say how history would have unfolded, but 
recall that invalidating a political compromise between the North and 
the South over volatile issues of race is precisely the error many 
attribute to the Dred Scott decision.  Plessy might well have kept the 
peace.229 
3.  Lochner v. New York. — Lochner v. New York was once fa-
mously indefensible.  Bruce Ackerman wrote in 1991 that, even more 
so than Dred Scott, judges “resist the very suggestion that Lochner 
might have been a legally plausible decision” when it was decided.230  
Matters are different today.  Lochner revisionism has become some-
thing of a cottage industry as libertarians have become more promi-
nent at think tanks, in politics, and in the legal academy.  But Lochner 
remains firmly within the anticanon, and its defenders must always 
remain self-conscious about their iconoclasm.  David Bernstein, for ex-
ample, though a Lochner revisionist, has called the case “the touch-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 226 Id. at 2767–68 (plurality opinion). 
 227 On formalism, note that Justice Harlan wrote the unanimous opinion in Cumming v. Rich-
mond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), which held that it did not violate the Con-
stitution for a county to tax black residents to pay for an all-white secondary school.  Justice Har-
lan refused to consider whether maintenance of racially segregated public schools violated the 
Constitution because “[n]o such issue was made in the pleadings.”  Id. at 543. 
 228 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, 
at 576 (1988). 
 229 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1996) (situating Plessy within a set of “[b]ackground social, political, economic, 
and ideological forces” that would have made a contrary decision “virtually unthinkable”). 
 230 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 64. 
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stone of judicial error.”231  David Strauss says, with only mild hyper-
bole, “You have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream 
of American constitutional law today.”232 
Which is why the title of the essay in which that statement appears, 
“Why Was Lochner Wrong?,” is curious.  One would think that by the 
time a case earns the scorn of every lawyer on the reservation, there 
would be some agreement as to why.  The simplest answer, and likely 
the most accurate, is that it is inconceivable in the twenty-first century, 
as it was in the second half of the twentieth, to restore the Lochner era.  
Many a Tea Party activist would hesitate before putting every state’s 
wage and hour and employment discrimination laws in jeopardy of 
judicial override.  As Ackerman writes, “For the overwhelming majori-
ty of today’s Americans, Lochner’s constitutional denunciation of a 
maximum-hours law, limiting bakers to a sixty (!) hour workweek, 
speaks in an alien voice.”233  The attack on Lochner, however, rarely 
rests solely, or even primarily, on alarm at the results, and so Strauss’s 
title question remains interesting. 
We can place the standard critique of Lochner into two separate 
categories.  The first category is of a piece with Justice Holmes’s dis-
senting opinion, in which he famously wrote that “[t]he 14th Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”234  It is er-
ror, on this view, for judges to invalidate democratically enacted 
statutes based on their subjective moral or political preferences rather 
than on the values authoritatively codified in the Constitution.235  
Holmes’s tradition is a minimalist one.  For him, the question of the 
degree to which a maximum-hours law, versus an unrestrained labor 
market, contributes to the general welfare is exclusively within the leg-
islature’s competence.236  Justice Harlan’s less colorful Lochner dissent 
is, by degrees, less deferential to legislatures, but he nonetheless be-
lieved that the Lochner majority erred in dismissing as unreasonable 
views as to the dangers of bakers’ work that were eminently  
reasonable.237 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 231 Bernstein, Legacy, supra note 49, at 2. 
 232 Strauss, supra note 49, at 373. 
 233 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 64. 
 234 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 235 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, at 162 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (criticizing the 
Lochner majority on the ground that “it’s quite clear that they’re not interpreting the law, they’re 
making the law”); Rehnquist and Powell Hearings, supra note 73, at 159 (statement of William 
Rehnquist) (“[T]he series of freedom of contract cases, . . . by the objective judgment of historians, 
represented an intrusion of personal political philosophy into constitutional doctrine which the 
framers had never intended . . . .”). 
 236 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 237 Id. at 69–73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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The second category of Lochner critique has more of a positivist 
than a minimalist flavor.  Here, the concern is not that the Court im-
properly second-guessed legislative judgments, but that it did so in the 
name of invented rights.  As with the first category of criticism, there 
are different degrees of error we can assign.  At one extreme, it is al-
ways improper for the Court to invalidate legislation on the basis of 
“unenumerated” rights such as liberty of contract.238  A more moderate 
version of the criticism would suggest that rights need not be spelled 
out in the text of the Constitution but that the right to contract is ei-
ther not as robust as the Lochner Court took it to be — a view that 
perhaps dovetails with Justice Harlan’s — or is not a constitutional 
right at all.  On this view, unenumerated rights that satisfy some other 
rule of recognition, such as the right to privacy, might be affirmed, but 
the right to contract fails to meet the test.239  We might particularly 
have it in for a Court that exalts weak or nonexistent rights such as 
the right to contract but refuses to grant constitutional protection, for 
example, to speech by political dissidents.240 
Someone wishing to defend the Lochner Court has any number of 
plausible strategies at her disposal.  First, it is far from clear that the 
right to contract recognized in Lochner was either invented by the Jus-
tices of that era or inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The right had been recognized in prior cases, 
including unanimously in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.241  More generally, 
Howard Gillman has argued forcefully that the right to contract grew 
out of Jackson-era hostility to class legislation,242 and William Nelson 
and others have traced the doctrine to the free labor ideology of the 
antislavery movement.243  It is no stretch to argue that among the 
rights the Fourteenth Amendment granted to former slaves was the 
right to bargain freely over the terms of their employment relation-
ships.  It may be that regulations of that sort lay within the traditional 
police powers of a state government, but as with any laws that threat-
en important rights, judges must carefully scrutinize the ends pursued 
and the means chosen.  It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Loch-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 238 BORK, supra note 160, at 44. 
 239 See Strauss, supra note 49, at 381. 
 240 See id. at 376. 
 241 165 U.S. 578, 589–91 (1897). 
 242 HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10–12 (1993). 
 243 See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judi-
cial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 532 (1974).  Others have 
also argued that liberty of contract has deep roots in natural rights ideology.  See Bernstein, Revi-
sionism, Revised, supra note 49, at 31–42; James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: 
A Tale of Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 370, 383–86 (2005). 
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ner-era Court upheld vastly more challenged state laws than it  
invalidated.244 
Indeed, its historical provenance gives the right to contract at least 
as much to commend it — on originalist terms — as the right to priva-
cy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 a case that falls comforta-
bly within the constitutional canon.  Griswold makes clear that Loch-
ner’s anticanonicity cannot be rooted in its reliance on substantive due 
process or in its recognition of rights that are absent from the constitu-
tional text.246  A case that is right about the existence of unenumerated 
rights but wrong about just what substantive due process guarantees 
seems a poor candidate for the anticanon.  When the set of rights that 
fall under the umbrella of substantive due process remains deeply con-
tested, it seems unfair to label a case the worst of the worst on the 
ground that it overprotected civil rights.  Owen Fiss makes a related 
point: “Lochner sought to say clearly and unequivocally that the legis-
lative power was indeed limited, and to do so during a time when 
those limits were being called dramatically into question.”247  From a 
post-Brown perspective, this is not a judicial impulse we should wish 
to discourage. 
Finally, consider the broader problem the Lochner-era Court tried 
to address: class legislation.248  Class legislation is passed for the bene-
fit of a particular interest group rather than for the people more gener-
ally.  We have become accustomed to thinking of interest group rent-
seeking as the fulcrum of representative democracy.  But across the arc 
of American history, that is a relatively recent view, emerging as a plu-
ralist conception of democracy became dominant in the last century. 
Nelson has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that 
government treat classes of citizens equally was not limited to consid-
erations of race, but proceeded from a general assumption that legisla-
tion should be for the benefit of all.249  Thus, Justice Peckham’s con-
demnation of a maximum-hours law that applied only to bakers was, 
according to Nelson, “entirely consistent with the basic doctrine of 
American constitutionalism extracted in the preceding three decades of 
adjudication from the Fourteenth Amendment: that a statute which, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 244 Victoria Nourse has argued that judicial scrutiny was far more likely at the time of Lochner 
to favor state interests.  Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of  
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752–53 
(2009). 
 245 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 246 Strauss, supra note 49, at 379–80. 
 247 FISS, supra note 211, at 165. 
 248 See generally GILLMAN, supra note 242. 
 249 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRIN-
CIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 77–80 (1988). 
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without reason, distinguishes between two groups of similarly situated 
citizens is unreasonable, arbitrary, and therefore void.”250 
Even under a pluralist conception, the law at issue in Lochner 
might raise our constitutional antennae.  Commentators continue to 
treat footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,251 particular-
ly as elaborated by John Hart Ely, as a lodestar for how the Court 
should adjudicate rights within a post-New Deal, pluralist constitu-
tional order.252  On this conception, the repudiation of Lochner entails 
deference to legislatures except where laws infringe upon rights enu-
merated within the Bill of Rights, impede the channels of political 
change, or curtail the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”253  Ely 
argued that discreteness and insularity tend to exacerbate the social 
distance that marks a group for irrational prejudice in the course of 
political bargaining.254  Whether or not that is correct as a matter of 
positive political science,255 most can agree that judges should give 
special solicitude to politically powerless groups whose members are 
the victims of extraordinary legislation benefiting political  
majorities.256 
The Bakeshop Act passed unanimously in both houses of the New 
York legislature.  But the legislative consensus around the measure 
might not necessarily have reflected approval of the maximum-hours 
provision,257 as the bill also contained consumer-friendly regulations 
focused on maintaining sanitary conditions in bakeries.258  Moreover, 
unanimity may not always be occasion for legislative deference.  Jus-
tice Scalia is fond of referring to the Talmudic rule that the Sanhedrin 
could not pronounce a death sentence unanimously.259  The idea, in 
part, was that a unanimous verdict suggested that the accused had no 
defender to articulate the case in his favor.  The chief promoter of the 
Bakeshop Act was Henry Weismann, who led the Bakery and Confec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 250 Id. at 199. 
 251 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 252 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–
88 (1980). 
 253 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; see also id. at 152–53. 
 254 ELY, supra note 252, at 160–61. 
 255 Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
 256 See Klarman, supra note 229, at 1 (“It is common wisdom that a fundamental purpose of 
judicial review is to protect minority rights from majoritarian overreaching.”). 
 257 PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 65 (1998).   
 258 The bakers’ union referred to the Act in its journal as “a sanitary measure solely.”  
Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1481. 
 259 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.  
No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322); cf. Barry Leff, The Rabbi  
and the Supreme Court Justice, THE NESHAMAH CENTER (Mar. 14, 2007), 
http://www.neshamah.net/reb_barrys_blog_neshamahn/2007/03/the_rabbi_and_t.html#more (sug-
gesting that Justice Scalia might not agree with these kinds of procedural obstacles). 
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tionary Workers’ International, which had successfully organized 
many of the larger upstate New York bakeries.260  Many of the smaller 
bakeries in New York City remained non-unionized and, significantly, 
staffed by Italian, French, and Jewish immigrants.261  The union had 
already made considerable gains in limiting bakers’ work hours but 
wished to codify those gains, particularly with increasing competition 
from these immigrant shops whose bakers were willing to work much 
longer hours.262  Thus, the union newspaper the Baker’s Journal 
warned of “the cheap labor of the green hand . . . from foreign 
shores,”263 and an 1898 New York State factory inspector’s report 
complained that “it is almost impossible to secure or keep in proper 
cleanly condition the Jewish and Italian bakeshops.  Cleanliness and 
tidiness are entirely foreign to these people, and their bakeshops are 
like their sweatshops, for like causes produce like effects.”264 
These references underscore that recent immigrants are often as 
discrete and insular as any minority, and that at least some aspects of 
the Bakeshop Act were undeniably “special interest” legislation.  That 
was one of the reasons for the Nation’s opposition to the Act, which it 
called “union tyranny” in an editorial approving of Lochner265: “the 
main effect of the decision . . . will be to stop the subterfuge by which, 
under the pretext of conserving the public health, the unionists have 
sought to delimit the competition of non-unionists, and so to establish 
a quasi-monopoly of many important kinds of labor.”266  Whether im-
migrant bakers were “victims” of legislation that forcibly limited the 
hours they could work depends on whether we believe the potential 
benefits to their health, leisure, and dignity outweighed the (potentially 
catastrophic) losses to their pocketbooks, but a footnote four sensibility 
gives us reason to wonder whether the Act’s proponents cared about 
the answer to that question. 
4.  Korematsu v. United States. — Korematsu presents the weakest 
case for anticanonicity of the four principal cases discussed, but it is 
the hardest of the four to defend using conventional constitutional ar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 260 DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 24–25 (2011); KENS, supra note 257, 
at 58–59.  Ironically, Weismann successfully represented Joseph Lochner in the Supreme Court, 
having left the union in disgrace and become a bakery owner and an attorney.  Bernstein, supra 
note 47, at 1484, 1491–92. 
 261 David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the 
Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 155, at 325, 329. 
 262 Id. at 328–29. 
 263 Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1477 (quoting Now for the Ten-Hour Day, BAKER’S J., Apr. 20, 
1895, at 1). 
 264 Id. at 1481 (quoting Bakeshop Inspection, BAKER’S J., Aug. 1, 1898, at 19, 20 (quoting 
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK)). 
 265 Editorial, A Check to Union Tyranny, THE NATION, May 4, 1905, at 346. 
 266 Id. at 347. 
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guments.  These features of the case are directly related, as I show in 
section III.B.267  It is nonetheless important to understand why even 
this case is not indefensible and, indeed, is consistent with arguments 
made by prominent constitutional thinkers, including at least one sit-
ting Supreme Court Justice, in the constitutional debates over post–
September 11 national security policy. 
The three categories of error that one may attribute to Korematsu 
can be summed up as follows: the Court approved bad racial profiling, 
the Court approved racial profiling simpliciter, and the Court ap-
proved racial profiling superfluously.  General John DeWitt’s orders 
establishing a curfew for all individuals of Japanese ancestry residing 
on the West Coast and subsequently requiring that they report to resi-
dential assembly centers for a determination of loyalty constituted bad 
racial profiling because they were based on little more than naked rac-
ism and associated hokum.  As Justice Murphy detailed in his dissent-
ing opinion, DeWitt’s Final Report on the evacuation contained a lita-
ny of overwrought group stereotypes, referring to the Japanese as 
“subversive” and as an “enemy race” whose “racial strains are undi-
luted.”268  In testimony before a House subcommittee taken in April 
1943, General DeWitt explained his view that “we must worry about 
the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”269  In a Rec-
ommendation to the Secretary of War dated February 14, 1942, which 
was also reproduced in his Final Report, DeWitt wrote that “[t]he very 
fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and con-
firming indication that such action will be taken.”270  The absence of 
evidence may or may not be evidence of absence, but reasonable 
people can agree that it isn’t evidence of presence.  As Eugene Rostow 
wrote in the wake of the Court’s ruling, “[t]he dominant factor in the 
development of this policy was not a military estimate of a military 
problem, but familiar West Coast attitudes of race prejudice.”271 
There is a more and a less critical version of this charge against 
Korematsu.  The difference rests on the answer to whether the mili-
tary’s, and the Court’s, actions would have been justified if there were 
in fact significant evidence of a Japanese fifth column operating within 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 267 See infra note 555 and accompanying text. 
 268 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting J.L. 
DEWITT, U.S. ARMY, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 
1942, at 33, 34 (1943) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 269 Id. at 236 n.2 (quoting Investigation of Congested Areas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. Of 
the Comm. on Naval Aff., H.R., 78th Cong. 740 (1943) (statement of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, 
Commanding Gen. of W. Def. Command)). 
 270 Id. at 241 n.15 (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 268, at 34) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 271 Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases — A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 496 
(1945). 
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the United States.  If Korematsu would then have been either correct 
or not egregiously wrong, then we can say that its error was its ap-
proval of ineffectual racial profiling.  We might alternatively believe 
that the sin of Korematsu is not simply its refusal to find dispositive 
(or even compelling) the lack of evidence supporting the exclusion or-
der but, more broadly, the Court’s acquiescence in a policy in which 
race constituted any evidence of subversion.272  This distinction graphs 
onto competing views of racial profiling in general as either disfavored 
if and when ineffective or disfavored notwithstanding effectiveness.  
Commentators are not always clear which they mean when they dis-
cuss the wrongs of Korematsu. 
A third problem with Korematsu is that the Court could have ruled 
against the government or ducked the case without any adverse conse-
quences for the U.S. military effort.  The majority in effect treated the 
military’s authority to evacuate U.S. citizens on racial grounds as a po-
litical question.  But as Alexander Bickel has most forcefully ex-
plained, a merits decision has different institutional consequences than 
invocation of an avoidance strategy.273  Even in circumstances in 
which the Court’s decision to uphold legislative or executive action has 
no real-world effect, “the Court’s prestige, the spell it casts as a sym-
bol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have been 
tentative in the conception or that are on the verge of abandonment in 
the execution.”274  Justice Jackson affirmed that view in his Korematsu 
dissent, in which he implied that the Court should not have authorized 
the military’s actions: “A military commander may overstep the 
bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we review and 
approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the  
Constitution.”275 
Korematsu was argued on October 11 and 12, 1944, and came 
down on December 18 of the same year.276  By then, Allied victory in 
the Pacific was a question of when rather than if.  Three months earli-
er, American forces had secured the island of Saipan, which led to the 
resignation in disgrace of Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo.277  
The day before the decision issued, the War Department announced its 
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 272 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 105, at 993 (“The error was to treat people as dangerous and to 
intern them not based on their individual conduct, but on the basis of their group identity.”). 
 273 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (1962). 
 274 Id. at 129. 
 275 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 276 Id. at 214 (majority opinion). 
 277 See Alvin D. Coox, The Pacific War, in 6 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN: THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 315, 362–63 (Peter Duus ed., 1988). 
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revocation of the evacuation orders,278 based on the view within the 
Department that the continued mass exclusion from the West Coast of 
persons of Japanese ancestry “[was] no longer a matter of military ne-
cessity.”279  The Court therefore knew with perfect surety that a deci-
sion in Korematsu’s favor would not weaken the war effort.  Even if 
that did not render the case moot — Korematsu was appealing a crim-
inal conviction — at the very least the Court could have vacated the 
conviction on the grounds that he was a citizen, reserving judgment on 
the treatment of aliens.280  Instead, a majority chose to gesture at abso-
lute civilian deference to the judgments of military commanders in a 
time of war, and to place the Court’s valuable institutional stamp on 
racism. 
The defense of Korematsu begins, though, where this criticism 
leaves off.  The Court has long espoused deference to military judg-
ments about the conduct of war.  The question in any case is how 
much deference to give.  Under the Court’s equal protection and due 
process jurisprudence, race-based decisionmaking is always suspect, as 
Justice Black’s majority opinion was the first to note.281  But the use 
of Japanese ancestry as a proxy for dangerousness had already been 
accepted as constitutionally valid by the Court, and unanimously so, in 
Hirabayashi v. United States.282  In Hirabayashi the Court upheld a 
West Coast curfew order issued by General DeWitt even though it dis-
criminated against residents of Japanese descent solely on the basis of 
race.283  If Hirabayashi is wrong, then an anticanon based on flawed 
reasoning or moral vacuity should include it as well as Korematsu.  If 
Hirabayashi is correct, the argument against Korematsu must be either 
that a race-based curfew is orders of magnitude less serious than a 
race-based evacuation order and subsequent preventive detention, or 
that the evidence justifying the former was different either in kind or 
in degree from the evidence needed to justify the latter.284 
At this point we must consider the lens through which the Court 
reviews actions of the President and his Executive Branch subordi-
nates, whose roles are underspecified in the Constitution.  Justice Jack-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 278 See Army Lifts Blanket Ban on Japanese-Americans; No Mass Return Expected, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 18, 1944, at 1.  This “coincidence” was planned, apparently in large part by Chief 
Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter.  See, e.g., Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1935 & n.11 (2003). 
 279 PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 277 (1983) (quoting a 1944 communication from Henry L. 
Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 280 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR-
TIME 206–11 (1998). 
 281 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 282 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 283 See id. at 88, 92. 
 284 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 231–32 (Roberts, J., dissenting); IRONS, supra note 279, at 258. 
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son’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer285 has be-
come the leading doctrinal framework for evaluating claims of execu-
tive authority.286  The Korematsu decision appears, though not without 
qualification, to fall into Youngstown Category One,287 in which execu-
tive power is at its maximum because the President is acting pursuant 
to an express or implied congressional authorization.288  The qualifica-
tions are these: the evacuation order was not issued by the President, 
but by General DeWitt pursuant to the President’s authorization in 
Executive Order 9066.  The Executive Order authorized the military 
to establish exclusion zones, but it did not by its terms order any par-
ticular exclusion or specify any particular ethnic or racial group to be 
discriminatorily excluded.289  We must be careful not to assume that 
the Youngstown analysis is indifferent to whether the claim of authori-
ty under review is asserted by the President directly or by a subordi-
nate exercising delegated discretionary authority.  Likewise, the con-
gressional statute approving Executive Order 9066 and criminalizing 
Korematsu’s violation of the exclusion order predated the exclusion 
order itself.290  Again, whether to place the order in Youngstown Cate-
gory One may depend on the extent to which we can impute to Con-
gress the discriminatory features of the order, which are not specifical-
ly approved in the statute. 
Justice Jackson himself amplified those qualifications into a dispo-
sition in his Korematsu dissent.  “[T]he ‘law’ which this prisoner is 
convicted of disregarding is not found in an act of Congress, but in a 
military order,” he wrote.291  This reasoning, though, is unduly  
formalistic.  President Roosevelt of course supported the policy, his 
Justice Department vigorously defended the Administration’s position 
in Court, and Congress was aware of precisely how its statutory au-
thority was being used and chose not to address it.292  Under Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown opinion, then, the exclusion should have been 
“supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation.”293 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 285 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 286 See id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 287 Id. at 635–37. 
 288 Id. at 635. 
 289 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 290 Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173, repealed by Nat’l Emergencies Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 501(e), 90 Stat. 1255, 1258 (1976). 
 291 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 292 See Russo, supra note 107. 
 293 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Korematsu v. United States, 
140 F.2d 289, 290 n.2 (9th Cir. 1943) (noting that “Congress authorized and implemented” General 
DeWitt’s curfew order). 
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An objection remains: Youngstown might not be relevant authority 
because (apart from its postdating Korematsu) Youngstown is con-
cerned centrally with the existence vel non of executive power, not 
with the validity of rights claims that challenge that power.  The ob-
jection seems to me well founded, but Justice Thomas seems not to 
agree.  He argued in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that courts were incompetent 
to second-guess the military judgments of the President, that decisions 
such as whom to detain, for how long, and under what conditions “are 
simply not amenable to judicial determination because ‘[t]hey are deli-
cate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’”294  Citing fa-
vorably both Justice Jackson’s Youngstown opinion and Hirabaya-
shi,295 Thomas argued that the high degree of deference owed the 
President for military decisions made in his role as Commander in 
Chief “extends to the President’s determination of all the factual predi-
cates necessary to conclude that a given action is appropriate.”296  As 
Justice Thomas has been a member of the Supreme Court for two  
decades, a view that he holds is not lightly made the basis for placing a 
precedent within the anticanon. 
B.  A Shadow Anticanon 
The set of accounts I have attempted to debunk will strike some 
readers as an easy target.  Each of these four decisions commanded a 
majority of the Supreme Court, so most of the members of the highest 
court in the land found their arguments persuasive at one time.  The 
architecture of sound legal argument has not changed so much over 
the years that we should expect once-persuasive opinions later to earn 
universal rebuke solely because of conventional legal errors.297  What 
does have the capacity to change over the course of just a couple of 
generations is conventional morality.  Given that possibility, the prob-
lem with these cases may not be just that they were poorly reasoned 
but that they were poorly reasoned in the service of ends that society 
has come to recognize as immoral: the perpetuation of slavery, of Jim 
Crow, of labor exploitation, and of race-based detention. 
There is something to this claim, and I do not mean to suggest that 
it is entirely mistaken.  But there are also important ways in which it 
is incomplete.  Part III makes the affirmative case that anticanonical 
cases must be susceptible to use as antiprecedents, a practice that de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 294 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Wa-
terman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).  
 295 See id. at 583–84. 
 296 Id. at 584. 
 297 Cf. Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1916–17, 1919 
(1994) (acknowledging and describing gradual evolution of what Bobbitt calls the “modalities” of 
constitutional argument). 
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mands more of a decision than simply poor reasoning and bad morals.  
It is helpful, though, to devote a few additional words to the negative 
case.  The long history of the Supreme Court includes many decisions 
with both poor legal reasoning and moral bankruptcy of a surpassingly 
high order.  I highlight four here: the cases used in Part I as “control” 
cases to help demonstrate the anticanon’s special pattern of citation.  
Considerations of brevity prevent comprehensive discussion of these 
cases.  What follows shows, however, that many of the criticisms of the 
anticanon may be lodged, both in style and in substance, against other 
decisions that have received more measured treatment from courts and 
commentators. 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania could easily be called the worst Supreme 
Court decision ever issued.  The human tragedy of the decision is 
breathtaking.  In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court reversed the 
criminal prosecution of a slave catcher who had kidnapped and sold 
into slavery a woman, Margaret Morgan, who likely was not a fugitive 
slave, and her two children, who assuredly were not.298  The Court’s 
holding was that the Fugitive Slave Clause299 prohibited states from 
subjecting slave catchers to a state-sanctioned civil process, except to 
prevent “breach of the peace, or any illegal violence.”300  Under the 
logic of the opinion, however, the kidnapping could not itself be out-
lawed as “illegal violence.”  Put otherwise, violence against blacks was 
“legal” violence; “illegal” violence was violence against whites.  The 
decision abided the constant threat of enslavement experienced by free 
brown-skinned Americans in both the North and the South.301  By 
constitutionally forbidding states from preventing private violence 
against blacks, Prigg worked a simultaneous assault on due process 
and on equal protection, the twin pillars of the modern Fourteenth 
Amendment.  As mentioned above, Prigg virtually made Dred Scott a 
fait accompli.302 
Justice Story’s reading of the Fugitive Slave Clause is not defensi-
ble.  His opinion omits any consideration either of Pennsylvania’s obli-
gations toward its black residents, or of Morgan’s or her children’s fac-
tual defenses; its understanding of the Fugitive Slave Clause as both 
essential to the constitutional bargain and completely preemptive of 
state law303 is strained.  It would, for example, divorce the interpreta-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 298 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626 (1842). 
 299 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII. 
 300 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 613, 625. 
 301 Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1993). 
 302 See supra p. 409. 
 303 See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622–25. 
379 - 475 GREENE - BOOKPROOFS.DOC 10/29/11 – 11:45 PM 
2011] THE ANTICANON 429 
tion of that provision from the parallel language of the Extradition 
Clause,304 which the Court later found not to be enforceable in federal 
court.305  The Prigg Court’s additional holding that Congress could not 
force state officials to comply with administration of the Fugitive 
Slave Act306 formed a significant link in the chain of events that led to 
the establishment of the Republican Party and the outbreak of Civil 
War.307  In his 1860 State of the Union Address, delivered seventeen 
days before South Carolina voted to secede, President Buchanan sug-
gested as much: “Let us trust that the State legislatures will repeal 
their unconstitutional and obnoxious enactments [against the fugitive 
slave law].  Unless this shall be done without unnecessary delay, it is 
impossible for any human power to save the Union.”308  Even if Jus-
tice Story were right that the Constitution prevents states from inter-
fering with slave catchers engaged in self-help, then it follows that the 
Constitution is fundamentally pro-slavery.  That conclusion contri-
buted to a rupture in the abolitionist community, many of whose 
members had pushed a strategy of seeking jury trials in slave-
recapture cases.309  It is also the central error attributed to Dred Scott.  
To paraphrase Bork, who says Dred Scott must say Prigg.310 
If Prigg is the great stain on the legacy of Justice Story, Giles v. 
Harris is — or should be — the most prominent stain on the name of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Jackson Giles was a black Alabama citizen 
who wanted to vote in the November 1902 elections.311  Unfortunately 
for him, the newly enacted state constitution required registered voters 
to have paid poll taxes, to be literate, to have been employed for a 
year, and to own at least forty acres of land; the registrar was invested, 
moreover, with extensive discretion to deny new registrants.  Those, 
like Giles, who were registered prior to the new law312 were grandfa-
thered for life, but only if directly descended from (or themselves) a 
war veteran (including on the Confederate side of the Civil War) or if 
they “[were] of good character and . . . underst[oo]d the duties and ob-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 304 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
 305 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107–10 (1861). 
 306 See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615–16. 
 307 See Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Constitution: Ableman v. Booth and the 
Struggle over Fugitive Slaves, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 83, 86–89 (2008). 
 308 James Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message, December 3, 1860, in AMERICAN PRESIDENTS: 
FAREWELL MESSAGES TO THE NATION, 1796–2001, at 174, 177 (Gleaves Whitney ed., 2003). 
 309 See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 164–68 (1975). 
 310 See BORK, supra note 160, at 32 (“Who says Roe must say Lochner and Scott.”). 
 311 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482 (1903). 
 312 See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COM-
MENT. 295, 299 (2000). 
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ligations of citizenship under a republican form of government.”313  It 
is difficult to concoct a more transparent attempt to evade the Fif-
teenth Amendment.  Participants at the all-white constitutional con-
vention did not attempt to hide their work.  In his opening address to 
delegates, convention president John B. Knox said: “And what is it 
that we want to do?  Why it is within the limits imposed by the Feder-
al Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this State.”314 
They succeeded.  Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes recog-
nized what Alabama was doing to its black citizens and did nothing 
about it; indeed, the severity of the state’s disenfranchisement was the 
very reason for the Court’s quiescence: 
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to 
keep the blacks from voting. . . . If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a 
name on a piece of paper will not defeat them.  Unless we are prepared to 
supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it seems to us 
that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.  
Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, 
if done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be 
given by them or by the legislative and political department of the gov-
ernment of the United States.315 
Being legally disenfranchised in a massive state-sanctioned con-
spiracy against your race?  Call your senator. 
Giles is the anti–Cooper v. Aaron.316  In Cooper, the Court held that 
the Little Rock school board was not permitted to delay its integration 
plan, in deference to the Court’s role as “supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution.”317  Giles, rather, stands for the proposi-
tion that the Court is anything but “supreme.”  So far as racial dis-
crimination was concerned, the Court was self-consciously impotent. 
The Court reinforced that view in Gong Lum v. Rice.318  Gong 
Lum, a Chinese man, wanted his nine-year-old daughter, Martha, a 
U.S. citizen, to attend the only public school in her district, the Rose-
dale Consolidated High School.319  Rosedale was maintained for white 
students, and the Mississippi Constitution provided at the time that 
“[s]eparate schools shall be maintained for children of the white and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 313 ALA. CONST. of 1901 art. VIII, §§ 177–84 (1901); see also Giles, 189 U.S. at 483–84 (describ-
ing sections 177–84 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution). 
 314 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (quoting John B. Knox, President Ala. Con-
stitutional Convention of 1901, Address Before the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 
(May 21, 1901)). 
 315 Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.  Richard Pildes calls this reasoning “the most legally disingenuous 
analysis in the pages of the U.S. Reports.”  Pildes, supra note 312, at 306. 
 316 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 317 Id. at 18. 
 318 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
 319 Id. at 79–80, 84. 
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colored races.”320  Gong claimed that, though Martha was not white, 
neither was she colored, and that she was closer to the former than the 
latter.  Gong’s lawyer said as much to the Mississippi Supreme Court: 
The court will take judicial notice of the fact that members of the Mongo-
lian race under our Jim Crow statute are treated as not belonging to the 
negro race.  The Japanese are classified with the Chinese.  These two  
races furnish some of the most intelligent and enterprising people.  They 
certainly stand nearer to the white race than they do to the negro race.  If 
the Caucasian is not ready to admit that the representative Mongolian is 
his equal he is willing to concede that the Mongolian is on the hither side 
of the half-way line between the Caucasian and African.321 
The Court rejected this argument.  In a unanimous opinion, the 
Court held that Mississippi was entitled to maintain an all-white 
school from which all “colored” students were excluded, and that cate-
gory included Chinese children.322 
Gong Lum is an ugly, unfortunate case, arguably worse than Plessy.  
Part of the ugliness stems from the fact that this was not a test case; 
the stakes of the litigation were clear to the Court, which was tasked 
with assigning a race to the plaintiff, with foreseeable consequences for 
her projects and plans.  As Primus has written, the modern Court — 
or at least Justice Kennedy — has come to understand race-based poli-
cies with individual, identifiable victims in a different and more perni-
cious light than policies with faceless victims whose identities are not 
known in advance.323  More generally, the Court placed its blessing on 
a scheme whose design cannot be defended as even formally race-
neutral.  White parents were able (indeed required) to send their child-
ren to one of the numerous white-only schools in Mississippi, while 
students of other races were designated “colored” and lumped together 
into an undifferentiated mass at scattered, inferior schools.  The undif-
ferentiated mass better approximates the modern liberal cosmopolitan 
ideal, but coupled with separate schools for white students, the system 
as a whole is inexplicable in terms other than the promotion of white 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 320 MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. 8, § 207 (1890). 
 321 Rice v. Gong Lum, No. 24773, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 146, at *22 (May 11, 1925) (transcribing 
briefing by the appellees). 
 322 Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 87. 
 323 Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1369 (2010).  
Operational examples of this distinction include the Court’s preference for designing promotional 
exams with intended racial effects over throwing out an exam already administered that does not 
achieve those effects, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009); Justice Kennedy’s stated 
preference for drawing school district lines that take race into account over the ex post assignment 
of students to schools based in part on their race, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); and the assumed constitutional distinction between “ten percent” plans and  
individualized affirmative action plans, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner at 14–17, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635. 
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supremacy.324  Indeed, the policy the Court blessed virtually required 
the sorts of racist arguments that Gong’s attorney made on his behalf.  
Like the policy in Loving v. Virginia,325 the Mississippi Constitution 
sought to protect a space for white racial purity; racial division was 
neither an unintended nor an instrumental consequence of the policy, 
but was in fact its goal.326 
A final case worth mention is Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a 
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy.327  The Court has since said that 
the case was wrong the day it was decided.328  Bowers’s overruling 
sharply divided the Court, but less than a decade later, seventy percent 
of the American people say they would not support a ban on same-sex 
intimacy.329  The Court in Lawrence v. Texas disavowed both the result 
and the reasoning of Bowers, which assumed the answer to the ques-
tion presented both by permitting traditional practice to conclusively 
determine rights under the Due Process Clause and by rejecting Mi-
chael Hardwick’s claim on the ground that there was no fundamental 
right of “homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”330  Framed at that level of 
specificity, there is no fundamental right to do a great many things 
that the Constitution should and does protect. 
The analytic problems of the Bowers majority opinion appear al-
most willful.  First is the curious insistence on treating Michael Hard-
wick’s claim as an as-applied challenge even though the statute did not 
distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex acts.331  In doing so the 
Court expressly reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the law 
as applied to sodomy between men and women, implying that such a 
challenge would entail different analysis.332  But given that the Court 
based its decision on a tradition of antisodomy laws (which typically 
did not discriminate based on sex)333 and the presumptively valid 
moral concerns that underlie them,334 one is left to wonder what con-
siderations could possibly motivate a different analysis.  Is a communi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 324 The Mississippi Supreme Court said as much in its opinion rejecting Gong’s claim: 
To all persons acquainted with the social conditions of this state and of the Southern 
states generally it is well known that it is the earnest desire of the white race to preserve 
its racial integrity and purity, and to maintain the purity of the social relations as far as 
it can be done by law. 
  Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925). 
 325 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 326 See id. at 11. 
 327 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986). 
 328 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 329 Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Knowledge Networks, Field Report: Constitu-
tional Attitudes Survey 56 (2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 330 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 191–92. 
 331 See id. at 188 n.2. 
 332 Id. 
 333 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.  
 334 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–96. 
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ty’s moral condemnation of non-procreative sex less privileged than its 
moral condemnation of gays?335  Or is it that any less flagrant a sever-
ing of the statute would have branded just about every sexually active 
person in Georgia — rather than just gays — as criminals?336  One 
member of the majority — Justice O’Connor — later implied that it 
would have been a different case had the Georgia statute applied only 
to same-sex sodomy.337  But there was no danger of an opposite-sex 
couple being prosecuted under the statute,338 and Justice O’Connor 
signed on to an opinion that itself saw a constitutional distinction be-
tween same-sex and opposite-sex sodomy.339 
Another member of the majority, Justice Powell, suggested that the 
case would have come out differently had it involved an Eighth 
Amendment claim and a serious prison term.340  But the problem with 
the law was not the nature of its penalty but the nature of its prohibi-
tion.  The statute expressed hostility toward a class of citizens, casting 
a shadow over not just their sex lives but also their employment pros-
pects, their political activity, and their familial relationships.  Bowers 
enabled Justice Scalia’s powerful retort in Romer v. Evans, that a ban 
on laws disfavoring gays and lesbians was in serious tension with al-
lowing their archetypal conduct to be criminalized.341  Justice Powell 
famously told his gay law clerk during deliberations that he had never 
met a gay person, and he later came to regret his vote in the case.342 
Bowers authorized the State to visit serious criminal sanctions — or 
not, at its prosecutors’ discretion — upon individuals solely because of 
whom they choose to love and how.  If any decision could be more an-
tithetical to the spirit of liberty, I am not aware of it.  The emerging 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 335 Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMER-
ICA, 1861–2003, at 2 (2008) (“From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, the norm reflected in 
[the Anglo-American legal regime regulating sexuality] was procreative marriage.”). 
 336 See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 658 (1994) (quoting a memo written to Justice Marshall by his law 
clerk Dan Richman during the Bowers deliberations: “To repeat the point, which I’m sure many 
members of the Court will forget or ignore: THIS IS NOT A CASE ABOUT ONLY HOMO-
SEXUALS.  ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE DO THIS KIND OF THING.”); JOYCE MURDOCH & 
DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 316 
(2001) (“Homosexuals were being told that when they engaged in certain nearly universal sexual 
practices the Constitution would not keep cops out of their bedrooms.”). 
 337 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 338 A married couple had been plaintiffs in the original action, but their claims were dismissed 
below on the grounds that there was no risk that they would be prosecuted.  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 
188 n.2. 
 339 Id. at 190. 
 340 Id. at 197–98 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 341 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640–41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 342 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521, 530 (2001). 
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consensus on LGBT rights makes Bowers look terrifically dated, just 
eight years after Lawrence. 
 
*  *  * 
 
What is wrong with Prigg, Giles, Gong Lum, and Bowers?  Or ra-
ther, what is right with them?  Are they any better reasoned than the 
anticanon?  A well-trained lawyer would recognize many of their “le-
gal” errors.  Their moral failings are at least the equal of the cases in 
the anticanon.  The decisions in Giles and Bowers were highly salient 
when rendered, and garnered as much or more media attention than 
did Plessy or Lochner.343  If analytic error compounded with immorali-
ty is not sufficient to place a case within the anticanon, then we must 
turn our gaze elsewhere. 
III.  RECONSTRUCTING THE ANTICANON 
Legal canons do not always, or even usually, refer to cases.  Canons 
also refer to rules of construction, particularly for statutes, in a usage 
not unrelated to the one that motivates this Article.  In a well-known 
essay published in 1950, Karl Llewellyn purported to demonstrate that 
for every canon of statutory construction, there is a responsive canon 
that limits or qualifies the operation of the first.344  For example, plain 
and unambiguous language must be given its natural effect, but not if 
doing so would lead to absurd results or frustrate manifest purpose.345  
Llewellyn’s point, which endures, was that canons can be as much re-
sources for constructors as rules of construction.  Even as commenta-
tors and judges insist that canons lend answers to conflicts over the 
meaning of legal texts, canons are not authoritative on their own.  
“[T]o make any canon take hold in a particular instance,” Llewellyn 
said, “the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by 
means other than the use of the canon.”346  Canons are best described 
not as a set of instructions but as an argot for those trained in the art 
of legal argument. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 343 Giles and Bowers, like Lochner but unlike Plessy, were front-page news.  Compare, e.g., The 
Supreme Court Sustains the Alabama Constitution, DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 28, 1903, at 1, and 
Justices Back Ban on Private Homosexual Acts, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1986, at 1 (reporting on Giles 
and Bowers, respectively), with New York 10-Hour Law is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 1905, § 1, at 1 (reporting on Lochner), and infra p. 442 (discussing relatively light media cov-
erage of Plessy). 
 344 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
 345 Id. at 403. 
 346 Id. at 401. 
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I argued in Part I that a decision’s anticanonicity is said to consist 
in its embodiment of a set of legal propositions to be avoided in consti-
tutional adjudication.  On this definition, Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, 
and Korematsu are the most defensible members of the anticanon.  
Part II concluded, though, that the frequently articulated argument 
that these cases achieve anticanonical status because of the uniquely 
low quality of their legal reasoning, or because they are morally nox-
ious, or both, is not complete.  Indeed, these cases stand for a variety 
of often mutually inconsistent propositions, and are no less defensible 
or more morally repugnant than many other decisions that remain rel-
atively obscure. 
This Part takes as settled that anticanonicity does not result (at 
least not linearly) from a decision’s argumentation or outcome.  It in-
stead results from other features of the case that make it a useful re-
source for subsequent legal communities.  Section A recounts the his-
torical path the treatment of these cases took toward realizing their 
current designations as anticanonical.  Section B uses that history, in 
part, to derive a theory of the anticanon, an account that articulates 
more systematically the features of the anticanon that enable it to 
serve its function in constitutional argument. 
A.  Historicism 
For three of the four cases in the anticanon, it is easy to identify the 
precise moment at which their central holding was decisively repu-
diated.  The first line of the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically 
intended to overrule the Dred Scott decision.347  Brown all but over-
turned Plessy, and a series of per curiam opinions extending Brown to 
public beaches,348 golf courses,349 and buses350 finished the job.  Loch-
ner is nearly irreconcilable with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.351  
By numerous measures, however, it took much more than formal re-
pudiation to place these decisions in the anticanon.  Indeed, as the Ko-
rematsu example suggests, it is not even clear that formal repudiation 
is necessary. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 347 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 173 (1986). 
 348 Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam). 
 349 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam). 
 350 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). 
 351 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  Lochner also stands in serious tension with Bunting v. Oregon, 243 
U.S. 426 (1917), which upheld a ten-hour workday for manufacturing employees.  Id. at 438.  
Many believed that Bunting signaled the end of Lochner-style reasoning, until the Court’s later 
decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  See id. at 564 (Taft, C.J., dissent-
ing) (“It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have al-
ways supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.”). 
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That is so because recognition of a case as anticanonical is not in-
ternal to legal reasoning.  A visiting alien who has learned how to ne-
gotiate American constitutional argument and is aware of the status of 
precedents as either good or bad law, but is not aware of the anti-
canon, could not identify its members.352  This claim, at least in part, 
is historicist in nature.  A historicist approach to the treatment of legal 
precedents assumes that the status of a precedent depends on social 
and historical context rather than on conventional legal reasoning.353  
Under such an approach, it should be possible to specify at least some 
of the conditions for anticanonicity by examining cases longitudinally, 
with an eye toward the events and historical conditions that altered 
how we think about each case. 
The most efficient way to begin this inquiry is to return to our cita-
tion study.  Two results are of particular interest.  First, three of the 
four cases — Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner — began to receive sig-
nificant negative treatment in Supreme Court opinions in the 1960s.  
Although Plessy was first repudiated in 1954, Dred Scott and Lochner 
were effectively overruled well before the 1960s.  This timing suggests 
that significant negative treatment in case law reflects a phenomenon 
that does not depend directly on whether a case is formally good or 
bad law.  Second, the final case, Korematsu, in fact receives more posi-
tive than negative treatment, and its significant positive treatment 
ticks up in the 1960s.  These two interesting results are related, and 
understanding them takes us some way toward understanding how the 
anticanon came into being. 
1.  Dred Scott. — In many quarters, Dred Scott was notorious from 
the start.  In the week after the decision was issued, the Chicago Tri-
bune wrote: “We scarcely know how to express our detestation of [the 
Taney opinion’s] inhuman dicta, or to fathom the wicked consequences 
which may flow from it.”354  The decision was foremost in the minds 
of Reconstruction Republicans drafting the Fourteenth Amendment; 
Charles Sumner tried (in vain) to prevent a bust of Chief Justice Taney 
from being placed in the Supreme Court chamber along with those of 
Taney’s predecessors.355  Elsewhere, the reaction was somewhat differ-
ent.  The Augusta (Georgia) Constitutionalist took the decision as an 
opportunity to declare that “opposition to southern opinion upon [sla-
very] is now opposition to the Constitution, and morally treason 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 352 Cf. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1039 (1997) (“If we did not already know that Marbury was so momentous a case, we 
would be hard pressed to explain why it is so celebrated.”). 
 353 See Balkin, supra note 17, at 679. 
 354 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 417 (quoting CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1857). 
 355 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 222 (1977). 
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against the Government.”356  The reaction in newspapers was not en-
tirely sectional.  The New York Herald, a northern Democratic paper, 
wrote: “The supreme law is expounded by the supreme authority, and 
disobedience is rebellion, treason, and revolution.”357 
This divide alone is reason to doubt that Dred Scott was made in-
stantly anticanonical with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
A war had just been fought, with partisans of one side willing to kill 
and to die to defend the decision’s presuppositions.  In his 1935 bio-
graphy of Roger Taney, Carl Swisher accused historians assessing the 
case of exhibiting a pronounced Union bias: “[S]o sublime was their 
confidence that the North was right and the South wrong in the sec-
tional struggle, they were unable to do anything but condemn all ac-
tions based on sympathy with the South.”358  So long as the wounds of 
the war remained fresh, it would be difficult to use Dred Scott as a 
shared symbol of constitutional error.  Dred Scott has not been favora-
bly cited in a majority opinion of the Supreme Court in more than 100 
years,359 but the decision did not receive negative treatment — the 
crux of the anticanon — in any majority opinion between 1901 and 
1957. 
Indeed, with the notable exceptions of the first Justice Harlan, dis-
senting in Plessy, and Hugo Black, discussed below, the Justices of the 
Supreme Court did not seem to identify the case as uniquely sinful in 
the way it is thought of today until well into the 1960s.360  Several of 
the individual opinions in the Insular Cases relied on Dred Scott as 
authority for the constitutional relationship between Congress and ac-
quired territories.361  Justice Frankfurter referred to the case as a “fail-
ure” in his opinion for the Court in United States v. UAW-CIO,362 but 
for him that consisted in refusing to practice constitutional avoidance, 
in failing to “take the smooth handle for the sake of repose.”363  The 
phrase referred to a letter written by Justice Catron to President Bu-
chanan during the Dred Scott deliberations, in which the Justice urged 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 356 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 418 (quoting AUGUSTA CONSTITUTIONALIST, Mar. 
15, 1857). 
 357 Id. (quoting N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 8, 1857). 
 358 SWISHER, supra note 185, at 583. 
 359 The last was Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).  See id. at 81. 
 360 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  That language also 
speaks, of course, to Justice Harlan’s extraordinary prescience in recognizing Plessy’s dim future.  
See AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 468). 
 361 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 250, 257 (1901); id. at 291 (White, J., concurring); De 
Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196 (1901); id. at 209 (McKenna, J., dissenting).  
 362 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1957). 
 363 Id. at 591 (quoting 10 WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN 106 n.1 (John Bassett Moore ed., 
1910)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  Taney’s purported abuse of obiter dictum was also for 
many years a preoccupation of historians who studied the case.  See FEHRENBACHER, supra 
note 147, at 335–36. 
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the President to persuade Justice Grier not to decide the case on the 
narrow question of whether Scott had even been domiciled at Fort 
Snelling.364  Frankfurter’s opinion implicitly endorses this narrow 
holding, under which Scott would have lost on a technicality. 
Consistent with this treatment of the case, which today feels oddly 
disinterested, Noel Dowling’s influential constitutional law casebook 
did not refer to the Dred Scott decision in any of its first five editions 
running from 1937 through 1954.365  When the case finally appeared in 
the 1959 edition, it was in a footnote to a discussion of a series of 1950s 
cases on the meaning and import of national citizenship; there was not 
a hint of normative disapproval.366  Indeed, when Gerald Gunther 
took over the Dowling casebook in 1965, he cited Dred Scott as posi-
tive authority for the existence of substantive due process.367 
In a 1953 article on the case, political scientist Wallace Mendelson 
referred to “a rather general acceptance of it as a ‘sincere’ judicial ef-
fort to solve a nation-wrecking problem.”368  Mendelson was perhaps 
responding, at least in part, to a then-recent series of rehabilitative 
writings on Taney in the legal realist tradition.  Charles Smith’s 1936 
biography argues, for example, that “[f]rom the standpoint of tech-
nique in interpreting the Constitution as it was written, Taney’s opi-
nion . . . is one of the best that he ever wrote.”369  Ben Palmer’s 1939 
monograph on Chief Justices Marshall and Taney, aptly subtitled  
“Statesmen of the Law,” sought to place the jurists’ decisions, includ-
ing Dred Scott, within historical context to “mak[e] a correct appraisal 
of a man’s character and influence, unaffected by the emotional distor-
tion of contemporary view.”370  So doing, Palmer concluded that Ta-
ney’s Republican opponents had knowingly slandered him by conflat-
ing his assessment of “the public attitude toward the negro when the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 364 10 WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, supra note 363, at 106 n.1. 
 365 See NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1937); 
NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter DOWLING, 
SECOND EDITION]; NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1946); 
NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1950); NOEL T. DOWLING, 
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1954).  The Dowling casebook is the precursor to 
the Sullivan and Gunther casebook, authored by Kathleen Sullivan, that is popular in law school 
classrooms today.  SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85. 
 366 NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1127 (6th ed. 1959). 
 367 NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 862 n.1 (7th ed. 1965). 
 368 Mendelson, supra note 186, at 16 (citing Charles Evans Hughes, Roger Brooke Taney, 17 
A.B.A. J. 785, 787 (1931)). 
 369 CHARLES W. SMITH, JR., ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN JURIST 155 (1936). 
 370 PALMER, supra note 159, at 216. 
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constitution was adopted”371 with his own views on slavery, which, to 
Palmer’s mind, revealed him to be “kindly and humane.”372 
And then there was Swisher’s biography, already mentioned, which 
concludes in a wistful air faintly recognizable to modern lawyers: 
Had the Confederacy been permitted to establish itself it might have pre-
served a rich and vital culture which in its own way gradually removed 
the worst evils connected with it, and southern territory might not have 
become the waste lands of northern missionary zeal, inhabited throughout 
vast areas by a civilization brooding over its own decay.  Within his field 
of action Taney labored to avert this disaster.  Those rejecting the biased 
argument that the victory of the North proved that the South deserved its 
fate will, at the very least, accord him sympathy and admiration.373 
Three decades later, however, Swisher contributed to a volume on 
Supreme Court Justices in which, while not abandoning his desire for 
a contextual assessment of Taney, he adopted a strikingly different 
tone.  “[I]t is . . . hard to comprehend the seemingly self-willed blind-
ness of Taney and other paternalistic Southerners who refused to look 
away from peaceful residential plantations to mass-production planta-
tions of other kinds where Negroes were worked to death under the 
lash of ruthless overseers,” he wrote.  “To us it simply refuses to make 
ethical and moral sense, and we cannot see how it could have made 
sense to intelligent and honest people a century ago.”374 
Swisher’s tonal shift spans an important epoch in Dred Scott’s pre-
cedential life, one punctuated by Brown and the events Brown pre-
saged.  The language of constitutional evil with which we today asso-
ciate Dred Scott went absent from Swisher’s biography and Justice 
Frankfurter’s 1957 discussion, but it appeared twice in separate  
opinions of Justice Black during Frankfurter’s tenure.  In the 1945 
case of Williams v. North Carolina,375 Black wrote in dissent: “I am 
confident . . . that today’s decision will no more aid in the solution of 
the problem than the Dred Scott decision aided in settling controver-
sies over slavery.”376  What is notable about Black’s Williams opinion 
is how gratuitous the reference is.  The case had nothing at all to do 
with race, much less slavery; it involved a prosecution for bigamous 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 371 Id. at 218. 
 372 Id. at 219.  Palmer also emphasized that Taney would not have reached the question of the 
constitutionality of slavery in federal territories but for the extended discussion of the issue in Jus-
tice McLean’s and Justice Curtis’s dissenting opinions.  See id. at 221.  Don Fehrenbacher dis-
putes this account of the motivation for reaching the power of Congress to ban slavery in the ter-
ritories.  See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 147, at 309–11. 
 373 SWISHER, supra note 185, at 588. 
 374 Carl Brent Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE 35, 59 (Allison Dunham & 
Philip B. Kurland eds., 1964). 
 375 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
 376 Id. at 274 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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cohabitation, which the Court upheld against a full-faith-and-credit 
challenge.377  Black was using the decision not as a precedent in the 
traditional sense, but as a symbolic resource whose mere invocation 
added an exclamation point to his argument. 
Justice Black used Dred Scott to similar effect in his dissent in Co-
hen v. Hurley,378 a 1961 decision in which the majority upheld an at-
torney disbarment against a due process challenge.379  Joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, Black criticized the majority for 
basing its decision in part on tradition: “This argument — that consti-
tutional rights are to be determined by long-standing practices rather 
than the words of the Constitution — is not, as the majority points 
out, a new one.  It lay at the basis of two of this Court’s more re-
nowned decisions — Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Fergu-
son.”380  This usage of the anticanon was more mature than in Justice 
Black’s Williams dissent.  As in Williams, Dred Scott was being used 
as symbolic authority rather than as controlling precedent.  But unlike 
in Williams, we also see a healthy dose of revisionism, as neither Dred 
Scott nor Plessy is anti-positivist in the way Justice Black sought to 
argue.  This kind of gratuitous revisionism — Cohen is also not a race 
case — is a common feature of anticanon invocation. 
Other Justices similarly deployed Dred Scott in subsequent years.  
In Bell v. Maryland,381 in which the Court vacated convictions for sit-
ins, Justice Douglas wrote in his concurrence, “seldom have modern 
cases (cf. the ill-starred Dred Scott decision) so exalted property in 
suppression of individual rights.”382  Douglas’s usage was not revision-
ist in the way of Black’s Williams opinion, but one might easily have 
invoked Dred Scott as standing instead for the proposition that the 
Court should not use creative arguments to constitutionalize matters of 
local law, as Douglas urged in Bell.383  Dred Scott’s symbolic value 
progressively was becoming such that it was useful to characterize its 
central propositions at an exceedingly broad level of generality. 
Bell also represented the first instance since Justice Harlan’s Plessy 
dissent in which the weight of Dred Scott’s negative authority was 
brought to bear against the forces of racial exclusion.  Unlike Justice 
Frankfurter and unlike Dowling, Justice Black and Justice Douglas 
were using Dred Scott as a case about race.  This is significant and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 377 Id. at 227, 239 (majority opinion). 
 378 366 U.S. 117 (1961). 
 379 Id. at 118. 
 380 Id. at 142 n.23 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 381 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
 382 Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in part) (citation omitted). 
 383 See id. at 260 (arguing that the petitioners’ convictions should be invalidated under the  
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause). 
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goes some way toward explaining why the case, though long famous 
and heavily criticized, was less surely anticanonical before the 1960s.  
Until that point, Dred Scott more commonly stood in for the harms of 
judicial overreach.  This emphasis made sense in light of the juridical 
commitments of the post–New Deal Court, including, prominently, 
Frankfurter.  As section B discusses, however, anticanonical cases are 
characterized by their normative multiplicity, and it was not until 
Brown and the civil rights movement that Dred Scott could be called 
to service as a race case.  Already available as a warning that judges 
should “take the smooth handle for the sake of repose,” Dred Scott be-
came a further, even if at times incompatible, warning that judges 
should recognize and root out political affronts to black citizenship.  In 
order for Dred Scott to enter the anticanon, racial equality had to be-
come not just a legal imperative but an ethical commitment of the 
American political culture. 
Once Dred Scott came to be one of the political symbols that sig-
naled that ethical commitment, it took on added life as the prime ex-
emplar of the evils of substantive due process — and therefore of  
Roe — apart from any connection either to racial exclusion or to cala-
mitous political events.  In his famous (canonical?) critique of Roe, Ely 
compared the case, quite sensibly, to Lochner, not to Dred Scott.384  
But Lochner’s moral resonance was perhaps insufficient for it to serve 
this function for conservative opponents of Roe.  David Currie wrote 
in 1983 that Dred Scott was “at least very possibly the first application 
of substantive due process in the Supreme Court, and in a sense, the 
original precedent for Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade.”385  Bork 
quoted that language favorably in his 1990 monograph, in which he 
suggested, as noted, that the three cases are indistinguishable.386 
Indeed, there is no fuller discussion of Dred Scott in the last 100 
years of Supreme Court case law than in Justice Scalia’s partial dissent 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which 
also quotes Currie to support the link between Roe’s and Dred Scott’s 
invocations of substantive due process.387  More poetically, he contin-
ues the comparison in the opinion’s coda, which describes the portrait 
of Taney hanging at Harvard Law School: 
There seems to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression of 
profound sadness and disillusionment.  Perhaps he always looked that 
way, even when dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts.  But those of us 
who know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 384 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937–41 (1973). 
 385 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 
1836–1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 736 (footnotes omitted). 
 386 BORK, supra note 160, at 32. 
 387 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
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eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had that case — its 
already apparent consequences for the Court and its soon-to-be-played-out 
consequences for the Nation — burning on his mind.388 
For Scalia and for many other social conservatives, Roe, like Dred 
Scott, not only involves substantive due process but also implicates 
profound questions of “life and death, freedom and subjugation.”389  
To deny that Dred Scott is anticanonical for the set of reasons Scalia 
identifies, to assert that it stands instead for the perils of originalism, 
or positivism more generally, or even racism, is to misunderstand the 
use of the anticanon.  The decision represents all of those things at 
once. 
2.  Plessy. — Plessy’s route to the anticanon has much in common 
with Dred Scott’s.  In both cases, the Supreme Court did not put the 
decision to real work until its members wished to firm up an ethical 
departure from Jim Crow during the 1960s.  Plessy’s centrality to that 
project is obvious in light of its (reluctant) starring role in the Brown 
opinion.  With the exception of that opinion, no Justice cited Plessy 
unfavorably in any opinion between Plessy itself and Justice Black’s 
Cohen opinion.  Prior to Brown, and indeed for some years after, there 
was no consensus even among elites that Plessy was wrongly decided, 
much less anticanonical.390  The Topeka, Kansas, Board of Education 
opened the argument section of its first Brown appellate brief with an 
approving citation to Plessy,391 and even the appellants argued not 
that Plessy was eroded or tacitly overruled but rather that it was “not 
applicable” to racial segregation in elementary education.392  The Ples-
sy decision was not hugely controversial at the time it issued;393 the 
New York Times and the Washington Post gave the decision minimal 
— and decidedly neutral — attention.394  Even the New Orleans Daily 
Picayune relegated the decision to a brief and approving mention on 
page four under the remarkable headline “Equality, but not  
Socialism.”395 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 388 Id. at 1001–02. 
 389 Id. at 1002. 
 390 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 32–33 (1959); Rehnquist Hearing, supra note 71, at 324–25 (memorandum from then-clerk Wil-
liam Rehnquist to Justice Jackson asserting that Plessy “was right and should be re-affirmed”). 
 391 Brief for Appellees at 11–12, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 WL 
87553, at *11. 
 392 Brief for Appellants at 11, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (No. 1), 1952 WL 47265, at *11. 
 393 See LOFGREN, supra note 146, at 5. 
 394 Louisiana’s Separate Car Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1896, at 3; Separate Coach Law 
Upheld, The Supreme Court Decides a Case from Louisiana, WASH. POST, May 19, 1896, at 6; see 
also Primus, supra note 17, at 257 n.49. 
 395 Equality, but not Socialism, NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, May 19, 1896, at 4. 
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Aware of this uninspired reception, Primus offers the possibility 
that Plessy could have become canonical by the 1930s or the 1950s.396  
This appears not to have been so.  As Lofgren notes, major treatises 
and casebooks ignored the case well into the 1940s.397  Charles War-
ren’s The Supreme Court in United States History omits the case in its 
first edition in 1922, and in a revised edition published four years later 
mentions Plessy only in a brief footnote cataloging twenty-five cases 
“involving rights of negroes.”398  Dowling’s casebook includes Plessy in 
its preliminary edition published in 1931, but the case disappears in 
subsequent editions produced in 1937, 1941, 1946, and 1950.  Tellingly, 
the New York Times story on Gong Lum, a case that relies explicitly on 
Plessy to extend the “separate but equal” doctrine to public schooling, 
does not mention Plessy at all.399 
What happened?  Well, Brown happened, of course.  But it is a 
mistake to assume that Brown itself made Plessy anticanonical.  For 
one thing, the Brown Court famously refused to label Plessy as wrong 
the day it was decided, instead considering the constitutionality of se-
gregated public education “in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the Nation.”400  For another, 
Brown did not make Brown itself canonical in the way in which we 
speak of it today.  The decision’s legacy had to overcome “massive re-
sistance” among Southern political leaders;401 its iconic status was fa-
cilitated by subsequent enforcement by the Court in cases like Cooper 
v. Aaron402 and Green v. School Board of New Kent County;403 and its 
role in securing civil rights for black Americans was arguably dwarfed 
and reinforced by the movement energy that led, among other things, 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.404 
Consistent with what Primus calls its “yoking” to Brown,405 Plessy 
was weaponized in the midst of this movement energy.  In Wright v. 
Rockefeller,406 in which the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 396 Primus, supra note 17, at 257 n.49. 
 397 LOFGREN, supra note 146, at 5. 
 398 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 621 n.1 
(1926). 
 399 Upholds Segregation of Chinese in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1927, at 14. 
 400 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954); see also Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme 
Court, 1953 Term — Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 98–99 (1954). 
 401 The Southern Manifesto was signed by 101 Southern members of Congress, including all 
but three of the South’s twenty-two Senators.  102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956). 
 402 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 403 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 404 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO-
CIAL CHANGE? 39–169 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Brown reflected rather than 
precipitated the social and political changes responsible for civil rights gains). 
 405 Primus, supra note 16, at 255. 
 406 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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an apparent racial gerrymander of New York City, Justice Douglas in-
voked Plessy in dissent, calling the alleged political division by race a 
“vestige[]” of Plessy.407  Four years later, Douglas again cited Plessy as 
part of a long list of historical inequities against blacks in his concur-
ring opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,408 which upheld the fair 
housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as within the power 
of Congress.  Plessy appeared again in Justice Black’s concurring  
opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell,409 which upheld the Voting Rights Act’s 
ban on literacy tests.  Black framed the ban in terms of overcoming 
unequal educational opportunities: “The children who were denied an 
equivalent education by the ‘separate but equal’ rule of [Plessy], over-
ruled in [Brown], are now old enough to vote.”410  Douglas cited Plessy 
again in his dissent in Milliken v. Bradley,411 in which he argued that 
failure to endorse an interdistrict desegregation remedy would likely 
restore Plessy’s “separate but equal” regime.412  In each of these in-
stances, members of the Court used Plessy as they used Dred Scott: as 
ammunition in their efforts to eliminate — and to empower political 
actors to eliminate — the vestiges of racial exclusion from American 
public life in the 1960s and early 1970s.  As with Dred Scott, the chief 
forces behind the use of the case in that way were Black and Douglas. 
And as with Dred Scott, this new role for Plessy led to its later use 
in very different ways by more conservative members of the Court.  
Today we associate Plessy with Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, 
and specifically with his admonition that the Constitution is “color-
blind.”413  But that language rarely appeared in Supreme Court  
opinions until Regents of the University of California v. Bakke414 was 
decided in 1978.  Bakke was of course an affirmative action case, and 
the dispute over the meaning of Plessy and of Harlan’s dissent was a 
central debate that would play out similarly in numerous subsequent 
cases.  Justices Brennan and Marshall warned against reading Har-
lan’s quote out of context.  Brennan called the “color-blind” language a 
“shorthand” that “has never been adopted by this Court as the proper 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”415  Marshall argued that 
Harlan should be read as recognizing that the “‘real meaning’ of the 
[Separate Car Act] was ‘that colored citizens are so inferior and de-
graded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 407 Id. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 408 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 409 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970) (Black, J., concurring). 
 410 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 411 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 412 Id. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 413 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 414 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 415 Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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by white citizens.’”416  Brennan and Marshall sought to claim Harlan 
as antiformalist and attuned to the “social meaning” of segregation. 
Meanwhile, Justice Stevens, who wrote for four Justices that the af-
firmative action policy at issue in Bakke violated Title VI, referred to 
the statement of Senator John Pastore in the legislative debate over the 
statute: “[T]here is one area where no room at all exists for private pre-
judices.  That is the area of governmental conduct.  As the first Mr. 
Justice Harlan said in his prophetic dissenting opinion in [Plessy]: ‘Our 
Constitution is color-blind.’”417  For Stevens, at least as to the statute, 
and implicitly for Senator Pastore, Harlan could be marshaled for the 
proposition that colorblindness implies race blindness in a formal 
sense.  For Brennan and Marshall, in effect, the symbolism of Harlan’s 
dissent was that the Constitution must be “blind” to a particular status 
inferred by the presence of color.  In Neil Gotanda’s terminology, Ste-
vens took Harlan to mean blindness as to “formal-race,” while Bren-
nan and Marshall took him to mean blindness as to “status-race.”418 
Few resources are more valuable to constitutional argument than 
the dissent to an anticanonical case.  The anticanonization of Plessy 
laid the groundwork for the canonization of the Harlan dissent, which 
in turn reinforced the anticanonicity of the majority opinion.419  In the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 416 Id. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 417 Id. at 416 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks  
omitted). 
 418 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38–
39 (1991). 
 419 See Primus, supra note 17, at 248.  Justice Harlan’s dissent was cited in the Supreme Court 
just twice before 1971, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677 n.7 (1966), and 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184–85 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring), and in only two other 
opinions prior to Bakke: Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 
412 U.S. 94, 150 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring), and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 
(1971).  Since Bakke it has been invoked in twenty-four opinions in nineteen separate cases, many 
of which bear no obvious relationship to Plessy.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2758 n.14 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 2782–83, 2787–88 
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2791–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 2799 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678, 683 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 
952, 1072 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); id. at 650 (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1030 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862–63 (1992); id. at 962 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992); Metro 
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 637 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Rutan v. Republican Party 
of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 174–75 (1989); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
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more than thirty years since Bakke, as all sides of the persistent debate 
over race-conscious governmental decisionmaking have sought to 
claim Harlan, a set piece has emerged, with more conservative Justices 
pushing a “formal-race” reading and more liberal Justices adopting 
something akin to the “status-race” position.420  For example, in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick,421 in which the Court upheld a federal government 
set-aside for minority contractors, Justice Stewart opened his dissent-
ing opinion with Harlan’s “color-blind” language and said, “I think to-
day’s decision is wrong for the same reason that [Plessy] was 
wrong,”422 because “racial discrimination is by definition invidious dis-
crimination.”423  And in Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts con-
trasted the Seattle school district’s statement that they had “no inten-
tion ‘to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as [a] . . . colorblind 
mentality’” with Harlan’s dissent.424  In the same case, Justice  
Thomas, explicitly taking Justice Breyer’s dissent to task for “at-
tempt[ing] to marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution,”425 
linked that notion conceptually both to Harlan and to the lawyers who 
litigated Brown.426  That dissent, for its part, indeed argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters “would have understood the legal 
and practical difference” between using racial classifications “to keep 
the races apart” and doing so “to bring the races together.”427  More 
than a century after Plessy was decided, and more than half a century 
since it was formally repudiated, its negative valence is more certain 
and its legal meaning less certain than ever. 
3.  Lochner. — We may be witnessing a transformation from the 
anticanonicity of Plessy to the canonicity of Justice Harlan’s more pli-
able, and therefore more valuable, dissenting opinion.  The story of 
Lochner is, in a sense, the converse.  Justice Holmes’s dissent, which is 
anything but pliable, was a canonical statement of opposition to the 
recalcitrance of the judicial conservatives who frustrated Progressive 
Era social legislation and a significant part of President Franklin De-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 788 (1986) (White, J., 
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522–23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 420 Compare, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 637 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 
521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), with Vera, 517 U.S. at 1071–72 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 421 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 422 Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 423 Id. at 526. 
 424 127 S. Ct. at 2758 n.14 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Debera Carlton 
Harrell, School Website Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controvery, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 2, 2005, at B1, B5). 
 425 Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 426 Id. at 2782–83. 
 427 Id. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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lano Roosevelt’s economic recovery agenda.428  The Lochner majority 
opinion itself was not anticanonical, however, until at least the late 
1960s, when it became a useful foil to Griswold v. Connecticut and its 
substantive due process progeny.429 
None of which is to say that Lochner was not a significant case.  It 
is to say, rather, that the case itself was no more significant within the 
judicial imagination than were other cases standing for similarly dis-
credited notions of substantive review of social and economic legisla-
tion, such as Allgeyer v. Louisiana430 and Coppage v. Kansas.431  All-
geyer unanimously invalidated a Louisiana statute that prevented 
Louisiana citizens from entering into marine insurance contracts with 
companies that did not comply with state law,432 and Coppage struck 
down a state ban on yellow-dog contracts, also on liberty-of-contract 
grounds.433  For many years, Allgeyer and Coppage were at least as 
significant precedents as Lochner.  Both the first and the second edi-
tions to the Dowling casebook, published in 1937 and 1941 respective-
ly, include extensive excerpts from both Allgeyer and Coppage, but the 
two editions combined contain only a single, cursory reference to 
Lochner.434  Indeed, the first six editions all cover Coppage in far 
greater detail than Lochner, which first received extensive treatment 
(at Coppage’s expense) when Gunther took over from Dowling for the 
seventh edition in 1965.435  As Figure C indicates, the Supreme Court 
cited both Coppage and Allgeyer more frequently than Lochner 
through the 1940s.  After those two cases were disavowed, they un-
derstandably faded from active citation.  By contrast, and typical of 
the anticanon, Lochner’s repudiation gave it new life. 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 428 See Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1470–73. 
 429 See id. at 1518 (“While Lochner era due process jurisprudence always had its severe critics, 
Lochner itself did not become a common negative touchstone until the early 1970s.”); see also id. 
at 1517–18 (arguing that the discussion of Lochner in the Griswold opinions of Justice Douglas 
and Justice Black influenced legal scholarship). 
 430 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 431 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
 432 165 U.S. at 591–93.  
 433 236 U.S. at 13. 
 434 DOWLING, SECOND EDITION, supra note 365, at 768–72, 866–80.  Of the three cases, only 
Coppage receives treatment in the preliminary edition of the casebook.  NOEL T. DOWLING, 
CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 847–62 (1931). 
 435 DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 367, at 864–70.  That 1965 edition is also the first to 
cover Griswold, but the decision to devote an entire section of the book to “The Aftermath of 
Lochner” almost certainly was made before the Griswold decision came down.  Id. at 745, 870.  
Griswold was decided June 7, 1965, and the cutoff date for materials to be included in the case-
book was June 15 of that year.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965); DOWLING 
& GUNTHER, supra note 367, at XII. 
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FIGURE C: SUPREME COURT CASES 
REFERRING TO ALLGEYER, LOCHNER, AND COPPAGE 
  
 Consistent with this treatment, in recounting the history of substan-
tive due process doctrine for economic regulation, Justice Black’s  
opinion in the 1949 case Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern 
Iron & Metal Co.436 referred not to the “Lochner era,” a term that 
would not enter regular use until the 1970s,437 but rather to the “All-
geyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine.”438  In Ferguson 
v. Skrupa,439 decided just two years before Griswold, Justice Black  
similarly referred to “[t]he doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, 
Adkins [v. Children’s Hospital440], [Jay] Burns [Baking Co. v. Bryan441], 
and like cases,” visiting no special disfavor upon Lochner.442  West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,443 which undermined Lochner’s legal premise 
by upholding a minimum wage law for women, did not single the case 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 436 335 U.S. 525 (1949).   
 437 See Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1473, 1518. 
 438 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 535.  In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), 
the Court held that Congress lacked the power to criminalize yellow-dog contracts for interstate 
carriers.  Id. at 179–80.   
 439 372 U.S. 726 (1963).   
 440 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 441 264 U.S. 504 (1924).  
 442 Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 730.  In the Burns decision, the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute 
fixing the permissible weight for loaves of bread.  264 U.S. at 517. 
 443 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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out, but buried it in a footnote between Allgeyer and Adair.444  Loch-
ner was at best a first among equals. 
Lochner is now much more than that, and it is worth pondering 
why.  There are differences between the cases.  Allgeyer had to do with 
choice of law and protectionism in the insurance industry, Coppage 
with yellow-dog contracts, Lochner with hour and (implicitly) wage 
legislation; arguably, Lochner’s subject was more central to the na-
tion’s economic life, though that is not obvious.  More significant is the 
presence, in Lochner, of Justice Holmes’s memorable dissent, and the 
subsequent treatment of that dissent by Progressives, including espe-
cially Felix Frankfurter and his disciples.445  Frankfurter adored 
Holmes.446  The two had socialized extensively in the 1910s; both were 
regulars — and Frankfurter a boarder — at the House of Truth, a 
Dupont Circle salon that also attracted Progressive intellectuals such 
as Walter Lippmann and Harold Laski.447  Frankfurter believed that 
Holmes’s “conception of the Constitution must become part of the po-
litical habits of the country, if our constitutional system is to endure; 
and if we care for our literary treasures, the expression of his views 
must become part of our national culture.”448 
Frankfurter held Holmes’s Lochner dissent in especially high re-
gard, viewing it as a near-perfect distillation of what was, for Frank-
furter, a perfect judicial philosophy.449  As a young Harvard professor 
in 1916, Frankfurter published a study of Holmes’s constitutional  
opinions in which he characterized Allgeyer as the “crest” of a wave of 
natural law thinking on the Court.450  The wave broke, he wrote, with 
Lochner: “Enough is said if it is noted that the tide has turned.  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 444 Id. at 392 n.1; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 83 n.12 (1947) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Lochner among many other cases invalidating regulatory legislation). 
 445 Holmes was not a member of the Allgeyer Court, and he filed a very brief dissent in Cop-
page that incorporated by reference his Lochner opinion.  Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).   
 446 Justice Douglas is said to have remarked, “You know why Frankfurter didn’t have any 
children?  Because Holmes didn’t.”  Roger K. Newman, The Warren Court and American Politics: 
An Impressionistic Appreciation, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 661, 677 (2001) (book review) (quoting 
an interview with Eliot Janeway) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 447 See Jeffrey O’Connell & Nancy Dart, The House of Truth: Home of the Young Frankfurter 
and Lippmann, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 79, 79, 87 (1985); Brad Snyder, The House that Built Holmes 
(Dec. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 448 FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 29 (1938). 
 449 Felix Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REV. 683, 
691 (1916) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions] (citing Holmes’s Lochner dissent as 
an opinion that “reflects his whole point of view towards constitutional interpretation”); see also 
Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353, 359 
(1916) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Hours of Labor] (“[T]he opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes [in Loch-
ner] pithily and completely puts the other point of view.”).   
 450 Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions, supra note 449, at 690. 
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turning point is the dissent in the Lochner case.”451  This strikes a dis-
cordant note in the ear of the modern lawyer; many of us learned in 
law school that Lochner began the trend that Frankfurter seems to say 
it ended.  He could not have known at the time that a new wave of 
Lochner-style opinions was on the horizon, but his sentiment is not 
just dated.  For Frankfurter, Lochner was inseparable from Holmes, 
whose dissent, he was certain, was the case’s enduring contribution to 
American law. 
Frankfurter would return to the same theme in later lectures, ar-
ticles, and opinions: that Holmes’s Lochner dissent played an integral 
part in altering the Court’s thinking on the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In his 1928 treatise on federal jurisdiction co-written with James Lan-
dis, Frankfurter argued that, soon after Lochner, “[t]he philosophy be-
hind the constitutional outlook of Mr. Justice Holmes . . . appeared to 
be vindicated by demonstration in detail.”452  A decade later, in a lec-
ture that would form part of Frankfurter’s idolatrous monograph on 
Holmes,453 he told a Cambridge audience that “Mr. Justice Holmes’ 
classic dissent in [Lochner] will never lose its relevance.”454 
True enough, it now seems, but Frankfurter himself was in large 
measure responsible for that.455  Others have remarked that Frankfur-
ter’s “great admiration for Mr. Justice Holmes has led him to overem-
phasize the latter’s influence.”456  Whether or not his regard for 
Holmes’s place in history was distorted, we should not understate the 
impact Frankfurter’s views have had on the course of American legal 
thought (as we might by focusing solely on his Supreme Court tenure).  
For Progressive intellectuals and politicians searching for the set of ar-
guments that would lead to judicial affirmation of the New Deal, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 451 Id. at 691. 
 452 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 192 (1928). 
 453 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 448, at v.   
 454 Id. at 35. 
 455 Frankfurter was not the only Progressive to focus on Lochner and on Holmes’s dissent.  See 
David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical 
Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 819 (1998) (“Holmes’s opinion became a statist shrine for Pro-
gressive legal theorists.”).  In a 1909 article, for example, Roscoe Pound wrote that Holmes’s 
words in Lochner “deserve to become classical.”  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 
454, 480 (1909); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
79 (1921) (“It is the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes [in Lochner], which men will turn to in 
the future as the beginning of an era.  In the instance, it was the voice of a minority.  In principle, 
it has become the voice of a new dispensation, which has written itself into law.”).  Frankfurter’s 
own attentions might well have been piqued by Theodore Roosevelt’s public denunciation of 
Lochner in a speech in 1910.  See Nourse, supra note 244, at 779–84. 
 456 Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1939, at 
228, 229 (reviewing FRANKFURTER, supra note 448); see also Snyder, supra note 447, at 12 (“A 
key component of the House [of Truth]’s canonization of Holmes was alerting the public to the 
rightness of his opinions and elevating his dissents into super-precedents.”). 
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Frankfurter was a kind of guru.  Before he even reached the Court, 
Frankfurter had the ears of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, as 
well as of President Roosevelt.457  “[I]n the Thirties,” Joseph Lash 
writes, “for men concerned with the intellectual aspects of law and pol-
itics, a pilgrimage to Harvard to talk to Frankfurter and to be present 
at his weekly at-homes on Brattle Street, thronged as they were with 
Boston’s brightest and best born, was obligatory.”458 
As is well known, moreover, many of Frankfurter’s legal views 
proved metastatic, spreading through his extensive network of former 
students, law clerks, and professionally indebted mentees.  Accom-
plished New Dealers Benjamin Cohen,459 Thomas Corcoran,460 David 
Lilienthal,461 Charles Wyzanski,462 Nathan Margold,463 Alger Hiss,464 
and Landis465 (also a former Harvard Law School dean) were former 
students and protégés, as was Dean Acheson,466 whom Frankfurter 
placed in a clerkship with Louis Brandeis.  His former clerks included 
legendary professors at most of the nation’s top law schools: Bickel at 
Yale, Louis Henkin at Columbia, Currie and Philip Kurland at Chica-
go, Albert Sacks at Harvard.467  Frankfurter placed numerous other 
renowned professors in clerkships with other Justices, including Paul 
Freund (Brandeis),468 Henry Hart (Brandeis),469 Louis Jaffe (Bran-
deis),470 and Arthur Sutherland (Holmes).471 
It is difficult to gauge the precise influence that Frankfurter’s views 
on Holmes and on Lochner had on the many prominent lawyers and 
academics he trained and advised — not all were bullied into writing 
Holmes biographies, as Frankfurter’s former student Mark De Wolfe 
Howe was.472  We do know, though, that Bickel’s The Morality of 
Consent mentions neither Allgeyer nor Coppage but repeatedly laments 
that the Warren Court was doing very nearly what Holmes — who 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 457 JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 50 (1975). 
 458 Id. 
 459 Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and 
the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
71, 112.   
 460 LASH, supra note 457, at 36.   
 461 Id.  
 462 H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 98 (1981).   
 463 BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SE-
CRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 395 n.65 (1982).   
 464 LASH, supra note 457, at 36.   
 465 Id. at 35.   
 466 Id. at 36.   
 467 Id. at 351.   
 468 PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 141 (1982). 
 469 LASH, supra note 457, at 204 n.2.   
 470 IRONS, supra note 468, at 141.   
 471 G. Edward White, Hiss and Holmes, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 231, 252 (2002).   
 472 LASH, supra note 457, at 36, 54–55. 
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comes off quite well by Bickel — had sagaciously warned the Lochner 
Court not to do.473  And that Kurland considered Holmes, Learned 
Hand, Brandeis, and Frankfurter the leaders of the “lonely crowd of 
jurists dedicated to ‘self-restraint,’” who were “big enough” to resist 
reading their personal preferences into the Constitution.474  Charles 
Fairman, one of the most influential Fourteenth Amendment scholars 
of the twentieth century, was also Frankfurter’s student and mentee.475  
Fairman’s 1948 American Constitutional Decisions, designed for un-
dergraduate courses in American government,476 devotes a chapter to 
Lochner.477  Fairman situates Lochner as the central case on constitu-
tional limitations between the Slaughterhouse Cases478 and West Coast 
Hotel, with Justice Holmes carrying on the noble fight begun by Jus-
tice Miller.479  Eight of the ten paragraphs of Fairman’s commentary 
on Lochner are tributes to Justice Holmes.480  Of the Holmes dissent, 
he writes: 
An entire philosophy is compressed into three paragraphs.  Many men 
know those sentences by heart.  A number of Holmes’ best remembered 
opinions in later years were but the application of the Lochner dissent to 
the circumstances of the particular case.  His point of view has now be-
come a part of the accepted doctrine of the Court.481 
Even those protégés who took a more measured view of Holmes 
than Frankfurter did — Currie complained of Holmes’s “inclination to 
substitute epigrams for analysis,” with the Herbert Spencer line as Ex-
hibit A482 — would have had to confront their old mentor, in the class-
room, in articles, in casual discussion, in order to complete the  
argument. 
The only two Supreme Court opinions prior to 1963 that cite to 
Holmes’s Spencer line (there have been seven such opinions in the last 
eighteen years) were written by Frankfurter.483  In the first, Winters v. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 473 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 25–28 (1975) (arguing that in 
the 1960s, contra Holmes, “a majority of the justices, under Earl Warren, again began to dictate 
answers to social and sometimes economic problems”). 
 474 PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1971). 
 475 Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (1995).  The full article explores the relationship between 
Frankfurter and Fairman at some length.   
 476 CHARLES FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS iii (rev. ed. 1950). 
 477 Id. at 325–41.   
 478 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).   
 479 See FAIRMAN, supra note 476, at 324 (“Peckham, J., in upholding the new ‘liberty of con-
tract,’ carried on where [Justice] Field [dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases] once led, and 
Holmes, dissenting, fought for the values which Miller had defended.”).   
 480 Id. at 335–37. 
 481 Id. at 335. 
 482 CURRIE, supra note 195, at 82. 
 483 Frankfurter also cited to Holmes’s Lochner dissent in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 
157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If I begin with some general observations, it is not be-
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New York,484 Frankfurter dissented from the Court’s invalidation of an 
obscenity conviction with the tart comment, “If ‘the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’ nei-
ther does it enact the psychological dogmas of the Spencerian era.”485  
The following year, in American Federation of Labor v. American Sash 
& Door Co.,486 Frankfurter again assimilated the significance of Loch-
ner to the prescience of Holmes.  Under the Lochner order, he wrote: 
Adam Smith was treated as though his generalizations had been imparted 
to him on Sinai . . . . [E]conomic views of confined validity were treated 
by lawyers and judges as though the Framers had enshrined them in the 
Constitution. . . . Had not Mr. Justice Holmes’ awareness of the imperma-
nence of legislation as against the permanence of the Constitution gradual-
ly prevailed, there might indeed have been “hardly any limit but the sky” 
to the embodiment of “our economic or moral beliefs” in that Amend-
ment’s “prohibitions.”487 
The opinion reports a standard critique of the Lochner era.  It im-
plicitly exaggerates the aggressiveness of the Court in invalidating 
economic legislation, and it expressly promotes the views of Holmes, 
who (like Frankfurter) believed that the Fourteenth Amendment im-
poses few substantive limits on legislative choices that do not implicate 
civil liberties.488 
This standard critique was challenged on the Court less than two 
decades later, surprisingly perhaps, from the left.  Thus, Justice Doug-
las, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,489 the precursor to Griswold, wrote, 
just before quoting Holmes’s Lochner dissent, that “[f]or years the 
Court struck down social legislation when a particular law did not fit 
the notions of a majority of Justices as to legislation appropriate for a 
free enterprise system.”490  Douglas refused, however, to adopt the ab-
solutist position associated with Holmes and with Frankfurter.491  
“The error of the old Court, as I see it, was not in entertaining inqui-
ries concerning the constitutionality of social legislation but in apply-
ing the standards that it did,” Douglas wrote.492  “Social legislation 
dealing with business and economic matters touches no particularized 
prohibition of the Constitution,”493 but to say that “whatever the ma-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cause I am unmindful of Mr. Justice Holmes’ caution that ‘General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 484 333 U.S. 507 (1948).   
 485 Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
 486 335 U.S. 538 (1949).   
 487 Id. at 543 (internal citation omitted). 
 488 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 448, at 49–51. 
 489 367 U.S. 497 (1961).   
 490 Id. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 491 Frankfurter wrote the Poe majority opinion holding the challenge nonjusticiable. 
 492 Poe, 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
 493 Id.   
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jority in the legislature says goes” would serve to “reduce[] the legisla-
tive power to sheer voting strength and the judicial function to a mat-
ter of statistics.”494 
Douglas was laying a foundation for his majority opinion in Gris-
wold, which also confronted Lochner directly and distinguished it as 
“touch[ing] economic problems, business affairs, [and] social condi-
tions” rather than “an intimate relation of husband and wife.”495  Why 
did Justice Douglas feel the need to address Lochner, and not Coppage 
or Allgeyer?496  For one thing, Thomas Emerson’s appellant’s brief497 
raised Lochner directly, and did not discuss those other cases.  It 
roughly drew the distinction that would later emerge in the case law, 
between legislative judgments “as to the need and propriety of all 
types of economic regulation,” which should receive “full leeway” from 
courts,498 and “legislation which impairs the freedom of the individual 
to live a fruitful life or to sustain his position as citizen rather than 
subject,”499 which the Court “has subjected to much more intensive 
scrutiny.”500  The brief singled out Lochner as exemplary: “We are not, 
in short, asking here for reinstatement of the line of due process deci-
sions exemplified by [Lochner].”501 
As important (and related), by 1965 Holmes’s Lochner dissent had 
become canonized.  The sixth edition of the Dowling casebook, pub-
lished in 1959, quotes Holmes’s Lochner dissent at far greater length 
than it does the majority opinion.502  Both the 1954 and the 1961 edi-
tions of the Frankfurter-inspired casebook authored by Freund, Su-
therland, Howe, and Ernest Brown also quote the Holmes dissent at 
length.503  One could not invalidate legislation under the substantive 
protections of the due process clause without meeting Holmes’s — and 
the late Frankfurter’s504 — challenge. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 494 Id. at 518. 
 495 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
 496 Dissenting, Justice Black mentions Lochner most prominently in a string cite along with 
Coppage, Jay Burns Baking Co., and Adkins.  Id. at 514–15 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 497 Brief for Appellants, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (No. 496), 1965 WL 92619.   
 498 Id. at *22. 
 499 Id. at *22–23. 
 500 Id. at *23. 
 501 Id.  Remarkably, the state of Connecticut did not mention Lochner (or any other discredited 
substantive due process case) in its briefing.  See Brief for Appellee, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (No. 
496), 1965 WL 92620. 
 502 DOWLING, supra note 366, at 739–40. 
 503 PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 
1309–10 (2d ed. 1961); PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTH-
ER PROBLEMS 1158–59 (1st ed. 1954). 
 504 Frankfurter died on February 22, 1965, just weeks before Griswold was argued.  See Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 479 (stating that the case was argued on March 29–30, 1965); Edward G. 
McGrath, Felix Frankfurter Dies, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1965, at A1. 
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Once Lochner started down the road to anticanonicity, partisans on 
both sides of the substantive due process debate reinforced their re-
spective views in subsequent opinions.505  The introduction to the ma-
jority opinion in Roe v. Wade contains only one external citation506: to 
Justice Holmes’s “now-vindicated” dissent in Lochner, which Justice 
Blackmun emphasized the need to “bear in mind.”507  But the message 
was not the familiar admonition against judicial activism.  Rather, Jus-
tice Blackmun took the essential message of Holmes to be: “[The Con-
stitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the 
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel 
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the ques-
tion whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States.”508  Through Holmes, in other words, Lochner 
meant that a community’s aversion to a particular practice, in this case 
abortion, does not settle the question of the constitutionality of a pro-
hibition of that practice.  How times had changed. 
Then-Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, took the traditional view of 
Lochner.  “While the Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. 
Justice Holmes in [Lochner],” he wrote, “the result it reaches is more 
closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that 
case.”509  Such accusations, on both sides, have become a familiar, 
nearly hackneyed, part of our constitutional discourse.  Thus, Ely’s 
denunciation of Roe largely took the form of a comparison of the case 
to Lochner.510  Ely plainly regarded the latter case as already antica-
nonical: “[I]t is impossible candidly to regard Roe as the product of  
anything [other than the ‘philosophy of Lochner’].  That alone should 
be enough to damn it.”511 
Playing defense, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland512 acknowledged, while overturning a municipal 
housing ordinance on substantive due process grounds, that “[a]s the 
history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern 
lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilec-
tions of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.”513  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 505 See Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1473. 
 506 The introduction also cites to Roe v. Wade’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973), but the citation is used only for cross-reference and not to support any proposition.  See 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
 507 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117. 
 508 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 509 Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 510 Ely, supra note 384, at 937–43. 
 511 Id. at 939–40. 
 512 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 513 Id. at 502 (plurality opinion). 
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Moore, decided in 1977, marks the first time the term “Lochner era” 
appeared in any published opinion of a state or federal court.514  The 
phrase reappeared in the first edition of Laurence Tribe’s constitution-
al law treatise,515 published in 1978, after which, according to 
Bernstein, “use of the phrase ‘Lochner era’ in the law review literature 
skyrocketed.”516  By the time Justice Scalia — on offense, per custom 
— used Lochner to attack Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, he 
did not need to refer to the case by name: “[The Texas law] undoubted-
ly imposes constraints on liberty.  So do laws prohibiting prostitution, 
recreational use of heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60 
hours per week in a bakery.”517  Q.E.D. 
4.  Korematsu. — Korematsu’s path to the anticanon necessarily 
looks different from that of the others.  Korematsu is not only the most 
recent of the cases but it is also, as discussed, the only one that receives 
consistently positive citation, namely for its early articulation of the 
strict scrutiny standard.  For example, the Court in Bolling v. 
Sharpe518 cited both Hirabayashi and Korematsu for the proposition 
that “[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”519  Likewise, Justice White’s unanimous  
opinion in McLaughlin v. Florida,520 which invalidated a state statute 
that prohibited interracial cohabitation, took Korematsu to hold, as re-
levant, that racial classifications must be “subject to the ‘most rigid 
scrutiny.’”521  And Loving v. Virginia, which McLaughlin presaged, 
cited the same passage.  Though each of those cases dealt directly with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 514 Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1520.  According to Bernstein, the phrase was “virtually un-
known” before it appeared in the Gunther casebook in 1970.  Id. at 1518.  In that edition, which 
contained lengthy discussion of the “evils of the Lochner philosophy,” Gunther wrote: “Rejection 
of the Lochner heritage is a common starting point for modern Justices; reaction against the ex-
cessive intervention of the ‘Old Men’ of the pre-1937 Court has strongly influenced the judicial 
philosophies of the successors.”  GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 962 (8th ed. 1970).  The term “Lochner era” reappeared in several 
scholarly articles in subsequent years, including in the Harvard Law Review Forewords authored 
by Gunther and by Laurence Tribe.  Id.; see Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term —  
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1973).  Gunther was both a protégé and biographer of Learned Hand, Frankfurter’s intellectual 
kinsman and longtime friend.  GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE 
JUDGE ix, 221, 564–65 (1994). 
 515 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434–36, 438, 441, 456, 564, 
919 (1st ed. 1978). 
 516 Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1521. 
 517 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 518 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 519 Id. at 499. 
 520 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 521 Id. at 192. 
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instances of government racial discrimination, none distanced itself 
from Korematsu’s disturbing holding. 
It may be that the freshness of the case through much of the period 
in which Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner became anticanonical is a 
sufficient explanation for its being spared the Court’s rod for so many 
years.  Another possibility is that, as discussed in Part I, neither the 
courts nor the political branches had come to terms with Korematsu’s 
wrongness until the 1980s.  But there may be a simpler explanation for 
the near-absence of any negative citation to Korematsu during the en-
tirety of the Warren Court and the civil rights era: shame.  Recall that 
the anticanonization of Dred Scott and Plessy was largely the work of 
Justice Black, Justice Douglas, and to a lesser degree, Chief Justice 
Warren.  Black wrote, and Douglas joined, the discredited majority 
opinion in Korematsu.  Warren was not yet on the Court at the time of 
Korematsu, but as attorney general of California during World War II, 
he had been a vocal supporter of Japanese internment and had helped 
the military to implement the policy.  As Warren biographer G. Ed-
ward White writes, “he was the most visible and effective California 
public official advocating internment and evacuation.”522 
Warren wrote Bolling, which was the first case to cite Korematsu 
expressly to defend strict scrutiny in race cases.523  At least one other 
member of the Warren Court, Justice Harlan, clearly found the deci-
sion odious.  In Poe, he cited Korematsu as a negative example — in 
precisely the sense in which anticanonical cases are cited — to demon-
strate that the Due Process Clause must sometimes protect substantive 
rights, lest “the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, 
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of [life, liberty, and property].”524  
But in race cases, the Warren Court Justices consistently refused to in-
voke Korematsu for its obvious negative lessons, and instead treated it 
unself-consciously as a precedent to be cited for its positive contribu-
tions to the Court’s race jurisprudence. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 522 G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 71 (1982). 
 523 There were eleven cases that cited Korematsu prior to Bolling.  In only two of those  
opinions was Korematsu cited remotely to defend strict scrutiny in race cases, and the majority 
opinion in one of those two was written by Justice Black.  See Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418 (1948) (Black, J.); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 (1948).  In the re-
maining nine cases, the citations to Korematsu were not made in the context of strict scrutiny.  See 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 661 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 
1, 34 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 175 (1948) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 767 (1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 
333 U.S. 28, 37 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 671 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); Ex 
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 524 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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We cannot know whether the Warren Court’s silence — nay, dou-
blespeak — on the dangers of Korematsu stemmed from embarrass-
ment, stubbornness, both, or some other source.  We do know that 
Warren wrote in his memoirs that he “deeply regretted” his involve-
ment in the internment, and that thinking of the “innocent little chil-
dren who were torn from home” left him “conscience-stricken,”525 
though he refused to acknowledge that regret publicly until 1974.526  
Black defended his opinion until his death, though Roger Newman 
writes that he was reluctant to discuss the case even with his clerks.527  
Douglas wrote in his memoirs that it was a mistake to affirm the use 
of internment camps,528 and his discussion of the case near the end of 
his tenure on the Court strikes a conspicuously defensive tone.  In De-
Funis v. Odegaard,529 Douglas dissented from the Court’s holding that 
a challenge to the University of Washington Law School affirmative 
action program was moot.530  He noted that the Court last sustained a 
racial classification in Korematsu and Hirabayashi, and he appended 
the following in a footnote whose tone cannot easily be captured in  
excerpt: 
Our Navy was sunk at Pearl Harbor and no one knew where the Japanese 
fleet was.  We were advised on oral argument that if the Japanese landed 
troops on our west coast nothing could stop them west of the Rockies.  
The military judgment was that, to aid in the prospective defense of the 
west coast, the enclaves of Americans of Japanese ancestry should be 
moved inland, lest the invaders by donning civilian clothes would wreak 
even more serious havoc on our western ports.  The decisions were ex-
treme and went to the verge of wartime power; and they have been se-
verely criticized.  It is, however, easy in retrospect to denounce what was 
done, as there actually was no attempted Japanese invasion of our country.  
While our Joint Chiefs of Staff were worrying about Japanese soldiers 
landing on the west coast, they actually were landing in Burma and Kota 
Bharu in Malaya.  But those making plans for defense of the Nation had 
no such knowledge and were planning for the worst.  Moreover, the day 
we decided Korematsu we also decided [Endo], holding that while evacua-
tion of the Americans of Japanese ancestry was allowable under extreme 
war conditions, their detention after evacuation was not.531 
One is forgiven the impression that the Justice doth protest too 
much.  There is much to quarrel with in Douglas’s legacy-building re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 525 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 149 (1977). 
 526 ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 159, 520 (1997). 
 527 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 318–19 (1994). 
 528 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975, at 280 (1980).  Douglas wrote 
but withdrew a concurring opinion arguing that the evacuation was constitutionally authorized 
but that detention was not.  Id. 
 529 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
 530 Id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 531 Id. at 339 n.20. 
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visionism, some of which I discussed in Part II.  Suffice for now to say 
that it was impossible to place Korematsu in the anticanon, even as 
circumstances bid it there, while Warren, Black, and Douglas sat on 
the Court. 
More recently, Supreme Court discussion of Korematsu has begun 
to approximate the pattern of other anticanonical cases: use across the 
political spectrum to serve a variety of different morals.  Thus, when 
Justice Marshall marshaled Korematsu against compulsory drug test-
ing for railroad employees, he adopted an absolutist stance, citing the 
case for the danger of “allow[ing] fundamental freedoms to be sacri-
ficed in the name of real or perceived exigency.”532  In Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC,533 the dissenting Justice O’Connor took Koremat-
su to teach us that racial classifications “endorse race-based reasoning 
and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contri-
buting to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”534  In Reno v. 
Flores,535 which upheld an INS policy of juvenile detention, Justice 
Stevens in dissent appeared to view Korematsu’s error not as violating 
any absolute restriction but rather as representing the danger of inade-
quate or incompetent process: “[T]he [Korematsu] Court approved a 
serious infringement of individual liberty without requiring a case-by-
case determination as to whether such an infringement was in fact ne-
cessary to effect the Government’s compelling interest in national  
security.”536 
Korematsu’s use by Justice Scalia is perhaps the best signal of its 
true arrival in the anticanon.  Scalia has invoked the decision twice in 
abortion-related cases, for which he reserves his angriest work prod-
uct.  In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,537 dissenting from a 
decision upholding an injunction against antiabortion protesters, he 
cited Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent and said: “What was true of 
a misguided military order is true of a misguided trial-court injunc-
tion. . . . [T]he Court has left a powerful loaded weapon lying about 
today.”538  Then, more stridently, in Stenberg v. Carhart,539 in dissent 
from a decision invalidating Nebraska’s ban on so-called “partial 
birth” abortions, Justice Scalia began his dissent: “I am optimistic 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 532 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Korematsu Court approved “an odious, gravely injurious racial  
classification”). 
 533 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 534 Id. at 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 535 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
 536 Id. at 345 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 537 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 538 Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 539 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned 
its rightful place in the history of this Court’s jurisprudence beside Ko-
rematsu and Dred Scott.”540  Both cases were identified solely by their 
petitioner, and neither was given — nor needed — a citation. 
B.  Theory 
We are ready, at last, to articulate a theory of the anticanon.  We 
have seen that anticanonicity is not solely a function of poor conven-
tional legal reasoning, nor of immorality, nor of the two in combina-
tion.  We have also seen that historical accident plays an important 
role in establishing a case as anticanonical.541  Dred Scott and Plessy 
would not have achieved that status in the absence of a Court pre-
pared to write civil rights protections into positive constitutional law 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Lochner arguably would have been lost to his-
tory without Frankfurter’s canonization of Holmes.  Korematsu’s 
treatment reflected the composition of the Court at key moments of 
historical evaluation and revision.  More broadly, history confirms that 
decisions that acquire anticanonical status are used as distinctive re-
sources in later constitutional controversies; this use then itself be-
comes a litmus test for anticanonicity. 
In this section let us think more systematically about how this use 
is accomplished.  Among the first features one notices about the anti-
canon is that its authority is universally invoked.  It is used by all sides 
of modern political and legal controversies.  What enables this feature 
to persist is that the arguments against these cases span the ideological 
spectrum.542  Dred Scott is wrong both because it employs substantive 
due process and because it is overly positivist and originalist.  Plessy is 
wrong both because it fails to be colorblind and because it is overly 
formalistic about race, missing the social meaning of Jim Crow.  Loch-
ner is wrong both because it resorts to substantive due process and be-
cause it exalts liberty of contract and laissez-faire capitalism over pro-
gressive legislation.  Korematsu is wrong both because it defers 
negligently to the Executive and because it is not colorblind.  For both 
Plessy and Lochner, the presence of memorable dissenting opinions 
surfaces an even greater range of arguments, facilitating claims by a 
wide array of participants. 
We can restate the pluripotency of the anticanon using the lan-
guage of incompletely theorized agreements, a concept popularized 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 540 Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 541 Cf. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 995 (describing canons as “historical creations in 
which rational design and precision engineering are wishful thinking”). 
 542 Cf. Primus, supra note 17, at 280 n.144 (“[O]nce a dissent becomes sufficiently canonical, 
both sides of controversial positions will try to shape its holding to give themselves support.”). 
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within law by Sunstein.543  He argues that incompletely theorized 
agreements allow a pluralistic society with disparate views to produce 
some semblance of political and legal consensus.544  The various par-
ticipants in a legal dispute might agree on an outcome without neces-
sarily agreeing on broader principles or explanations.545  Sunstein’s  
paradigmatic examples describe a policy outcome — protection for en-
dangered species or strict liability for torts, say546 — and diverse rea-
sons for supporting that outcome.547  The suggestion here is a twist on 
the concept: there is agreement that anticanonical cases are wrongly 
decided, but there is disagreement both as to the best explanation of 
their errors and as to how to apply their lessons to future specific  
cases.548 
Incomplete theorization in this sense is an essential feature of anti-
canonical cases.  These cases represent shared reference points not be-
cause they signal unanimity or consensus but because they enable dis-
course — “dialogue” would be too strong — amid dissensus.  There is 
something of this explanation in Godwin’s Law, which posits that as 
an online discussion grows longer the probability of a comparison in-
volving Nazis or Hitler approaches one.549  Leo Strauss expressed a 
similar idea when he long ago lamented “the fallacy that in the last 
decades has frequently been used as a substitute for the reductio ad 
absurdum: the reductio ad Hitlerum.”550  Hitler has become a rhetori-
cal common denominator whose historical commitments are (for that 
reason) necessarily obscured.  The universal condemnation of the Nazi 
regime both enables and is enabled by the fact that it may simulta-
neously stand in for the excesses of democracy or of totalitarianism, of 
moral relativism or of moral certainty.  We may all find comfort in as-
sociating our opponent’s position with the anticanon, and cognitive 
dissonance (at least) inhibits our seeing the anticanon in ourselves.  It 
is what we are not. 
The anticanon, then, is normatively unstable.  It is a space in 
which diverse participants in constitutional debate work out mutually 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 543 See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1735–36. 
 544 Id. 
 545 Id. 
 546 Id. at 1736. 
 547 Id. at 1736, 1739–40. 
 548 This Article’s usage approximates what Sunstein calls agreement on a “mid-level” principle 
but disagreement both as to the more general theory that accounts for the mid-level principle and 
as to the outcomes that the principle specifies.  Id. at 1739.  
 549 See Tom Chivers, Internet Rules and Laws: The Top 10, from Godwin to Poe, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Oct. 23, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6408927/ 
Internet-rules-and-laws-the-top-10-from-Godwin-to-Poe.html. 
 550 LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 42 (1953). 
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eligible but competing ethical commitments.551  Jack Balkin has made 
a somewhat analogous point about the constitutional canon: “Canoni-
cal cases are protean — they can stand for (or be made to stand for) 
many different things to different theorists, and that is what makes 
them so useful for the work of theory.”552  Balkin’s point is that canon-
ical cases serve as a test for the viability and creativity of academic 
theories about constitutional law, and they could not play this role if 
they could only be understood in one way.  This is true a fortiori of an-
ticanonical cases.  Because canonical cases are good law, they would 
be relevant to constitutional law even if they were not especially useful 
to constitutional theory.553  The anticanon, in contrast, has no reason 
for being except to serve as a test for theories — whether academic or 
judicial — about legal substance or method.  Save as historical foot-
notes, anticanonical cases are invoked only to serve this purpose.  It is 
all the more important, then, that the anticanon be, as Balkin says, 
“protean.” 
This feature relates intimately to a second important characteristic 
of the anticanon.  Recall my suggestion in section II.A.4 that Koremat-
su is both the least defensible of the anticanon cases and presents the 
weakest case for anticanonicity, and that these features are related.554  
In fact, they are positively correlated.  Imagine that, instead of detain-
ing Japanese Americans, the military were executing them summarily.  
And imagine Korematsu came out the same way.  Under the circum-
stances, citing Korematsu to illustrate the dangers of affirmative ac-
tion, or even wartime detention of enemy combatants, would be at 
least hyperbolic, and would border on category error.  And the error 
would grow in proportion to the perceived egregiousness of Koremat-
su.  All of which is to say that, beyond some threshold, the more ob-
viously wrong a decision, the fewer the reasonable opportunities for 
citation.  The most obvious constitutional errors are the least likely to 
be replicated.555 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 551 See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 162, at 20–28 (describing divergent criticisms of Dred Scott 
and noting that “each school of contemporary constitutional thought hopes to discredit rival theo-
ries and the judicial opinions believed to rely on those theories,” id. at 20–21). 
 552 Balkin, supra note 17, at 681. 
 553 And as Balkin and Levinson acknowledge, not all canonical cases are especially useful to 
modern constitutional theory.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 973–76 (discussing 
McCulloch and noting that, despite its canonical status in law school curricula, it receives little 
attention in law reviews). 
 554 See supra p. 422–23. 
 555 A related phenomenon may provide a partial explanation for the failure of Buck v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200 (1927), or Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), to gain more traction among judges 
and commentators.  Both are better known for the shock value of particular phrases in associated 
opinions than for their contested application of an otherwise acceptable legal norm.  See Buck, 
274 U.S. at 207 (“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”); Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. . . . The 
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This is perhaps another way of saying that anticanonical cases 
must, on some replicable metric, be correct.  These are not the prod-
ucts of rogue judges — incompetent, drunk, or on the make.  Hardly.  
Anticanonical cases tend toward the peculiar logic of judicial formal-
ism so often praised in other contexts: a delegation to history; an ap-
peal to neutral principles; a posture of deference to governmental 
branches more in the know.  These cases are useful because a certain 
style of reasoning may arguably lead both to the result in the antica-
nonical case and to a result that relevant participants in modern con-
troversies also espouse.  This is most obviously true of Lochner, whose 
reasoning may lead, on a set of reasonable assumptions, to Griswold, 
to Roe, to Lawrence, and to numerous other cases that have generated 
constitutional controversy.  If substantive due process were obviously 
incorrect, Lochner would long ago have faded from memory. 
Finally, an important criterion of anticanonical cases is that the 
competing claims that they embody relate to issues of (small “c”) con-
stitutional significance.  That is, the debates the anticanon facilitates 
do not just implicate the Constitution as a legal document but are cen-
tral to national identity.  It is no wonder that at least three of the four 
anticanon cases — Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner — have been used 
by prominent conservatives to attack Roe.556  Argument through the 
anticanon is a form of ethical argument, and the presence of the anti-
canon signals the independent significance of ethical argument as a 
modality of constitutional interpretation.  I am borrowing from Philip 
Bobbitt, who describes ethical argument as “denot[ing] an appeal to 
those elements of the American cultural ethos that are reflected in the 
Constitution.”557 
As Bobbitt does, it is important here to distinguish ethics from 
morals,558 since the anticanon implicates both.  Ethics refers, or may 
refer, to the context-specific values of a particular community, whereas 
in my usage morals refers to values that make claims that span com-
munities, perhaps because grounded in some deeper religious or quasi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and 
functions of womanhood.”)  These opinions might be sui generis in the sense that reasonable op-
portunities for associating an opponent’s position with these claims will presumably be rare.  
 556 See, e.g., supra pp. 441; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 557 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20 (1991). 
 558 See id. at 20–21; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94–95 (1982) (“Ethical con-
stitutional arguments do not claim that a particular solution is right or wrong in any sense larger 
than that the solution comports with the sort of people we are and the means we have chosen to 
solve political and customary constitutional problems.”). 
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religious imperative.559  The relevant community here is the American 
people, but the relevant ethos embodies their values as refracted 
through existing legal and political institutions.  Dred Scott is immoral 
on any acceptable moral theory, but it takes work to establish that it 
was unethical in its time — its claims about black citizenship were 
consistent with much of American legal and political practice late into 
the last century.  Placing Dred Scott within the anticanon contributed 
to a project of conferring official recognition upon an ethical transfor-
mation with regard to race relations.  Likewise, many cases besides 
Dred Scott are inarguably immoral, including perhaps all of my sha-
dow anticanon.560  But immorality is neither a necessary nor a suffi-
cient feature of the anticanon.  Inconsistency with ethos, by contrast, is 
an affirmative feature of anticanonical cases.  Along with incomplete 
theorization and legal defensibility, it enables anticanonical cases to be 
used as resources in constitutional argument. 
If I have succeeded in making that case, we should be able to say 
something, even if not dispositive, about what the shadow anticanon 
lacks.  It is in the nature of historical contingency that one possible an-
swer is “nothing.”  It may be that these cases simply missed some his-
torical boat, and might just as well have done the work of the cases 
that made it on.  Even apart from historical contingency, moreover, the 
features of anticanonicity that I have identified may be necessary but 
not sufficient, insofar as the anticanon is self-reinforcing.  The more 
decisively anticanonical a case is, the more likely it is to be cited and 
discussed across the political spectrum, in diverse and potentially in-
compatible ways.  Indeed, as with Godwin’s Law, the diversity (and 
therefore potential incompatibility) may itself expand over time, such 
that the anticanon — because it is so pluripotent — approaches a 
closed set of cases to which partisans of nearly every contested ethical 
position eventually refer.  Still, it may expand our understanding to 
seek to identify features that make it less likely that the shadow anti-
canon could serve the same function within constitutional argument as 
the actual anticanon. 
As to Prigg, it is difficult to extract the decision from the context of 
slavery.  We pray that we will never again ask judges to interpret the 
Fugitive Slave Clause, and unlike in Dred Scott, the majority opinion 
bears no obvious methodological residue that many of us feel the need 
to disclaim.  Giles, which addresses questions of equity jurisdiction, 
the political question doctrine, and separation of powers that remain 
highly relevant, requires a different explanation.  It may be, as Samuel 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 559 Cf. Peter Singer, Introduction to ETHICS 3, 4 (Peter Singer ed., 1994) (“[Ethics] is sometimes 
used to refer to the set of rules, principles, or ways of thinking that guide, or claim authority to 
guide, the actions of a particular group . . . .”). 
 560 See section II.B, supra pp. 427–34. 
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Brenner argues, that Giles failed to catch on because it was “procedu-
rally messy.”561  As likely, I suggest, are its authorship, its cynicism, 
and its terseness.  As to authorship, Holmes has had his critics over the 
years, and a bad case can sully an otherwise admired body of judicial 
work,562 but placing an opinion of a canonized Justice into the antica-
non requires double the work of pulling down the likes of Rufus Peck-
ham — perhaps triple in light of Frankfurter’s counterpressure.  Jus-
tice Holmes’s acidly cynical reasoning comes into tension with the 
need for the reasoning of anticanonical cases to resonate with modern 
controversy.  The decision is so unorthodox methodologically that it is 
difficult to imagine opportunities for using its analysis as a trump in 
serious debates of today.  Finally, and relatedly, its brevity limits points 
of entry into the majority’s reasoning; it manages to be obscure — 
Holmes liked his opinions that way563 — such that anyone wishing to 
understand it and to incorporate its rejection into a broad theory has 
real work to do. 
Brevity may work, as well, to the disadvantage — or rather, advan-
tage — of Gong Lum.  Its author, Chief Justice Taft, specifically re-
ferred to it as an easier case than Plessy,564 and even as I have argued 
that Gong Lum is more disturbing, it is easy to regard the case as en-
tirely derivative of Plessy’s reasoning.  That is not to say that preserv-
ing Plessy but holding for Gong Lum cannot be done.  A court re-
solved to do so might argue, for example, that segregated railcars are 
more innocuous or less socially significant than segregated schools.565  
Still, it requires some imagination to argue for a different result with-
out reconsidering the earlier decision.  Gong Lum also issued without 
dissent, and we have seen with both Lochner and Plessy the important 
work that dissenting opinions can do to propel a majority opinion into 
the anticanon. 
Bowers is a poor fit for the anticanon not merely for the fact that it 
is so recent, and therefore has detritus floating throughout the legal 
system,566 but also for the implications its recent vintage has for the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 561 Samuel Brenner, Note, “Airbrushed out of the Constitutional Canon”: The Evolving Under-
standing of Giles v. Harris, 1903–1925, 107 MICH. L. REV. 853, 872 (2009). 
 562 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
in part) (discussing Chief Justice Taney). 
 563 See Snyder, supra note 447, at 46–47. 
 564 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927). 
 565 Cf. Robert A. Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools — 1953, 67 HARV. 
L. REV. 377, 389–90 (1954) (suggesting that the Brown Court had the option of preserving the 
doctrine of “separate but equal” while holding that it applies differently to different phases of the 
education process, for example, as between academic versus nonacademic activities). 
 566 Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3051, 3053–54 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring), with id. at 3097 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (debating whether Lawrence or Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), which relies on Bowers, will be the more enduring 
precedent). 
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constitutional landscape.  It may be that seventy percent of the Ameri-
can people oppose anti-sodomy laws, but it is quite possible that if 
Lawrence were decided today, it would be a 5–4 decision rather than 
6–3.  Some of the reasons that slow the pace of methodological innova-
tion more generally — the gravitational pull of precedent in a common 
law system, life tenure for federal judges, simple inertia — are also 
likely to slow anticanon evolution and reconfiguration. 
These examples may suggest a set of weak criteria for inclusion in 
the anticanon: the presence of a strong dissent; the identity of the 
judge writing either the majority opinion or an important dissent; and 
the age of the decision.  A strong dissent offers its own set of resources, 
both to those who seek to erode a precedent and to those who seek to 
use an antiprecedent once it achieves that status.  We have already 
seen, for example, that Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent was elevated in-
to the canon by the anticanonization of Plessy itself, and that the sta-
tus of the two opinions has since become mutually reinforcing.567  An 
opinion authored by a judge of great renown — Justice Holmes, for 
Giles — or who remains on the Court during periods in which the  
opinion might otherwise be used as a negative precedent — Justice 
Black, for Korematsu — might impair the progression of a case into 
the anticanon or, if in dissent, accelerate it.  We must be cautious here, 
as identification of a judge as great or not depends in part on his body 
of work, and so it may be difficult to discern the direction of causa-
tion.568  Finally, a relatively recent decision, like Bowers today or Ko-
rematsu in the 1960s, might be too intimate, too raw, for universal 
condemnation.  These features may not be necessary for a case to func-
tion as anticanonical, but they may either help or hinder the contin-
gent process that makes a case eligible for anticanonical treatment. 
IV.  SHAPING THE ANTICANON 
If the anticanon did not exist, would we have to invent it?  Would 
we want to?  The answer is not clear.  There is little evidence that the 
anticanon as we know it existed prior to the 1960s — it appears that, 
before then, even long-reviled decisions like Dred Scott were generally 
discussed in legal contexts as matters of history, not contemporary  
relevance.569  Importantly, each of the cases in the anticanon focuses 
on individual rights, a category of cases less central to the Supreme 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 567 See Primus, supra note 17, at 256–57. 
 568 See PALMER, supra note 159, at 145–46 (“[T]he dark shadow of [Chief Justice Taney’s]  
opinion in [Dred Scott] has blotted out other features in a judicial career of singular interest and 
of great value to America.”); Primus, supra note 17, at 259 (“Perhaps . . . the heroism of the dis-
senting judge and the greatness of his dissenting opinion are constructed in tandem, each support-
ing the other.”). 
 569 See section III.A, supra pp. 435-60. 
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Court’s pre–Warren Court docket, and less likely at the time to be dis-
cussed at length in casebooks, treatises, or other academic literature.  
Structure cases are not inherently unsuitable for anticanonical treat-
ment, but errors in structure cases are more likely to sound in positive 
law, and are therefore perhaps less likely to generate the disgust that 
Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu evoke.  On this view Lochner is an 
outlier insofar as its error is one of excessive solicitude for rights, 
though notably it becomes anticanonical in the course of reinforcing a 
rights narrative — recall that it is Thomas Emerson, not the State of 
Connecticut, who discusses Lochner in the Griswold briefing before the 
Supreme Court. 
An anticanon might be a predictable sign of a mature constitutional 
system.  In such a system, normative disagreement about the Constitu-
tion need not reference the text itself, or even broad principles em-
bodied within the text, but may have a degree of separation from both; 
the reference points are freighted symbols comprising an argot that so-
phisticated participants in the debate are meant to understand.  Think 
of an old married couple who communicate as much through raised 
eyebrows as through active conversation.  Or think of curse words, 
whose full range of meaning can be especially difficult for second-
language learners to internalize.  Sophisticated discourses among insid-
ers tend to converge on an efficient shorthand.  That shorthand might 
be especially useful in discussions of historical episodes meant to illu-
strate some broader proposition about constitutional norms.  As Pri-
mus writes, “when courts make arguments from constitutional history, 
they argue from a small subset of all available historical materials, a 
subset limited to those aspects of history with which the judges are 
familiar.”570  We can think of the anticanon as a kind of set piece made 
necessary, or at least convenient, by the complexity and breadth of 
available history and the relative incompetence of judges to engage in 
serious historical inquiry. 
Certain features of our constitutional culture might make ours a 
particularly ripe space for anticanon formation.  We remain obsessed, 
for example, with the countermajoritarian difficulty.  Unelected judges 
are granted authority to overturn the enactments of popularly elected 
legislative bodies.  In principle, we are comfortable having them do so 
insofar as they are faithful agents of the instructions immanent within 
the Constitution, which was popularly ratified by a supermajority.  
This principal-agent conception of judges is a fiction, however, as it is 
premised on the notion that those instructions both are reasonably 
clear and in fact reflect values or intentions that are entitled to demo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 570 Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171, 174 
(2006). 
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cratic weight.  A very old Constitution that is very difficult to amend 
and whose provisions are often stated in very broad terms cannot of-
ten satisfy those conditions.  And so we are left with four options when 
adjudicating irreconcilable constitutional conflicts between litigants: 
abandon the Constitution, abandon judicial review, abandon democra-
cy, or, through acts of cognitive dissonance, selectively blame the mes-
senger when judicial review goes horribly awry.  This last option is the 
most stability enhancing of the four, and constructing an anticanon is a 
means of achieving it. 
There remains, however, the significant question of whether the an-
ticanon is a good thing for our constitutional culture.  Regardless of 
whether the anticanon is itself an inevitable or a contingent feature of 
our legal order, it may still profit us to consider how we might influ-
ence its content, and whether it is desirable to emphasize it as against 
other juridical resources.  The possibility that the anticanon may be 
responsive to our fixation on the countermajoritarian difficulty sug-
gests an important potential benefit.  The anticanon is a tool through 
which judges square nontextual constitutional change with the rule of 
law.  It may be illuminating to consider the question through the lens 
of Ackerman’s well-known work on “constitutional moments.”571  
Ackerman’s project has been to develop and apply a means of identify-
ing the positive constitutional commitments of the American people as 
worked out through dialogue between the people and their political 
and legal institutions.572  Ackerman’s paradigm cases are the moments 
that virtually all constitutional lawyers recognize as paradigm-shifting 
in the history of American rights protection at the Supreme Court: Re-
construction,573 the New Deal era,574 and the civil rights revolution.575  
Reconstruction is the repudiation of Dred Scott, the New Deal era a 
repudiation of Lochner, and the civil rights revolution a repudiation of 
Plessy.  To fully inhabit a world in which these cases constitute the an-
ticanon is to accept the corollary that our Constitution requires, and 
always has required, a post-Reconstruction, post–New Deal, and post–
civil rights era social and political order.  That social and political or-
der must be reconciled with the Constitution, both to prevent a debili-
tating level of cognitive dissonance and to write our ethical commit-
ments into positive higher law.  By inventing or exaggerating 
interpretive errors that obstruct constitutional evolution, the anticanon 
aids in this task without undermining the Constitution itself and with-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 571 See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 16; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 49. 
 572 See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 49, at 1754. 
 573 See 2 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 571, at 7. 
 574 See id. 
 575 See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 49, at 1757–93. 
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out formally ceding lawmaking power to unelected judges.  If there is 
no harm in this exercise (on which more later), then there is no foul. 
There is another, more controversial, benefit to maintaining an an-
ticanon.  If the anticanon is, as suggested, a subterfuge, then it is, like 
all subterfuges, an insider’s game.  That is, control over the content of 
the anticanon may be substantially in the hands of the most sophisti-
cated participants in legal discourse.  I will have more to say about 
this premise below, but let us assume that legal professionals in fact 
exert substantial control over devising and refereeing the anticanon.  
There may be value in maintaining professional leverage over constitu-
tional interpretation in a world in which intermediaries between aca-
demic and public discourse are in steady and perhaps irreversible de-
cline.576  The long tradition of constitutional interpretation outside the 
courts includes substantive claims sounding in original meaning that 
can be both illiberal and ill-informed, including by Know Nothings, 
Klansmen, McCarthyites, and certain elements of the modern Tea Par-
ty movement.  As the historian Jill Lepore has written, “[s]et loose in 
the culture, . . . [originalism] is to history what astrology is to astrono-
my, what alchemy is to chemistry, what creationism is to evolution.”577  
Once we know what the “people out-of-doors”578 look like, we may see 
value in retaining substantial professional influence over constitutional 
law and history.  Insofar as continuing to construct and to make use of 
the anticanon is an important means of doing so, there is reason to 
continue that project. 
Consider, for example, the stakes of the debate over the meaning of 
Plessy v. Ferguson.  As discussed, Plessy is a prominent location at 
which debate over affirmative action occurs, with one side claiming 
that the case, via Justice Harlan, represents an ideal of colorblindness, 
and the other claiming that it stands for the significance of viewing 
government recognition of race contextually.579  But the relevance of 
the distinction extends beyond affirmative action.  The 2010 Arizona 
immigration law, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor-
hoods Act580 (S.B. 1070), criminalizes failure to carry immigration doc-
uments and authorizes state officers to request such documents based 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 576 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 702–04 (2009) (discussing the de-
cline of traditional intermediaries between academic and public discourse on constitutional  
methodology). 
 577 JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S REVOLUTION AND 
THE BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY 123–24 (2010). 
 578 The term has old roots, as reflected in LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35, 47 (2004). 
 579 See supra pp. 444–45. 
 580 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0113 (amended by 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0211 (H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 
2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010))).   
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on a “reasonable suspicion” standard.581  Like the Separate Car Act, 
S.B. 1070 is race-neutral, but both statutes have a racially discrimina-
tory social meaning.  A formalist approach to Plessy ignores this com-
monality; a contextual view makes it plain. Ceding responsibility for 
anticanon construction and maintenance cedes a powerful resource in 
ongoing constitutive arguments. 
There is, however, a dark side to the anticanon.  Each of the bene-
fits noted above has associated costs, and they are dear.  First, for 
every Know Nothing there is an Anti-Garrisonian, advancing what 
Balkin has called “off the wall” constitutional arguments in the service 
of some higher moral end.582  Indeed, as they see it, many Lochner re-
visionists labor in this tradition.  Second, it may be normatively unap-
pealing — and it is certainly elitist — to attempt, through the anti-
canon or any other device, to declare any community’s claims void ab 
initio.583  It may also tend systematically to privilege “mainstream” 
claims or those most comforting to members of the dominant social 
order.  On this view, a case like Bradwell v. Illinois may escape the at-
tention of those responsible for constructing the anticanon not out of 
disagreement, per se, with the political equality of women but out of 
tacit and perhaps ill-considered discomfort with the status of that 
proposition as unassailable.584  That ambivalence is reflected in legal 
doctrine: the intermediate scrutiny standard is an announcement that 
the women’s movement stands in a different relation to higher law 
than does the civil rights movement.  That relation is both, in part, 
cause and, in part, effect of the treatment of Bradwell by legal aca-
demics and judges. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 581 Id.  As of July 2011, the Arizona law had inspired similar legislation in Georgia, Indiana, 
Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah.  H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S. 
Enrolled Act 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ala. 2011); S.B. 20, 119th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2011); H.B. 497, 2011 State Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 
2011). 
 582 Balkin, supra note 63, at 1710 (discussing Frederick Douglass’s argument that the original 
Constitution was antislavery, id. at 1709–10). 
 583 Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983) (“Insular communities often have their own, competing, unambi-
guous rules of recognition.  They frequently inhabit a nomos in which their distinct Grundnorm is 
supreme from its own perspective.”). 
 584 No sex discrimination case sits at the core of the anticanon even though such cases account 
for one third of the opinions mentioned in law reviews as anticanonical or antiprecedential.  See 
supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text; cf. Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Minefield: 
Some Observations on the Theory, Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism, 6  
FEMINIST STUD. 1, 8–16 (1980) (defending the proposition that male readers’ discomfort with 
modern women’s literature has contributed to the “diminished status of women’s products and 
their consequent absence from major canons,” id. at 14); Judith Resnik, Constructing the Canon, 2 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221, 221 (1990) (“We women . . . have been closed out of the hierarchy of 
holding the power to write the canon.”). 
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What we might call, on this view, the “gatekeeping” cost of forming 
and maintaining an anticanon may be higher than the analogous cost 
of maintaining a canon.  The core of the anticanon amounts to no 
more than four cases.  These four cases stand for an ever-expanding 
set of normative propositions, and so the stakes of placing a case with-
in the anticanon — and the price of removing one — are high.  In-
deed, it appears that no case ever has left the anticanon, notwithstand-
ing the concerted efforts of multiple generations of Lochner 
revisionists.  Richard Epstein wrote as early as 1984 that he believed 
Lochner was correctly decided,585 and at Clarence Thomas’s confirma-
tion hearing Joseph Biden, then chair of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, said Epstein’s “school of thought is now receiving wider credence 
and credibility.”586  Yet John Roberts, a Republican nominee, stated 
clearly and repeatedly at his hearing fourteen years later (as Thomas 
had earlier)587 that Lochner was wrongly decided.588  To have denied 
Roberts the opportunity to cite Lochner as his paradigm case for judi-
cial activism, or to dilute the force of his repeated evocations, would 
have required that he significantly alter his confirmation strategy.  
These kinds of “stickiness” effects multiply any costs, including gate-
keeping costs, associated with the process of anticanon construction. 
Third, placing a case in the anticanon carries with it the implica-
tion that the central problem with the case is bad judging.  The pre-
vailing Dred Scott narrative, for example, casts Roger Taney as a vil-
lain who ignored the Constitution in order to implement his personal 
racist preferences.  Taney might be perfectly villainous, but this is a 
distraction from the reasonable possibility that the Constitution itself 
enabled Scott to lose.  As Graber argues, Dred Scott’s status as anti-
canonical sanitizes the Constitution and prevents us from confronting 
the problem of “constitutional evil.”589  Balkin has made a similar ar-
gument about Plessy: 
Plessy must always have been inconsistent with the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment and with the premises of the Reconstruction Constitu-
tion.  To believe otherwise would be to accept facts about our country that 
are painful to accept.  We do not want Plessy to have been right — re-
gardless of the constitutional common sense of the period in which it was 
decided — because we do not want to be the sort of country in which 
Plessy could have been a faithful interpretation of the Constitution.590 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 585 Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 
733–34 (1984). 
 586 Thomas Hearing, supra note 71, at 115. 
 587 Id. at 115, 173, 241. 
 588 Roberts Hearing, supra note 67, at 162, 408, 633. 
 589 See GRABER, supra note 162, at 8–12. 
 590 Balkin, supra note 17, at 709–10. 
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Maintaining an anticanon helps avoid such cognitive dissonance 
about our history.  While it can be valuable in promoting a sense of 
possibility about our constitutional culture, exalting a flawed Constitu-
tion can have unfortunate consequences.  For one, it complicates the 
position of those of us who believe that we should not aspire to origi-
nalist modes of constitutional argument.  The primary appeal of origi-
nalism lies less in the rule-of-law claims advanced by some constitu-
tional theorists than in the cultural resonance of the founding 
generation and its political work.591  Certain uses of the anticanon may 
impede serious engagement with that generation’s dangerous bargain 
with slavery interests,592 and with the ways in which features of that 
bargain continue to manifest themselves in our constitutional struc-
ture.593  Justice Scalia’s, Judge Bork’s, and Justice Black’s dispropor-
tionate invocations of the anticanon might reflect a need for original-
ists in particular to imagine what Henry Monaghan calls a “perfect” 
Constitution, one shorn of any insufferable commitments.594 
For those who profess support for originalism, there is something in 
deemphasizing the anticanon as well.  Pretending that judges rather 
than the Constitution are always responsible for the most objectiona-
ble results reinforces judicial supremacy and discourages the American 
people from taking ownership over the Constitution.  If indeed the 
Constitution may rightly, or at least not wrongly, be interpreted to em-
brace constitutional evil, then all the better that we strive constantly to 
engage with it, that we may better it through appropriate democratic 
channels. 
Much of the work of transforming how we think about the anti-
canon can perhaps be accomplished through a change in emphasis.  It 
is tempting to teach Dred Scott as part of the anticanon because of its 
devotion to racism or to originalism or to substantive due process.  But 
it is more accurate to change those “or”s to “and”s.  Legal pro-
fessionals — including, especially, law professors — might emphasize 
that what cases like Dred Scott best symbolize are not errors in consti-
tutional reasoning, but limitations upon it.  Some of those limitations 
inhere in the document itself, which might contain text that is too in-
flexible to permit a judge to come to what we now understand to be 
the correct decision.  Other limitations are imposed by traditional con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 591 See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2009).  
 592 For discussion of what he calls “the Constitution’s concessions to slavocracy,” see Alexander 
Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. 
REV. 307, 319, 319–22 (2004).  
 593 See DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO 
RATIFICATION 3–10, 81–84 (2009) (arguing that the bargain over slavery influenced, among other 
things, the Revenue Clause, the structure of the electoral college, and equal suffrage in the  
Senate). 
 594 Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 (1981). 
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ceptions of the judicial role.  In either case, these limitations should be 
discussed openly and challenged where appropriate.  Rather than suc-
cumb to, ignore, or (in vain, perhaps) seek to eliminate the anticanon, 
we might reimagine it in the service of a contextual view of the judi-
cial role. 
A venerable objection remains.  It is no longer fashionable to sug-
gest that law professors have substantial agency in influencing consti-
tutional content, or even (to a degree) method.595  Popular constitutio-
nalists and scholars of American political development have argued 
persuasively that constitutional law is fashioned through a complex 
conversation among social and political movement participants,596 elite 
opinion leaders,597 political entrepreneurs, and judges.598  In other 
work, I have argued that this process need not be limited to the sub-
stance of constitutional law, but may also influence the Court’s rhetor-
ic about, and to a lesser degree use of, methodologies that have en-
gaged relevant members of the public.599  I have argued in particular 
that political and social movement players have worked with conserv-
ative elites to emphasize and to legitimate originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.600 
According to Balkin and Levinson, participants in constitutional 
discourse — particularly law professors — may have even less control 
over the constitutional canon than they have over other aspects of con-
stitutional law.  “Much of what is canonical is not the result of con-
scious planning,” they write, “but of the serendipitous development of 
the ever-shifting contours of a culture, a discipline, or an interpretive 
community.”601  This is another way of saying that the canon is histor-
ically contingent, a point with which I agree in respect to the canon, 
the anticanon, and indeed much of constitutional lawmaking.  Balkin 
and Levinson advance the further claim that while liberal arts faculty 
members assert substantial control over the canons within their disci-
plines because “[t]hey teach the courses, assign the books, and become 
the arbiters of quality and taste in intellectual production and in sig-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 595 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (“[T]oo few law professors are producing articles or 
treatises that have direct utility for judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners . . . .”). 
 596 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Consti-
tutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 597 See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION (2009). 
 598 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SU-
PREMACY (2007); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003). 
 599 Greene, supra note 576, at 700–02. 
 600 Greene, supra note 591, at 13–14, 17; Greene, supra note 576, at 680–82. 
 601 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 995. 
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nificant parts of ‘high culture,’” constitutional law professors have 
much less control over their own academic theory canon.602  This is 
because the courts and the political branches play such an important 
mediating role in shaping the content of constitutional law and the 
agenda for constitutional theory.603 
That may well be true as a comparative claim about canon forma-
tion across academic disciplines.  But there is reason to believe it is far 
less true of the anticanon.  Historically, the players driving the content 
of the anticanon have been Black and Frankfurter, Gunther and Tribe, 
Scalia and Bork.  They have not been Margaret Sanger or Glenn Beck, 
or even Ronald Reagan or Edwin Meese III.  Movement leaders, poli-
ticians, and indeed the mass public help to create the conditions under 
which the anticanon may be invoked and to generate the stakes of an-
ticanon use; the forces that contribute to the construction of constitu-
tional law are responsible, ultimately, for the scope and substance of 
constitutional method as well.  But with respect to the anticanon, that 
process is mediated through and policed substantially by legal academ-
ics and by judges acting in their roles as advocates rather than as deci-
sionmakers.604  Unlike the canon, which is necessarily directed in part 
by the demands of positive law, the anticanon remains inert until it is 
used for some rhetorical purpose in either academic theory or legal or 
political decisionmaking.  Making use of the canon has a substantial 
element of craftsmanship, while deploying the anticanon is part and 
parcel of the art of legal persuasion.605 
CONCLUSION 
If the mission of the anticanon is to demonstrate how not to do 
constitutional law, then the anticanon is a failure.  An examination of 
the ways in which anticanonical cases have been used reveals that the 
anticanon’s lessons can be very different for different users.  Indeed, 
the uses of such cases can be so varied as to be incompatible, such that 
demonstrating how not to do constitutional law may be the function 
the anticanon performs least well.  This is not, however, ironic.  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 602 Id. at 1001. 
 603 Id. 
 604 Cf. Bartrum, supra note 17, at 368 (“Lochner is evidence that the academy . . . [can] have a 
profound impact on the constitutional canon and constitutional meanings.”). 
 605 This is not to suggest that actors outside of the legal profession neither make use of the anti-
canon nor advance claims through it.  In a 2004 presidential debate, for example, President 
George W. Bush negatively referenced Dred Scott in response to a question about the sorts of 
judges he would appoint to the Supreme Court.  President George W. Bush and Senator John F. 
Kerry Participate in the Second Presidential Debate, CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, Oct. 8, 2004.  This 
was code that conservative activists would have identified with opposition to Roe.  But Dred 
Scott does not owe its anticanonicity to anti-Roe activists, even as they help it to retain that  
status.  See section III.A.1, pp. 436–42. 
379 - 475 GREENE - BOOKPROOFS.DOC 10/29/11 – 11:45 PM 
2011] THE ANTICANON 475 
primary purpose of the anticanon is not to show how not to reason in 
constitutional cases, but rather to supply a rhetorical trump that can 
identify the limits of conventional constitutional argument under a 
guise of acting within those conventions. 
To call Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu constitutional 
martyrs seems to imply a nobility that they do not deserve.  I do not 
believe any of these cases was correctly decided, and I hope that were 
I a judge in any of the four, I would have dissented, and angrily.  But 
martyrs need not merit our admiration.  The German word blutzeuge, 
or martyr, is associated with the National Socialist Party, which used 
the term to describe those who died for the Nazi cause.606  Anticanoni-
cal cases are martyrs insofar as they are vilified out of proportion to 
their conventional errors in order to save us all from ourselves.  They 
obstruct serious engagement with the reality that constitutional inter-
pretation is often contested, unstable, and susceptible to otherwise ap-
propriate use for tragic ends.  By implying that constitutional interpre-
tation, properly performed, should always have produced the results 
we now want it to produce, that obstruction helps us to sustain an 
ideal of coherent democratic governance, over time, in a constitutional 
system.  The problem, on this view, is the temptation inherent in judi-
cial review; it is and always has been they the judges, not we the 
people. 
I do not know whether it serves us, on balance, to sustain this illu-
sion.  The anticanon is most effective when used unreflectively to de-
feat opposing claims.  And for those of us who teach lawyers how to 
construct constitutional arguments; who propagate academic theories 
meant to bring constitutional doctrine into balance; who write case-
books, file amicus briefs, and generally help, over time, to define con-
stitutional error, it is our special duty to reflect.  At the same time, so 
long as we properly understand its glorious and unreflective pluripo-
tency, the anticanon’s very existence makes obvious the essential con-
testability that lies at the heart of constitutional law, and that the best 
constitutional lawyers must internalize.  It serves us, perhaps, to rec-
ognize that supplying meaning to the anticanon is a constitutive ele-
ment of legal advocacy, and that something vital would be lost were 
we willingly to let it die. 
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 606 See Elisabeth Däumer, Blood and Witness: The Reception of Murder in the Cathedral in 
Postwar Germany, 43 COMP. LITERATURE STUD. 79, 94–96 (2006). 
